We all hate losing, but we need to keep some kind of realistic perspective on the stakes and the game.
We all hate losing, but we need to keep some kind of realistic perspective on the stakes and the game.
When I read Robert Coram’s Boyd [wc] I was fascinated. Here was a fellow who appears to have been two things: 1- a strategic genius and 2- a really fast thinker. Coram (and others, including Chuck Spinney) have long held Boyd forward as a innovator who re-invented the art of war, but I respectfully must disagree.
I think that with a procurement program like the F-35, there’s too much money at stake for anyone to point, and say out loud, “OK, this is not going to work.”
This is not a story about the F-35. It’s a story about the corrupt and broken process that brought the US taxpayers the F-35.
I’m not going to build out an exact time-line of events because it would be a waste of time.
This is another F-35 story. I know you’re probably thinking “when will this end?” and all I can say is: when the money-pump runs dry.
I am really on the fence about this one.
Shiro Ishii goes right in the book next to Josef Mengele; a “failed intellectual” in the description of William Shirer (The Rise and Fall of The Third Reich) who noted that many of Hitler’s nihilistic genociders were, like Hitler himself, academics and philosophically-inclined people who veered off the normal track and careened into the dark woods.
Back in 2017, [I am tempted to add, “when I was still naive and optimistic”] I posted a bit about “operators” I spotted in pictures of the “rebels” in Libya.
My recent post about F-35s rapidly re-oriented toward the topic of “flying weapons systems that might actually work” so I’d like to speculate a bit. Any of my speculations are informed by some of the excellent SF (C. J. Cherryh, Joe Haldeman) and my experience with computer networking.
