Objective morality, whatever that is


I have lost what little taste I ever had for arguing with theists. It just leaves me feeling like I’m wasting my time — I’ll let Matt Dillahunty do the debates.

I got a request to join a fellow I don’t know, William Whiting, in a “fun conversation” for a podcast, for something called BasedFaithTV. Having a conversation, I can do. Unfortunately, this was just a guy aggressively asserting his Catholicism at me, and while it did start out amusing, it degenerated into an exercise session for his bigotry. It was not fun.

We got mired in a discussion about “objective morality” with no attempt to define what that is. He said he had an objective morality, while I did not (there was a lot of atheist bashing going on). It developed that what he called “objective morality” could be more accurately described as an authoritarian morality — he possessed the absolute truth granted to him by a transcendent god, therefore he was always right and I was just wallowing in the world of my subjective feelings. I guess that’s one way to define it, but I don’t think he can defend the idea that he knows what the truth is. It all boiled down to the Bible (and the Church fathers and Catholic dogma) says it, therefore he believes it. Early on, he said that he thought it would be great if the Church got a zealous Pope who would lead all Catholics on a crusade to reconquer Europe and the Middle East, which tells you something about his moral compass.

I don’t accept that version of “objective morality”. I also don’t hold a different definition, that objective morality is a universal, not subject to interpretation, because, well, we don’t know what that universal truth is. Maybe there is some moral nature immanent in ourselves, bestowed upon us by a god or by natural selection, but if so, we live lives where we struggle to discern what the best way to live is. Some people seem to think they’ve found it in their holy book, but I’m pretty sure that just leads to horror when they get their way — see the idea of purifying Europe for the Catholic church as an example. I’d also agree that atheism doesn’t exempt one from that flaw. He brought up the Communist purges, and all I can do is agree. Those were horrible catastrophes led by atheists who believed in an objective morality defined by their ideology — or more likely, saw that ideology as a tool to grasp at power.

So this is an argument that objective morality is a good thing? I don’t get it.

I personally favor the idea that an objective morality is one independent of one’s personal, subjective, transient desires, and in that sense atheists can be objectively moral. Maybe I can think I’d sure like to steal that candy from that baby, but I don’t, because I think outside my immediate impulses. I can empathize with the child — they’d be distressed and unhappy if I snatched away their sweet, and I think that I wouldn’t want to live in a world where strangers could steal my candy. I can think about consequences. I don’t want to be beat up by the baby’s mother, and I don’t want a reputation as a candy thief. I can think rationally and objectively about what kind of society would be best for me and my children, and it’s one with some accepted rules of behavior.

I don’t have possession of an absolute truth, but I can try to approach it by trial and error, trying to minimize the likelihood of my personal extinction (that’s the final arbiter of morality!), by seeing beyond the gratification of my personal impulses. That’s what an objective morality is to me — I do things I don’t like right now, because I’m capable of seeing the rewards of doing what others would like, and building a culture of mutual aid and shared community. In a sense, part of that is built in and part of human nature, since we are social animals, but there are so many different ways of building that self-supporting culture that we can’t claim one absolute way to truth.

Oh, also…I mentioned to him that I once had a debate with a Jesuit priest who impressed me greatly with his humanity and his tolerance, and that he seemed to have a very different interpretation of what Catholic morality involved, and it was the antithesis of Mr Whiting’s views. So much for an “objective morality” founded on Catholicism, because ideas there seemed to be highly diverse. His answer? That guy wasn’t a true Catholic, he was a heretic.

This conversation went on way too long and way too frustratingly, but lost any appeal near the end, when he started arguing that, as an example of absolute objective morality, gay and trans people are irreparably wrong and must repent. That’s not a pleasant conversation. That’s a guy using his claims of perfect knowledge of morality to deny the right to exist to people he doesn’t like, while claiming his bigotry is not at all subjective. I could laugh at him at the beginning, but when he tried to deny the humanity of so many people, I was increasingly dismayed and angry with this asshole, and eventually just cut him off. If he posts his podcast, I’ll let you all know, but I’ll tell you now that you won’t enjoy it.

He tried to claim that America today is his vision of Hell, because of all our liberal policies and the way liberals dominate everything. I should have realized then that he was calling from an alternate universe. Imagine his version of paradise on Earth: a European Reconquista by a militant Catholic church, followed by outlawing gay and trans people, among other regressive actions. And that is his vision of an “objective morality”.

He wants to continue our conversation. I don’t think so. I don’t talk with bigots.

Comments

  1. bobinger1833 says

    If there is objective morality, the world seems to operate without knowing it…as if it’s all subjective.
    Just like evolution. If god did create everything, he sure seemed to make it look just like he used evolution to do it.
    Occam’s Razor says theists are just like us but they add that one more (unnecessary) step.

  2. lochaber says

    “BasedFaithTV”

    The name alone seems like a red flag to me.

    Not always, but most of the time when I see people use “Based”, it’s often some flavor of bigot…

  3. kingoftown says

    So Jesuits (such as the current pope) are heretics? As a devout Catholic I take it he thinks the pope is heir to St Peter, god’s representative on earth and infallible. I wonder how he justifies that in his head.

  4. hemidactylus says

    Objective morality presumes something tangible out there to be discovered. We get silly unidimensional systems like Kant’s overbearing categorical imperative where we cannot lie to Nazis to protect hidden Jews. Or we get utilitarianism or eudaemonia (Sam Harris FMRI tube) seeking greatest good or well being to the detriment of the kid suffering in the broom closet in Omelas. Hence need for socially constructed rights to protect against tyrannical majorities.

    Morality and ethics exist within an intersubjective space of Habermasian consensus seeking where people argue based on their factual knowledge of the how the world works, internalized value systems, and subjective preferences and try to hash out good/bad and right/wrong. IMO a good start for a pluralistic moral matrix is WD Ross’s prima facie duties. There’s give and take and some stuff will conflict with other stuff.

  5. says

    Well, he was looking forward to the current Pope being replaced by a more zealous Pope, so maybe he just thinks the current Pope is weak. Maybe heretical. I don’t know, I didn’t dig too deeply into his twisted world.

  6. says

    Like most Bible thumpers, he has evidently never read the Bible. It contains innumerable contradictions, including contradictory statements about morality. It also contains many moral instructions that he very clearly does not observe, including for example a requirement that priests conduct a ceremony to induce abortion when a man suspects his wife of being unfaithful. I could write an entire book about this subject, but it isn’t really necessary to say any more here. We all know that any claim to deriving moral precepts from the Bible requires cherry picking, and furthermore that a good deal of Catholic doctrine has no basis in the Bible whatever. That fact alone would seem to cut the legs off his argument.

  7. raven says

    However long your conversation lasted with this guy, you lasted far longer than I would have.
    I would have made it 10 seconds, the time it takes to get up and run away.

    Catholics are so moral that they’ve killed tens of millions over the centuries in one atrocity after another. We have the Inquisition, the witch hunts, the Albigensian genocide, the crusades (several of which were against other xians), the Holocaust (which was originally planned out by a notorious Catholic turned heretic named Martin Luther), assorted random Pogroms of the Jews, the conquest of the New World (partial credit) which resulted in the near eradication of the native population, and the Reformation wars.

    I’m sure I’m leaving some Catholic mass murders out here. It’s hard to keep track after 2,000 years. Oh yeah, the continual slaughter of the Pagans as xianity took over Europe.

    The Albigensian genocide is notable for its success. The RCC killed over 1 million people. You will never meet an Albigensian. They managed to kill every single one of them.

    My ancestors fought against the Catholics in the Reformation wars.
    Against my other ancestors who were…Catholics.

  8. Snarki, child of Loki says

    “He tried to claim that America today is his vision of Hell”

    Well, Texas, certainly.

  9. moralatheist says

    I agree there is no objective morality. However, you can objectively prove that some moral systems are wrong. It sounds like this person’s moral system falls into that category.

    (I’m the author of a book called “Ask Yourself to Be Moral,” so I’m rather passionate on this subject.)

  10. says

    He tried to claim that America today is his vision of Hell…

    Did he say which country was closest to his vision of Heaven?

    Imagine his version of paradise on Earth: a European Reconquista by a militant Catholic church…

    Or an even more militant Holy Russian Empire. Last I checked, his Church was at least talking about some sort of reunification with Eastern Orthodoxy.

