Jayman raises an interesting point regarding Leibniz’ cosmological argument (as summarized by Pruss).
Pruss’ second point is: “there is a contingent fact that includes all other contingent facts.” Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that the material universe is not contingent. Nonetheless you seem to admit that there are contingent facts. This entails that there is a contingent fact that includes all other contingent facts (the union of all contingent facts).
I’m not sure what point Jayman thought he was proving by that, but it does suggest an interesting line of philosophical inquiry.
Suppose we define Reality as the union of all facts (i.e. the set which contains all facts). Notice I did not say “contingent facts” but simply “facts.” This is quite deliberate, since Leibniz wants to reason from the existence of contingent facts to the existence of a “necessary being” (which he wishes to identify with the Christian God). Obviously, this necessary being must also be part of Reality, since the set of all contingent facts cannot be explained by a “necessary being” that does not actually exist in Reality. Thus, if we consider Reality to be the set of all facts, including the fact of “necessary being,” then Reality must necessarily contain the explanation of its own existence. Since the existence of Reality is necessary in order to explain the existence of any god or gods which may happen to exist, it follows once again that Reality is not contingent (since it contains the explanation of its own existence) but any and all gods are contingent (since their existence requires the existence of Reality as at least part of the explanation for their own existence). The only possible God, therefore, is the pantheistic Alethea, QED.
Next, I was going to look at the set of all sets which do not contain themselves, but it’s Sunday, and I’m lazy…