Do you see what I see?
OK, let me give you a hint:
What is that big beige box?
It is a fucking copy machine. You know, like the kind of thing you might run a stack of those documents through, and make copies of them? One of those?
I can’t identify the brand but here’s another fun thing about “office” copy machines: they all keep internal logs of things like how many sheets were copied at what time on what day. That would correlate nicely, don’t you think, with surveillance video?
I don’t expect there would be video of Trump copying classified documents, as that would be non golf-related work. But it would sure be interesting to see if anyone had used that copier, and maybe ask them pointedly what they were copying and why.
Personally, I doubt that all the hulabaloo about TS/SCI documents is particularly important. I mean, it’s important in so far as it can be hung around Trump’s neck like a millstone, then pushed out of a helicopter at exactly 1 mile altitude. The US overclassifies materials to a ridiculous degree. Of course, there is important stuff, like the “collateral murder” video – the US loves to classify its worst mistakes and war crimes. I’m just a bit skeptical about the value of most of the stuff we are talking about. All that stuff about “placing the entire nation at risk” is just nationalist rah-rah.
There are definitely cases where intelligence leaks get people killed. And those are terribly important to the people that get killed.
Examples abound. When Aldrich Ames walked out of CIA HQ with the Soviet double agent/defector list and sold it to the KGB, those people were rounded up fairly quickly, and they died.
I once heard a fun story about copiers and secrecy, and I believe it is public knowledge and no longer top secret since that operation was blown in the early 90s. The CIA made an arrangement with a couple of copy machine companies, to produce versions of their copiers for the export (read: Russian, but maybe also Iranian) market. Copiers are just an imaging system, with a computer inside, and a laser printer. So, the CIA copiers had a hard disk attached to the computer, which kept FAX resolution versions of everything the copier copied. Then, those copiers were sold to … the KGB, Russian Army, etc. Fancy office copiers used to have the ability to flag the administrator (“I need more toner!” or “I need maintenance!”) and a copier repair guy who worked for the CIA would come out, offload the hard drive, reset it, and add some toner and reboot the thing. The impression I got from the guy who told me about this (who was the NSA’s Chief Scientist, RTM Sr.) was that the program worked fabulously well until Ames or Hanssen, or one of those guys blew the operation. When they talk about “compromising sources and methods” they’re talking about the copier repairman who responded to a call in a Russian military facility, walked over to the copier, and was surrounded by 20 KGB agents. Bad day. Worst day.