    Objective morality presumes something tangible out there to be discovered…

    No, it’s not “out THERE,” it’s “out HERE,” in the observable, predictable consequences of our actions; outside of our heads, but not at all outside of our observed environment and experiences.

  11. outis says

    You are way too patient, suffering such fools. He sounds blinkered to say the least, yet there’s many thinking those exact thoughts, how I’ll never understand.
    And concerning communist purges, I’d say there’s very little difference between those and pogroms, or inquisition’s genocides: such things happen when an authoritarian system gets the upper hand and start mowing down people en masse, just to give a lil’ tickle to their ideals of perfection. And to unleash their sadism, of course, which is never very far from the surface.

  12. says

    I agree there is no objective morality. However, you can objectively prove that some moral systems are wrong.

    First you deny the existence of the moral foundation of every single progressive and social-justice movement in human history; then you contradict yourself. That’s not exactly a great way to sell your book.

  13. ORigel says

    @12

    There is probably no objective morality. People tend to conform to the morality of tribes they identify with (it’s obviously more complex than that, of course), and progressives are a collection of overlapping tribes.

    It’s not ARBITRARY, though, because if you value what most progressives value (i.e. happiness, fairness, empathy), you would likely come to the conclusion that progressive policies are better than radical, reactionary, conservative, or centrist policies.

    Progressive and social justice groups NEED to say that morality is objective, to keep people believing in objective moral progress.

  14. ORigel says

    @12

    There is probably no objective morality. People tend to conform to the morality of tribes they identify with (it’s obviously more complex than that, of course), and progressives are a collection of overlapping tribes.

    It’s not ARBITRARY, though, because if you value what most progressives value (i.e. happiness, fairness, empathy), you would likely come to the conclusion that progressive policies are better than radical, reactionary, conservative, or centrist policies.

    Progressive and social justice groups NEED to say that morality is objective, to keep people believing in objective moral progress.

  15. says

    There is probably no objective morality.

    Actually, since people advocating some form of morality based on observation of real-world consequences of our actions have easily refuted contrary forms of morality, I feel pretty safe in saying there DEFINITELY IS objective morality.

    People tend to conform to the morality of tribes they identify with (it’s obviously more complex than that, of course)…

    Yeah, it’s WAY more complex than that, of course.

  16. Chris J says

    I don’t know if this would ever work, but if I got stuck in a conversation with this sort of person, I’d be interested in presenting some tough but mundane circumstances for them to resolve with their “objective morality.” Things that have nothing to do with the big political fights like abortion or lgbt rights, and that may not have just one moral answer.

    The trolly problem could be one, but maybe also whether it’s moral to call the police on someone experiencing a mental episode knowing that police often just shoot the person instead of helping, or something like that. The point would not be to get an answer, but for them to back up an answer clearly and incontrovertibly with their “objective morality,” for situations that just would never have happened in the time of the bible.

    The moment they start needing interpretation to discern the answer, they’re done. The hope would be that they’d be less over-confident in their answer if it doesn’t have to do with the big political fights they’re used to.

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  18. Pierce R. Butler says

    “Morals”, etymologically, means the mores of a given society – intrinsically variable and relativistic, as anyone who’s traveled much can tell you. Sheer practicality dictates you’ll have fewer problems if, when in Romania, you do as the Romanians do.

    … I wouldn’t want to live in a world where strangers could steal my candy. I can think about consequences. I don’t want to be beat up by the baby’s mother, and I don’t want a reputation as a candy thief. I can think rationally and objectively about what kind of society would be best for me and my children…

    I have a tentative thesis that optimum morality derives from a consideration of consequences, the longer-term and wider-spread the better. However, I lack the patience with philosopherese to dig into the study of what they call “consequentialism”, so will probably remain in my personal morass of improvisational semi-ethics for life.

  19. says

    Dear Prof. Myers,
    You are an intelligent, thoughtful, moral person. (Pardon the following mixed metaphor) Please stop taking the bait. ‘Discussing’ anything with religious (or political) zealots is like trying to reason with a rattlesnake about to strike. Fanatics are almost impossible to ‘de-fang’ and it is a very dangerous business. I gave up ‘discussing’ with those types a long time ago.

  20. ardipithecus says

    @20

    That assumes your target is the fanatic. Your targets are those in the audience who have not yet adopted the fanatic’s way of thinking.
    The rise in white supremacy in recent years is at least in part due to a decline in people in authority challenging the doctrine.

  21. says

    “Morals”, etymologically, means the mores of a given society – intrinsically variable and relativistic…

    That definition doesn’t mean such mores are not, or cannot be, based on objective circumstances. And no, such mores are not “intrinsically variable and relativistic;” there’s no physical law saying they can’t be at least partially based on observation of real-world consequences.

  22. John Harshman says

    Usually, I just shout “Euthyphro” and let them make standard lame responses. That whole argument should have died after Socrates (or perhaps Plato) skewered it.

  23. Pierce R. Butler says

    Raging Bee @ # 22: … there’s no physical law saying they can’t be at least partially based on observation of real-world consequences.

    Which also tend to vary with circumstances: f’rinstance, the development of contraceptives made a huge difference in “real-world consequences” of sexuality which much of the world still has not caught up to (including many of those proclaiming “liberation!” who don’t seem to account for many people still getting hurt by all-out disinhibition).

  24. pacal says

    The idea that “Objective Morality” is what God says is moral is hilarious. It amounts to might makes right. In otherwords it is indeed authortarian.

    When this pointed out all sorts of bad arguments are made. My favorite is variations of you can’t question God.

    What is also funny is when you point out the ban passages of the Bible, those believers in absolute morality find mass murder moral suddenly and some even talk about the absolute, objective morality imposed by God not applying to God.

    It is rather funny.

  25. pacal says

    No. 23 John Harshman

    I am not all that impressed by Euthyphro. The dialogue is all about the defining “Piety”, and has usual in Plato’s dialogues there is no perfect definition. It was all part of Plato’s little game of claiming that since certain people could not think of perfect defintions they were not really that smart. In other dialogues Plato talks about defining what is an Ass or a Shoe, well Plato ignored that people may not be able to define perfectly an “Ass” or “Shoe”, but the vast majority certainly still knew what a shoe or Ass was. After all shoes and Asses were bought everyday in Athens. A Shoemaker could indeed make a Shoe, meanwhile a Philosopher still can’t perfectly define anything.

    As for the dialogue itself. The context is Euthyphro going to the Law Courts to lay a murder charge against his Father. (Why Euthyhro tries to do so is the result of certain features of Athenian Law. The alleged victim was a poor Athenian Citizen.) The whole dialogue starts with the notion that Euthyhro must have some iron clad idea of “Piety” in order to lay such a charge against his own Father. We then get the familar Platonic games of negative dialectic and the search for a perfect definition.

    What I find most fascinating is the barely disguised disbelief from the Socrates character in the dialogue of a son charging his own Father for murder of a poor Athenian and the notion one must have a perfect definition of “Piety” to do something like that. But then Plato’s contempt for the Athenian poor Citizen was quite large.

    I note there is little to no discussion about whether or not it was “Pious” for Euthyhro’s Father to try up a man and leave him to die in a ditch.

  26. birgerjohansson says

    PZ Myers @ 25
    Too bad we cannot summon zombie Groucho Marx, he had a way with words when in a conversation with eejits.

  27. Akira MacKenzie says

    Morality is like money. It “exists,” but it doesn’t really. It’s a necessary social construction designed to help our species live with one another. Of course, people are going to disagree just what that construction should entail and some of it is based on irrationality or superstition as well as callousness and selfishness, thus we have the chaotic scramble between various schools of ethics vying to dictate the direction of humanity, Cat-licks like your opponent included.

    However, the joke is that our unconscious, uncaring universe doesn’t give two shits about what we do to ourselves or each other. Even horrors like the Holocaust are insignificant hiccups that no one will recall once H. sapiens have gone extinct.

    Or, to put it another way: Ph’nglui mglw’nafh Cthulhu R’lyeh wgah’nagl fhtagn.

  28. ardipithecus says

    If the lust for power is one’s motivating force, then beheading one’s rivals, massacring armies, raping, and pillaging cities may all become moral acts. The history of civilization is pervated with that kind of morality.

    Morality is subjective, but humans are great at rationalizing objective justifications for our subjective perspectives. One might say that rationalization is our superpower.

