I think that with a procurement program like the F-35, there’s too much money at stake for anyone to point, and say out loud, “OK, this is not going to work.”
I think that with a procurement program like the F-35, there’s too much money at stake for anyone to point, and say out loud, “OK, this is not going to work.”
This is not a story about the F-35. It’s a story about the corrupt and broken process that brought the US taxpayers the F-35.
This is another F-35 story. I know you’re probably thinking “when will this end?” and all I can say is: when the money-pump runs dry.
When you start to track problems with the F-35, you may discover that the problems have problems and that there are whole other branches of problems that you haven’t heard of, yet. It certainly makes me wonder if, perhaps, the whole thing is made up of problems; it’s possible. As long as the taxpayers are footing the bill, who cares?
Maybe I should start a trend: when I’m sad or lonely, I can just google “F-35 problem” and I’ll be laughing until it hurts in no time.
This is one that, I admit, never occurred to me, either. The fact that it did not is profoundly embarrassing. Ready for a little F-35 bashing?
When I started seeing stories about this, my immediate reaction is “someone’s lying.” That’s a given, because exaggerating things just a bit is built into every part of the fabric of US military procurement. As is secrecy, greed, and other bits of Lovecraftian evil. So, take everything here with a grain of salt because public information is mighty thin, right now.
We are presented with a conundrum:
There’s an article on hackaday [h] about a model-builder who is trying to make an ultra-realistic model F-35.
The F-35 program has been a litany of glitches and problems, many as a result of the program’s pork distribution approach.