  29. says

    ardipithecus: just because someone decides his own lust for power is the only thing that matters, doesn’t mean all morality is subjective. (Just for starters, there will be plenty of people asking whether it benefits them to let that one guy have whatever he wants.) Lots of people also refuse to accept the theory of evolution, but that doesn’t mean biology is subjective.

  30. says

    @21 ardipithecus ; @20 That assumes your target is the fanatic. Your targets are those in the audience who have not yet adopted the fanatic’s way of thinking.
    The rise in white supremacy . . . in part due to a decline in people in authority challenging the doctrine.

    I did not assume the fanatic to be the only target. And, there are few in the fanatic’s audience that have ‘not yet adopted the fanatic’s way of thinking.’ However, you are right, not challenging rtwing xtian terrorists in some way only allows them to continue. Finding those willing to listen to reasoning and admit the murderous hateful intent of these rtwing xtian terrorists must be abandoned/stopped is more effective.

    And, remember “NO ONE EXPECTS THE SPANISH INQUISITION’

  31. says

    replying to @30 Akira MacKenzie,

    Yes, social constructs are nebulous and numerous. Morality and ethics as concepts have often been twisted into grotesque things.

    And, the actions and words of these rtwing xtian terrorists are hastening our extinction. Extinction is mother nature’s way of saying, “you don’t get to screw things up anymore!”

  32. ORigel says

    @15
    1. You are assuming consequentialism; there are other schools of ethics.

    Even assuming consequentialism, the right thing to do varies depending on the goal you select. For example, certain policies tend to drastically reduce gun violence, and that would be considered “right” by people who want to reduce gun violence, but not by those who don’t care about reducing gun violence. If you argue with pro-gun people about being hypocrites, that rational people would want a society with less violence on grounds of both empathy and self-interest…if gun nuts value their right to carry murder tools over consistency, then gun control is not right– from their point of view.

    It gets starker with totally different cultures, or hypothetical ETs who might well have totally different nervous systems.

  33. woozy says

    Atheists can’t be moral, as objective morality comes from God seems to have as much validity as the argument, Atheists can’t eat food, as food comes from God.

  34. ORigel says

    @32
    Evolution is about reality; morality is about what we ought to do, or be, or value.

    If most people disagree with a wannabe dictator, it doesn’t mean morality is objective. It means their view is more popular, and counter to most people’s values.

    Imagine if you are a dyed-in-the-wool utilitarian, and you find out that God exists. God has infinite capacity for happiness, and is happy when people obey Him. Wouldn’t the utilitarian thing to do would be to do whatever God says, because all of humanity has an infinitesimal capacity for happiness compared to God?
    Or would you be on Team Humanity, provided you could press a button and incapacitate/kill that monster of a God?

  35. says

    You are assuming consequentialism; there are other schools of ethics.

    Yes, I’m assuming consequentialism because that’s what this thread is about — whether objective morality exists and what it means if it does.

    Even assuming consequentialism, the right thing to do varies depending on the goal you select.

    True, but: a) goals themselves are often determined by real-world needs and circumstances; and b) people will reason from real-world facts and consequences to decide what must be done to best achieve the goals.

    It gets starker with totally different cultures, or hypothetical ETs who might well have totally different nervous systems.

    Yes and no: different cultures and species will derive different mores based on objective facts of their nature, needs, environments and experiences, just as our mores are derived from objective facts of our natures, needs, environments and experiences. Our fact-based morality will be objectively valid for us, and theirs will be just as objectively valid for them.

  36. says

    Evolution is about reality; morality is about what we ought to do, or be, or value.

    Yes, and the latter is also derived in large measure from reality.

  37. consciousness razor says

    ORigel:

    Evolution is about reality;

    Rocks and electrons and the Declaration of Independence are part of reality, but evolution is not about any of them. Meanwhile, the belief which some people have that ghosts are real is certainly “about reality,” but it is still not the case that ghosts exist.

    It doesn’t sound to me like being “about reality” counts for very much. And I figure what you wanted to say with the statement above is not what you actually did say. (So, in more or less the same boat as most everything else in this thread….)

    morality is about what we ought to do, or be, or value.

    When people say that we ought to believe that evolution is real, is there no truth to that statement? (Or if you’re not disagreeing with Raging Bee in #32, then what’s this for?)

    Which of the two buckets are we supposed to put that that kind of statement in, that evolution is real? Could it be both or neither? Something else? Are there any other buckets, and where would we put the statement that there are (or are not) such things? If we just kept talking about this stuff, would we need an endless supply of new buckets as we go, or could it ever come to an end?

  38. Jemolk says

    That there is some objective morality is the stance most generally popular among philosophers. Ethicists especially. That should say something. Now, what we (philosophers) mean by objective in this sense is that it is not dependent on the contents of any mind or set of minds. This guy’s claimed morality would be regarded as subjective by philosophers, in that it depends on the contents of a particular mind — their god’s, in this case. That is what it means for morality to be subjective in philosophical terms.

    Subjectivism, meanwhile, can be classed as a kind of “non-realism” when it comes to morality, because even the stronger intersubjective variants can still be reduced, often with ease, to arbitrariness. Subjectivism means that people can choose their own morality, and intersubjectivity only means they have to choose from the plurality of moralities of many groups they belong to. It means no moral progress, and no right or wrong that can be seen externally. Without some degree of objectivity, our common understanding of morality simply does not function. Now, none of this is to say that we necessarily have found the correct version of morality, or that there exists anyone right now who is implementing it. Objectivists need not be convinced that it is known; only that it is in principle knowable.

    @35 — Yes, there are other schools of ethics. Consequentialism is merely the one that is most compatible with both objectivity and physicalism simultaneously. (It’s got other benefits too, but there’s no need to get into those right now.) There’s a reason naturalistic objectivists (that is to say, people who believe that objective morality exists, and its prescriptions arise inherently from formations of natural circumstances) like myself tend to be consequentialists. As for the goal you select — this isn’t about selecting goals. That would put it firmly in the subjectivist camp. The idea that it’s right, independent of any person or group’s thoughts on the matter, to minimize suffering and maximize happiness is not really that outrageous, and eminently defensible. How you do that depends on circumstance and is a matter of complex judgment, but what the target is is not a matter of individual choice.

  39. says

    PZ: Thanks for writing this.

    This is probably one the most clear and nuanced writing on the subject that I’ve seen recently.

  40. ORigel says

    @41 Sounds like a fallacious argument from bad consequences. To have a relatively-stable society, we don’t need morality to be objective. Rather, we need a large proportion of people to BELIEVE in objective morality and the possibility of moral progress. And societies where most people are trained starting from a very young age to believe the moral code of their society/tribe is correct, resulting in a limited range of values.

  41. ORigel says

    @40

    There is subjective truth in the statement, “we ought to believe evolution is true” (many people think so, primarily those who accept evolution as true and value people believing what is true) but not objective truth.

    However, “Evolution is true” is objectively correct.

  42. ORigel says

    @40

    There is subjective truth in the statement, “we ought to believe evolution is true” (many people think so, primarily those who accept evolution as true and value people believing what is true) but not objective truth.

    However, “Evolution is true” is objectively correct.

  43. ORigel says

    @39

    There are multiple systems of ethics compatible with reality, including negative utilitarianism (minimizing suffering– and the best way to do that is to cause a mass extinction event). No more people, no more suffering of people. It is also compatible with regular utilitarianism, and total happiness utilitarianism…

    Virtue ethics, rigid deontology, non-Randian egoism…a good number of incompatible systems even if you throw out falsehoods like Rand’s Objectivism and Kant’s ethics and DCT.

  44. consciousness razor says

    There is subjective truth in the statement, […] but not objective truth.

    What is subjective truth? Is it in the room with you right now?

  45. says

    There is subjective truth in the statement, “we ought to believe evolution is true” … but not objective truth.

    Actually, yes, that statement is based on the objective truth of evolution, and on the need to perceive and acknowledge reality. That’s two objective truths the statement is based on, so it’s not merely a “subjective truth.”

  46. DanDare says

    I like to get assholes like that to support slavery as supported by the bible, and help them get wound around their own axis.

    Regards objective morality. The Is of Ought.
    We have instincts as evolved creatures.
    In order of most prevalent and hardest to override:
    Self preservation
    Have sex
    Care for children
    These just “is” for good evolutionary reasons.
    Living with other, cooperating humans generally plays to those instincts. Sometimes against.
    Empathy helps for living in groups, but is not fixed in our populations. Many without it take advantage of those with it so there may be a trade off at work.
    So our “oughts” become objective evaluations of the situation to best achieve or foundational instincts.
    There are many paths, some better in some circumstances than others.
    That is how we arrive at objective morality.
    We also try to codify this to get everyone on board with some optimal way of living together. Laws are part of that. Scriptures and stories about gods are an old way of doing it. Culture is a more broad method. Each can build up inequity . Scriptures are more egregious than Laws as they become immutable, locking in ignorance and old prejudices.

  47. Jemolk says

    @43 — It’s really not. It’s a reductio ad absurdum. These are consequences of embracing subjective morality — that there can be no moral progress; that calling Nazis evil has no truth value; that a murderer could be morally correct so long as they are internally consistent. Are you willing to accept these things? If you are, then the reductio fails. Most are not; hence, it generally succeeds.

  48. bcw bcw says

    Emo Philips on the one true religion:

    Once I saw this guy on a bridge about to jump. I said, “Don’t do it!” He said, “Nobody loves me.” I said, “God loves you. Do you believe in God?”

    He said, “Yes.” I said, “Are you a Christian or a Jew?” He said, “A Christian.” I said, “Me, too! Protestant or Catholic?” He said, “Protestant.” I said, “Me, too! What franchise?” He said, “Baptist.” I said, “Me, too! Northern Baptist or Southern Baptist?” He said, “Northern Baptist.” I said, “Me, too! Northern Conservative Baptist or Northern Liberal Baptist?”

    He said, “Northern Conservative Baptist.” I said, “Me, too! Northern Conservative Baptist Great Lakes Region, or Northern Conservative Baptist Eastern Region?” He said, “Northern Conservative Baptist Great Lakes Region.” I said, “Me, too!”

    Northern Conservative†Baptist Great Lakes Region Council of 1879, or Northern Conservative Baptist Great Lakes Region Council of 1912?” He said, “Northern Conservative Baptist Great Lakes Region Council of 1912.” I said, “Die, heretic!” And I pushed him over.

  49. John Morales says

    Jemolk @50,

    These are consequences of embracing subjective morality — that there can be no moral progress; that calling Nazis evil has no truth value; that a murderer could be morally correct so long as they are internally consistent.

    You seem confused, since you apparently imagine this is an objection to the concept of subjective morality.

    For one thing, if morality is subjective, then moral propositions have truth value according to the subject.
    For another, morality is applied ethics, and there can be ethical progress (the knowledge-base) without concomitant moral progress (what is actually done).

    (There are other aspects, but suffice it unto the comment)

  50. John Morales says

    Well, just one more. Can’t resist. Uses your own style of claim:

    There are consequences of not embracing subjective morality, inasmuch as that to whatever degree of difference exists between one’s apprehension of objective morality (which presumably is the one one embraces and practices (see why I mentioned ethics?)) and another’s, that difference constitutes immorality and the degree of difference constitutes the severity of that immorality.

    So one, in order to improve overall morality, would have to become authoritarian and actually impose that morality, no?

    (No such requirement for moral subjectivists)

  51. John Morales says

    Raging Bee, um, what is this “the OBJECTIVE morality based on fact” to which you refer?

    Somehow, I’ve missed it.

    (Surely not Sam Harris’ version!)

  52. raven says

    Completely OT but interesting to many people.

    kcra.com
    5:30 p.m.: The new all-time high for downtown Sacramento is 116 degrees as of 5:30 p.m., KCRA 3 Meteorologist Heather Waldman reports. Stockton also tied its record high of 115 degrees today.

    California is a mess right now.
    A record heat wave and the electricity grid is struggling with rolling blackouts.

    That 116 F. is 46.7 degrees C.

    It was hotter in Death Valley but not by much at 121 F.
    The other difference is that almost no one lives in Death Valley while 2.6 million people live in metro Sacramento.

  53. hemidactylus says

    @56- Raging Bee
    Nope. Those who assert an objective morality are proposing it to be something tangible or discoverable. So where is it then? If not found it is a matter of fiat or a better yet an unfulfilled promissory note. @30 Akira MacKenzie hinted at this in comparing it to money, which is the textbook case of social construction. I’m not a fan of social construction when it comes to what are brute facts of the world out there addressable by science, but morality is more on the social construction side of things. There are perhaps social facts that play into how morality is constructed (social institutions, traditions, contracts, etc), but going too far in that direction collapses the very useful distinction between fact (is) and value (ought).

    We inject our values into the world and presume this to be objective fact, but it’s merely a way for us to interpret facts and make decisions based on value systems that are based on all sorts of abstract things— rights, duties, virtues, well-being etc. I wouldn’t go so far as to say morality is entirely subjective. Being in a space of intersubjectivity it takes more than one person to come together and hash out agreements on best ways to act and what values are most salient. But there isn’t some preformed objectively moral fact found by microscope or dissection method. Subjective whim and egoism are bad ways to ground morality though.

    As I said earlier in this thread I find WD Ross’s pluralistic form of deontology useful. Instead of finding an objective morality as some sort of world mirroring fact correspondence like objectivist epistemology would for scientific pursuits, I’d go with a more pragmatic “what works”. BTW eudaimonia or utilitarian ethics are subsumed under Ross’s duty of beneficence. But as a matter of conflict to be hashed out what if maximizing well-being or maximizing good for all conflicts with a promise (fidelity duty) or duty of non-maleficence (greatest good means someone gets thrown under the bus)?

    I actually think Hume’s guillotine has been overdone as facts are often necessary though insufficient in making moral decisions. I don’t think he meant to divorce the two. I think Owen Flanagan makes arguments that put Hume’s distinction in its place. And Moore’s naturalistic fallacy about the good as Platonic eidos being beyond analysis or definability has been overdone and often misapplied. Yuck! I prefer Hume’s fact-value distinction but toned down.

  54. consciousness razor says

    John Morales, #53:

    There are consequences of not embracing subjective morality, inasmuch as that to whatever degree of difference exists between one’s apprehension of objective morality (which presumably is the one one embraces and practices (see why I mentioned ethics?)) and another’s, that difference constitutes immorality and the degree of difference constitutes the severity of that immorality.

    That’s about like saying that, if someone believes that two plus two is not equal to four, then it must be the case that their wrongness is calculated by taking the difference between their (subjectively chosen?) answer and the number four.* Where this rule is supposed to come from, nobody can say, because it’s just bullshit and not logically entailed by any of this.

    Leaving aside that analogy, if I think (as I do) that homosexuality isn’t immoral while someone else thinks it is, they are just mistaken about that. It just isn’t immoral, and the basic reason why is that it’s not harming anyone, which is not merely my own apprehension but a straightforward fact (whether or not they know or believe this).

    It doesn’t follow that it is more (or less) severe depending on their belief that it is more (or less) bad, because such beliefs are false; and nothing follows from those beliefs which has any bearing on the truth (that it isn’t harmful). Because they’re false.

    You wouldn’t normally attempt to “derive” true stuff is this way, would you? If someone believes (falsely) that the Earth is flat, then what are we supposed to take away from that about its shape or the extent or type or degree of its roundness? How is it relevant what they thought? Does a mere belief like that (a false one) entail anything about the world or have any effects at all, besides of course the obvious effects that believers sometimes express them and act on them?

    *If you said -5 (mod 9), you’re still doing alright, by the way.

  55. hemidactylus says

    If objective morality is sold as something nobody has yet to stumble upon or grasp as of yet but is still in principle discoverable the retort “Ok if you say so…” kinda points to its fiat nature. Command morality from a deity or dictator aren’t the only sorts of fiat. There’s also fiat money not backed by anything solid, taken on faith in its value.

  56. John Morales says

    Indeed, CR. It’s not a very sturdy comment. Though I think it withstands your criticism. Anyway, that’s why I noted “Uses your own style of claim” to preface it.

    That’s about like saying that, if someone believes that two plus two is not equal to four, then it must be the case that their wrongness is calculated by taking the difference between their (subjectively chosen?) answer and the number four.

    No, if you want to make an apposite analogy, it’s about like if someone believes that two plus two is not equal to four, then it must be the case that it is wrong and the magnitude of that wrongness is calculated by taking the difference between their (subjectively chosen?) answer and the number four.

    (Incidentally, interesting that you just assume people could subjectively choose what it is they believe)

    You wouldn’t normally attempt to “derive” true stuff is this way, would you?

    Nor have I done so.

    What I’ve done is pointed out (in the style I was following) a corollary of a particular belief.

    BTW, I will top your modular arithmetic; two sets of two items is not four sets.

  57. consciousness razor says

    But there isn’t some preformed objectively moral fact found by microscope or dissection method.

    Yep, it sure looks like you listed all of the possible methods. All those people who believed they could find it by microscope or dissection are feeling pretty silly right now, I bet.

    Case closed, everybody.

  58. John Morales says

    [To put it slightly differently; put a pile onto a pile. You do not get two piles, you get a bigger pile]

  59. John Morales says

    Yep, it sure looks like you listed all of the possible methods.

    Whatever makes you imagine hemidactylus imagined all possible methods had thereby been listed?

  60. hemidactylus says

    @64- John

    Start with a grain of sand and add another. Keep doing this. When does it become a pile? Or pluck hairs from your head one by one. At what point are you bald?

  61. hemidactylus says

    @65- John

    I was merely making an analogy. Oddities such as the terminal nerve or Goethe’s bone are discoverable by dissection. A protozoan is discoverable by microscope. I’m trying to envision a eureka moment for discovering an objective morality. It sure ain’t in Sam Harris’s fMRI tube or his morality book for instance.

  62. John Morales says

    I get it, hemidactylus. But, hey, maybe an AI? ;)

    Anyway, no point nattering.
    I’m kinda hoping the philosopher Jemolk will school me.

    (Haven’t argued with one in a while)

  63. consciousness razor says

    John Morales:

    the magnitude of that wrongness is calculated by taking the difference between their (subjectively chosen?) answer and the number four.

    Still wacky. You can get the difference between those numbers, no doubt about that. However, I’m surprised i need to inform you that that is not a wrongness-evaluating function on your calculator. Saying that the answer is 17.381 (e.g.) is just as wrong as saying that the answer is 42. They’re both simply false, and that sort of thing isn’t a number.

    (Incidentally, interesting that you just assume people could subjectively choose what it is they believe)

    I don’t assume that. It was a question in that parenthetical. If you think so many things are subjective which I don’t, then I have to leave it to you to determine whether your belief about it is that this is up to your free will or whatever you might want to say.

    What I’ve done is pointed out (in the style I was following) a corollary of a particular belief.

    Uh, I don’t think so. Your style of argument* is not really taking it on board that there are at least some moral facts, then trying to see what is entailed by that. The whole game you’re playing is that if someone else believes something other than the truth, then we somehow have some kind of serious problem with the very concept that there was a fact of the matter at all.

    For a valid corollary, what you need to do is suppose (at least for the sake of argument) that the person is wrong. They have a false belief — they really do, as a matter of fact. Whatever you might think that entails, it’s not any kind of threat to moral realism,** because the concern is just about the implications of true stuff, not false stuff.

    And at least it seems to me like you were implicitly taking that sort of false premise (e.g., that gays are evil) as being just as important/relevant/etc. and with the same kinds of implications as a true one. As I said, that is not what people would ordinarily do with stuff they regard as matters of fact, things that concern reality or things/events in the real world. So, that looks to me like it’s being pulled from a non-realist sort of view, not from a realist one.

    *Assuming you’re willing (as you still seem to be) to claim it as your own and not just pass it off as some other comment’s problem.
    **Not that it makes a big difference, but I try to avoid the “objective morality” terminology, because I it confuses people and isn’t particularly helpful.

  64. John Morales says

    CR:

    Saying that the answer is 17.381 (e.g.) is just as wrong as saying that the answer is 42. They’re both simply false, and that sort of thing isn’t a number.

    Ah, I see. Wrong is wrong, and that’s that.

    How wrong is irrelevant to the wrongness, in your estimation, in the real world, where morality applies.

    If I get my braking distance wrong by a second or so, I’d bump into the car in front. If I get it wrong by around 5 seconds, I’m gonna smack really hard into it.
    If I get it wrong by much more, I’m gonna be smashed. But hey, wrong is wrong.

    I mean, sure, slapping someone in the face is wrong.
    Punching them in the nose is wrong.
    Stabbing them with a dagger is wrong.

    All wrong, so no difference, right?

    Chopping off the tip of a finger is no more and no less wrong than chopping off a hand or an arm, because… all are wrong.

    Well, unless one is a surgeon chopping gangrenous bits off, or someone trapped in a crevice in the wilderness with no other alternative to surviving, or whatever.

    I don’t assume that.

    You certainly assume that it’s a valid possibility, else why the parenthetical?

    Hm, perhaps today I’ll subjectively decide I like (c)rap music.
    Surely I can make myself like it!
    But nah, I know better. I also know I probably won’t like bashing my head against a wall, despite wishing to do so. I’m not gonna try, obs.

    Uh, I don’t think so. Your style of argument* is not really taking it on board that there are at least some moral facts, then trying to see what is entailed by that.

    To what moral facts do you refer? Care to enumerate some? One?

    For a valid corollary, what you need to do is suppose (at least for the sake of argument) that the person is wrong.

    What? It’s got nothing to do with right and wrong, only with logical entailment.

  65. hemidactylus says

    Are rights discoverable as things that always existed as Platonic eidos waiting for humans to come along and latch onto them or are they constructed? I opt for the latter. We made them up and bestowed them upon ourselves. We also came up with the notion of equality and bestowed that too. The implementation is imperfect but now we have this notion of universal human rights, which got some degree of impetus from the Holocaust, the idea of mistreating people because of sexual orientation or gender identity for instance is hopefully verboten. Rights basis isn’t the only approach but it’s something.

    Thall shall not murder as command morality in the Torah obviously wasn’t universalized as it mostly meant don’t murder members of their ingroup. Stoning people was acceptable to them. There’s a bit of reciprocity in mutual forbearance, but given the more recent construction of rights that were presumed self-evident (intuitionist??) and bestowed by God as a stand-in for us, murder is a most ultimate rights violation. We decree it as wrong (excepting wars). Where’s the objectivity?

    Rights are created not found (sadly I got some of this from Dershowitz (ugghh!!) but no source fallacies). And they have tradeoffs. We found this out in the pandemic. Eudaimonia via masking, vaccinations and other public health measures encroached by mandate on what people took to be their maximized individual rights. And that vaccination works is a fact, but do you value it based on other stuff?

  66. Jim Balter says

    If you can’t demonstrate your moral claim from axioms and with inference rules that everyone acting in good faith accepts, then your moral claim is not objective. This whole thread shows that there is no objective morality. (At least some people here are arguing in good faith; of course Hanlon’s Razor comes into play, as there’s quite a bit here that is downright stupid … see especially comments by RB.)

    @27 “I am not all that impressed by Euthyphro” John Harshman was referring to the Leibniz’s version of the dilemma (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euthyphro_dilemma) which substitutes “good” for “pious”.

  67. Jim Balter says

    sadly I got some of this from Dershowitz

    He wrote the book Supreme Injustice: How the High Court Hijacked Election 2000 … he wasn’t always the pathetic jackass that he is now.

  68. Jim Balter says

    That there is some objective morality is the stance most generally popular among philosophers. Ethicists especially. That should say something.

    It says that moral philosophers are a self-selecting self-feeding bunch who often come to the field from religious backgrounds, and that philosophy not only is not a hard science, but it’s not a science at all. On matters of fact, philosophers are no more reliable than theists, and claims to authority by moral philosophers strongly resemble The Courtier’s Reply (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Courtier%27s_reply) “coined by American biologist PZ Myers”.

  69. Jim Balter says

    Hi John. I didn’t even notice that connection. I actually came to P to say something about that Coyne piece, happened to land on this page, then saw the comment from Jemolk that made me think of the Courtier’s Reply, then looked at the Wikipedia page with the “coined” line, then I glanced back and saw my “pathetic jackass” comment and remembered that I was going to say something about Coyne. So no apophenia … rather it proves there must be a God!

  70. hemidactylus says

    @76- Jim Balter
    Another hate-reader of Coyne I see. He competes with Ron Desantis for who will run the ignorant pejorative “woke” into the ground first. Strange confluence there. Coyne is beyond obsessed with “woke”.

    It was a special treat back in late July when Coyne used some silly expose of wokeness in Portland Public Schools by none other than Christopher Rufo. Seriously, him. One of the regular commenters on Coyne’s blog took some issue with Rufo and pushed back. You might know how that sort of thing rubs free speech warrior Coyne wrong. He may have deplatformed the guy as I haven’t seen him comment there since.

  71. says

    Nope. Those who assert an objective morality are proposing it to be something tangible or discoverable.

    Have you not read one word of either the OP or my earlier comments? Objective morality is morality that is indeed based on tangible, discoverable facts regarding our nature, needs, circumstances, and experience. Why is this so hard for you to comprehend? Do you really believe that the basic moral principles and reasoning behind practically every progressive or social-justice movement in human history are invalid?

    Are rights discoverable as things that always existed as Platonic eidos waiting for humans to come along and latch onto them or are they constructed?

    That’s a false dichotomy. They’re neither, though they are a bit closer to the latter than to the former. The mere fact that we are sentient beings means we have the rights to inform, feed, nourish and exercise our capabilities as sentient beings (and, of course, we are also obligated to respect each other’s rights to do the same). Our rights are not “constructed,” they’re a direct consequence of our nature; and it is beneficial for humans to claim and exercise such rights, and objectively harmful to humans when we deny them such rights.

  72. says

    …there’s quite a bit here that is downright stupid … see especially comments by RB.

    Calling me stupid doesn’t mean much when you fail to specify what I got wrong.

  73. unclefrogy says

    If you argue with pro-gun people about being hypocrites, that rational people would want a society with less violence on grounds of both empathy and self-interest…if gun nuts value their right to carry murder tools over consistency, then gun control is not right– from their point of view.

    “I do not want to get into the “whole gun control thing” there are some things you are leaving out about besides being categorically judgmental.
    one the hings you are leaving out is something you might share with your “gun nut” that is a strong distrust people in the abstract general way and in the personal way. The “gun nuts” (I will separate from those who are involved in criminal activity) want the sane peaceful society but have through experience and learning believe with some truth that there are those who mean them harm be it criminals or bad governments. expecting to argue abstract rationality is just going to paint you as out of touch with everyday experience.
    how to get the conversation to go to the points that are shared is in my experience very difficult if not impossible,
    There is no way I would ever voluntarily get into a discussion about objective morality with some ultra conservative catholic the difficulty is too great and my patience is too limited

  74. John Morales says

    Raging Bee, the mere fact that you write “The mere fact that we are sentient beings means we have the rights to [blah]” indicates you beg the question.

    (Consider what ‘rights’ are)

  75. Jim Balter says

    Another hate-reader of Coyne I see.

    I try not to, but the same feed that delivers Pharyngula headlines to me also occasionally delivers Coyne’s, and that one stood out.

    You might know how that sort of thing rubs free speech warrior Coyne wrong.

    Indeed I do … he banned me long ago.

  76. Jim Balter says

    Calling me stupid

    I called your comments stupid, stupid.

    doesn’t mean much when you fail to specify what I got wrong.

    All of it is wrong, but it’s not my intent to explain your errors to you or to engage with you at all.

  77. Jemolk says

    John Morales @53 —

    So one, in order to improve overall morality, would have to become authoritarian and actually impose that morality, no?

    Um, no. Not at all. This requires that the mere existence of moral truths justifies dogmatism. That is absurd on its face. You might as well claim that because there exists a truth about the nature of quantum physics, we are justified in enforcing a single, rigid view of quantum physics.

    Again, objective morality simply means that there is a fact of the matter that is not dependent on the beliefs of individuals. There are numerous formulations of what that would look like; my position is a (significantly) modified form of utilitarianism, but other forms of consequentialism are available, as is deontology, virtue ethics, and variations on all three. Subjectivism, however, is not viable as a realist view of morality. There are too many holes. This isn’t just me saying that, either. What I’m defending here is the predominant view among ethicists. That is, people who specialize in ethics specifically. You can be an entirely consistent moral nihilist, but under subjectivism, and even its slightly more defensible variant intersubjectivism, Nazism was at the very least morally correct in 1940s Germany. This is utterly inescapable without reducing even the most robust form of intersubjectivism to personal whims. And while that is far from its only failing, it is sufficient to completely destroy the plausibility of the claim for quite a lot of people, myself included. I ask again, this time of you — are you willing to take this doctrine of the equal merit of moral views to this, its logical endpoint? You can defang the reductio ad absurdum that I’m posing here simply by accepting those consequences. Accept them or not, however, subjectivism inexorably leads there. Are you prepared to give up your ability to condemn even genocidal fascists morally? I notice this has not been directly answered by anyone. To keep that, there must be at least some moral truths that do not depend on either the individual or the culture — or, in other words, you need moral objectivity.

    Jim Balter @73 & 75 — Science is not the only discipline that exists, nor is it the only one to aim at some form of truth. Now, there are those who argue that science is the only one that is necessary. This is somewhat farcical, as defending the claim involves doing philosophy, but if you want to argue that, be my guest. Simply assuming it as you do in 75, however, is not a remotely reasonable thing to do.

    Now, on the claim that the disagreement in this thread disproves moral objectivity — this is a non-starter. To quote notable ethicist Russ Shafer-Landau at length on the subject:

    Brilliant physicists disagree about whether the fundamental elements of matter are subatomic strings; eminent archaeologists disagree about how to interpret the remains discovered at ancient sites; the finest philosophers continue to debate whether God exists. [Interjecting here to point out that your — and my — distaste for theism does nothing to rebut this last statement.] And yet there are objective truths in each area. There are objective truths about the fundamental nature of the physical world, about the nature of various prehistoric tribes, about whether there is or isn’t a God. We may never know these truths, but our opinion on these matters must answer to an objective reality. Our views don’t make physical or archaeological or philosophical claims true; the facts are what they are, independently of what we think of them.

    Disagreement about what the facts on the ground are cannot be justifiably used as evidence that there are no facts on the ground.

  78. Jemolk says

    Now for something more sympathetic, and that hopefully will involve less futile venting:
    Jim Balter@76 — That link. Good grief. A pathetic jackass indeed. I haven’t looked at what Coyne’s been posting lately, up until now. Heard plenty of bad things about him, but I’ve mostly been content to take everyone else’s word for it. Actually seeing it, though — wow. Completely unhinged.

  79. hemidactylus says

    @80- Raging Bee
    You might want to mull over when I said “We inject our values into the world and presume this to be objective fact”. Morality is…well…value laden. I don’t discount factuality or knowledge per roles in making decisions, but evaluation of alternative courses relies heavily on a preconceived value system. A fact of history would indicate a shift from honor to dignity basis. But this doesn’t itself give us a metaethical Archimedean point for one versus the other. Both honor and dignity are preconceived value systems we may find ourselves ensconced within. A factual explanation that some value system supplanted another is not itself a justification for the latter.

    Facts about our nature, needs, circumstances, experiences will be but components filtered through our value systems. Such values perhaps color our experience no? Honor or dignity as shared cultural representations would influence our circumstances. Needs would be prioritized by subjective preferences or intersubjective mores. And appeal to nature has its shortcomings. Much in human nature is dark and Hobbesian and should be countered or transcended. A subjective preference to avoid shame or ostracism goes quite a long way.

    For me intersubjectivity does sufficient heavy lifting. People compare notes and share values or even push for certain virtues like prudence or charity. So strawmanning me with the downplaying of social justice or progressive values will not fly. No need of objective morality to buttress those. I might point out early 20th century progressives were smitten by eugenics based on their own values. They rejected the laissez faire noninterventionism of merely letting people suffer or die of neglect. They took action.

    And I fail to see how “rights” automatically follow from our sentience or nature. It was in the nature of sentient people to exploit or enslave others and appeals to nature were later made to justify such things in the rationalist Enlightenment.

  80. John Morales says

    John Morales @53 —

    So one, in order to improve overall morality, would have to become authoritarian and actually impose that morality, no?

    Um, no. Not at all. This requires that the mere existence of moral truths justifies dogmatism.

    Notice the conditional predicate: “in order to improve overall morality”.
    How else to improve it, when others’ differs from yours?
    You can argue your morality to the nth degree, and have some recalcitrant person not accept it — and vice versa.

    (You don’t want to improve overall morality?
    That doesn’t seem like the most moral stance, does it?)

    Again, objective morality simply means that there is a fact of the matter that is not dependent on the beliefs of individuals.

    But morality is evinced via behaviour, and behaviour depends on the beliefs of individuals.

    There are numerous formulations of what that would look like; my position is a (significantly) modified form of utilitarianism, but other forms of consequentialism are available, as is deontology, virtue ethics, and variations on all three.

    Mine is far, far simpler. Be the best person I can be, knowing what I now, and having experienced what I have experienced. Or not, and do what I know is the wrong thing to do, but dammit, it’s what I want to do. Also, it changes as I evolve into an older, wiser person. Huh.

    Not that I am unversed in those three main branches of meta-ethics.
    Just that I’m not, like, dogmatic.

    What I’m defending here is the predominant view among ethicists.

    I think you’re doing a bit more than that; you are advocating what you think is the predominant view among ethicists.

    Subjectivism, however, is not viable as a realist view of morality.

    Really? Fact is, different societies have different moralities, and even within those different people have different moralities.

    If morality is objective, it must be the case that all but one morality is less than fully moral.

    Is that really the stance you propose?

    You can be an entirely consistent moral nihilist, but under subjectivism, and even its slightly more defensible variant intersubjectivism, Nazism was at the very least morally correct in 1940s Germany.

    So confused!

    If one is a moral nihilist, it can’t possibly follow that one would think Nazism was at the very least morally correct in 1940s Germany, since moral nihilism does not hold any set of morals as correct (or even valid).

    And while that is far from its only failing, it is sufficient to completely destroy the plausibility of the claim for quite a lot of people, myself included.

    Plausibility?
    Look, different societies, different times, different people.
    Different moralities.

    Are you prepared to give up your ability to condemn even genocidal fascists morally? I notice this has not been directly answered by anyone.

    Wow. You really don’t get the concept at hand, do ya?

    Condemning people is done on the basis of one’s morality, whether that morality be subjective or objective. Well, unless one is perverse and condemns people other than on the basis of one’s morality, which is a bit nonsensical.
    No need to give up anything, other than a dogmatic stance.

    (Or: there is nothing to stop me from condemning something even if I thought morality is merely subjective, because I’d be applying my subjective morality)

  81. John Morales says

    [OK, apology]

    I was too hasty.

    You can be an entirely consistent moral nihilist, but under subjectivism, and even its slightly more defensible variant intersubjectivism, Nazism was at the very least morally correct in 1940s Germany.

    On re-reading my own response, I now take the intent was to convey that though a moral nihilist is excused from any justification, a moral relativist would be compelled to acknowledge Nazism is moral for Nazis even if not for others.

    You make it sound like those relativists think it was morally correct in 1940s Germany, rather than that they acknowledge Nazis thought they were morally correct in 1940s Germany.

    I really don’t see how that somehow invalidates the concept, even under that interpretation.

  82. hemidactylus says

    @86- Jemolk

    Who is arguing there are no facts on the ground. I agree facts are important in moral decision making, but they are insufficient. Plus when people make assertions about facts per morality values are hiding behind the curtains backstage.

  83. Jim Balter says

    You might as well claim that because there exists a truth about the nature of quantum physics, we are justified in enforcing a single, rigid view of quantum physics.

    Of course we are justified in “enforcing” truth in quantum physics.

    objective morality simply means that there is a fact of the matter that is not dependent on the beliefs of individuals.

    It is logically impossible for there to be moral facts of the matter independent of the beliefs of individuals.

    Science is not the only discipline that exists, nor is it the only one to aim at some form of truth.

    The theists and woo heads tell me that too. Anyway, it’s a strawman, What I said is that, on matters of fact, philosophers are no more reliable than theists. Whatever “discipline” they have, it’s not one that can hill climb to truth. That’s not an assumption, it’s an inference well grounded in fact and logic.

    Now, there are those who argue that science is the only one that is necessary.

    Strawman. Again, I said “on matters of fact”. I didn’t say that philosophy has no value.

    This is somewhat farcical, as defending the claim involves doing philosophy,

    Only if you equivocate over the meaning of “philosophy”.

    if you want to argue that, be my guest.

    I argued what I argued, not your strawmen.

    Disagreement about what the facts on the ground are cannot be justifiably used as evidence that there are no facts on the ground.

    Another strawman. What I said was that , for there to be an objective moral truth, it would be necessary to demonstrate it based on accepted premises and inference rules. We do this all the time in science and mathematics, but it demonstrably cannot be done with morality — science has observations, which serve as logical premises, and mathematics has axioms from which we form axiomatic systems–but the axioms cannot be proven and are not considered to be objective facts. If we model moral philosophy on mathematics, we get what we have now–groups of philosophers who agree on certain moral axioms but cannot convince other groups of philosophers of those moral axioms.

    Simply assuming it as you do in 75, however, is not a remotely reasonable thing to do.

    Everything I do is reasonable, including finding this conversation familiar and tiresome. Ta ta.

  84. Jim Balter says

    You can be an entirely consistent moral nihilist, but under subjectivism, and even its slightly more defensible variant intersubjectivism, Nazism was at the very least morally correct in 1940s Germany.

    This presumes that there is a fact of the matter as to whether something is morally correct … otherwise the statement is incoherent. Under subjectivism, Nazis considered Naziism to morally correct. But that doesn’t mean that I or my community have to hold it to be morally correct, then or any other time–we don’t. And there are people in our society today that hold it to be morally correct–I find them to be morally in the wrong, but not objectively in the wrong–I find no coherent meaning to such a claim.

    This is utterly inescapable without reducing even the most robust form of intersubjectivism to personal whims.

    No, it simply isn’t. And if it were then there would be no good faith subjectivist moral philosophers, but there are. (And the fact that they are not “predominant” is irrelevant, just as it is irrelevant that atheists are not predominant.) You can insist that you must be right and they must be wrong, but I have seen these arguments for moral realism many times before and I have always found them to be poorly reasoned. As John said,

    You make it sound like those relativists think it was morally correct in 1940s Germany, rather than that they acknowledge Nazis thought they were morally correct in 1940s Germany.

    Exactly. Your (Jemolk’s) criticism of subjectivism assumes realism by saying that subjectivists must accept some moral fact about 1940s Germany. But we reject the notion that there are moral facts. Nazis had a moral outlook that we reject intersubjectively (we being those who do, while there is an increase of those who don’t). There is no “hole” or “utterly inescapable” problem with subjectivism–again, if there were, then there would be no good faith anti-realist philosophers and https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/moral-anti-realism/ would be a whole lot shorter.

    Again, familiar and tiresome. I should have included all this in my previous comment, but you can’t edit posts here and I skipped over the bit about Naziism when I first looked at #86. Anyway, you go believe what you believe and I’ll believe what I believe–that’s the thing about philosophy: when it comes to facts of the matter, the “discipline” is too weak to demonstrate them convincingly to all sincere parties, and so these debates rage for centuries. The philosophical area I usually debate in is Philosophy of Mind–the battle between physicalists and non-physicalists will continue indefinitely and even if someday there were widespread public acceptance of silicon-based robots as conscious entities, there would still be people arguing that they can’t be conscious because of Searle’s (completely bogus) Chinese Room argument. At least I find those debates fun and interesting–but not this one.

  85. Jim Balter says

    One more thing:

    You make it sound like those relativists think it was morally correct in 1940s Germany, rather than that they acknowledge Nazis thought they were morally correct in 1940s Germany.

    There can be some confusion between moral relativism, “the view that moral truth or justification is relative to a culture or society” (per https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-relativism/) and moral subjectivism or anti-realism, and Jemolk’s statement seems to conflate them, criticizing moral relativism, not moral anti-realism. I don’t think anyone here is defending moral relativism–I’m certainly not.

  86. Jim Balter says

    Are you prepared to give up your ability to condemn even genocidal fascists morally? I notice this has not been directly answered by anyone.

    This is absurd … you clearly don’t understand what moral subjectivism is–it’s not moral relativism, which might be termed moral situational realism. I don’t need there to be objective moral facts in order to morally condemn genocide … I hold it to be wrong, regardless of what anyone else believes or has believed–and no, that’s not just a personal “whim”. Similarly, I can find someone beautiful without there being any objective fact about who is or isn’t beautiful. Jomolk doesn’t seem to understand the very concept of subjective judgments.

  87. Jim Balter says

    Are you prepared to give up your ability to condemn even genocidal fascists morally? I notice this has not been directly answered by anyone. To keep that, there must be at least some moral truths that do not depend on either the individual or the culture — or, in other words, you need moral objectivity.

    I read this again, and I have come to an utterly unescapable truth: The person who wrote it is profoundly stupid. I have this ability: I hereby morally condemn genocidal fascists. I also deny that there are any moral truths. Unlike profoundly stupid people, I don’t expect my condemnation of genocidal fascists to be like God throwing a moral thunderbolt at them that stops them from being genocidal fascists–I don’t have that ability. But at least I have the ability to understand what the “ability to condemn” is, and that it most certainly does not entail the existence of moral truths.

  88. consciousness razor says

    John Morales:

    Really? Fact is, different societies have different moralities, and even within those different people have different moralities.

    If morality is objective, it must be the case that all but one morality is less than fully moral.

    No, it’s true that they can’t all be right if they are substantially different from each other, but they can all be wrong. Similarly, it wasn’t (and isn’t) necessary that one of the existing physical theories in Newton’s time must have been “fully correct,” and we happen to know that in fact none of them were.

    There is no contradiction in that. It’s not impossible, because you’re just making this up as you go. Because you just feel like arguing/trolling, as you always do.

    hemidactylus:

    I agree facts are important in moral decision making, but they are insufficient.

    Let’s put this in different terms…. If something is not real, according to you, then how it can be that you think anyone actually needs it?

    Suppose I told you, “without Santa Claus bringing gifts to the good boys and girls, all of our Christmas festivities are insufficient, and by the way there’s no Santa Claus. We can’t really have a proper Christmas without him. And since in fact we lack the requisite real Santa — here comes the wild part — we need to have a non-real Santa for all of our Christmas purposes.”

    Why would it be insufficient, without the non-real stuff that you’ve nonetheless decided is so very essential? How could something like that possibly help? What is that supposed to do?

    Or do you think something else about these “values,” which you believe are in some ways distinct from “facts”? (I assume this is your option, but you have yet to explain how you’re using these terms or to explain what that something else is supposed to be.)

  89. hemidactylus says

    @97- PZ
    I’ve been working up a retort toward the pejorative. Besides the pedigree perhaps back to Marcus Garvey, but definitely to Lead Belly speaking on the Scottsboro boys, woke meant black people being aware of the dangers making such a tool as the Green Book necessary. More recently it was utilized by BLM in a similar sense of being aware of prevalent racism.

    Taking woke back from the haters could be a exercise in patience and courage. Asking what’s wrong with wokeness could be an exercise in futility at this point given the damage done by ideological demagogues like Lindsay and Rufo and their second handers such as Coyne and Desantis. A huge heaping of neo-McCarthyism going on.

    Woke baselined is someone against racism and who treats people of differing sexuality and/or gender identity with acceptance, dignity and respect. It could use work.

  90. hemidactylus says

    @98- consciousness razor

    I prefer holding to the fact-value distinction. For one thing it protects from a form of scientism I abhor (see Sam Harris and his collapse of fact-value distinction because braining). It’s like ethical philosophy has science envy and can’t get over it. Hence moral science.

    Values are based on ideals as opposed to reals and have input from gut feels. We look at the world as it is and contrast that with our conception of the way it ought to be. We persuade each other based on overlapping value systems and set goals against the status quo based on ideals. Ideals, being what they are, are largely unattainable and we fall short, constrained by factual reality and Kant’s ought implies can principle. But the idealism remains.

  91. consciousness razor says

    hemidactylus:

    I prefer holding to the fact-value distinction.

    The problem isn’t that you make a distinction. Go right ahead. We could make distinctions all day, about all sorts of things.

    Values are based on ideals as opposed to reals and have input from gut feels.

    Earlier, you were talking about things to be found via microscope. So are you assuming dualism then, that these “gut feels” are non-physical? Or what should I make of this? I mean, after all, you were already going on about idealism, so…. Wut? Huh? And even supposing this sort of view is correct or at least headed in the right direction, what exactly is the problem supposed to be with realism? You don’t say.

    You were also going on about “social construction,” as if that meant that things like money aren’t real. If you believed that, then you would have no concerns at all about giving me all of your money, being the non-entity that it purportedly is, but I bet that won’t happen.

    Do you really believe the only other option is “things that always existed as Platonic eidos waiting for humans to come along and latch onto them”? Why would we need to think anything like that, or are you just using this as yet another opportunity to signal to us that you’ve read some obscure texts? By the way, people normally just say “forms” if they’re at least trying to be a little less pretentious when bringing up Platonism. (But what does Platonism have to do with it in the first place?)

    You also likened it to divine command theory, as if it had to do with anyone giving any such commands. (It was already pointed out that a god is a subject, so you’ve obviously got the wrong idea or are arguing with the wrong thing.) There’s also all the more general talk about authoritarianism and so forth.

    Overall impression: This is just throwing slop at the wall, hoping that at least something will eventually stick, maybe. A bunch of things are being jammed together and confused. It’s a bit of a mess. It’s just not clear what you think the problem is with realism, as opposed to a problem with various strawmen that you bring up (for no particular reason, apparently), or whether your alternative view is coherent.

    Those are the sorts of issues I’ve got at the moment … not Hume, not distinctions, not whatever your feelings are about Sam Harris, and probably not whatever the next item will be (assuming you keep randomly drawing them out of a hat).

  92. says

    I don’t discount factuality or knowledge per roles in making decisions, but evaluation of alternative courses relies heavily on a preconceived value system.

    True; but we don’t “preconceive” value-systems out of nothing — they also tend to be formed by interaction and experience with objective reality.

    If morality is objective, it must be the case that all but one morality is less than fully moral.

    Yes and no. One could argue that there is an optimal moral system that works best for a given people in a given political/economic/historical/social situation, and maybe different optimal moral systems for different people in different situations. (The extent to which a given people actually achieve their optimal moral system in any given time is another question.) And there certainly are plenty of “less than fully moral” arrangements for each group.

    (Or: there is nothing to stop me from condemning something even if I thought morality is merely subjective, because I’d be applying my subjective morality)

    True, but if lots of people think morality is merely subjective, then your opinion could be more easily dismissed by whoever doesn’t want to hear it. OTOH, if your condemnation is based on some set of observable facts about the benefits or harms done by that something you’re condemning, then it’s more valid than just another subjective opinion.

  93. says

    Morality is like money. It “exists,” but it doesn’t really. It’s a necessary social construction designed to help our species live with one another.

    And like morality, money is real to the extent that it is based on, and responsive to, certain objective facts. If, for example, there are no objectively-real things to buy, then the money is useless and not rally “real.” And moral rules and principles are (or at least can and should be) similarly grounded in objective reality.

  94. hemidactylus says

    @102 consciousness razor

    People have room to dream of a much better future perhaps in a manner lacking fetters to mundane reality. Not necessarily the same as a Plato or Bishop Berkeley. It’s saying things don’t have to be this way. But fatalism or jaded cynicism creeps in. Nietzsche’s amor fati. Those have their place I suppose to stifle imagination. Sure ideals, dreams, and imagination are neurally grounded and must account at some point for what is realistic if implemented.

    From a definition by my Merriam Webster app: “literary or artistic theory or practice that affirms the preeminent value of imagination as compared with faithful copying of nature
    — compare REALISM”

    Oughts themselves could be seen as constraining regulative principles. Science is constrained in how it can pursue “is” or facts by ethical review committees.

  95. hemidactylus says

    @104- Raging Bee

    Money works as a construct because of people having a faith in it as decreed by a government to confer exchange value upon a worthless piece of paper. Use and intrinsic value have been hollowed out of pretty much everything. People are things or means holding exchange value not valued as ends in themselves. It could be different but people must buy into a neoliberal unreality or illusion to survive or thrive.

  96. hemidactylus says

    @107 Raging Bee
    All I did was flip your monetary realism into its grounding within an overarching value system courtesy of Hayek, Thatcher, Reagan, Third Way etc. Of that ilk Ayn Rand, who sported a dollar sign, heralded capitalism as an unknown ideal.

    And the critique of instrumental rationality goes back to the foundation of Critical Theory.

  97. says

    Actually, no, nothing I said is “grounded” in any of those people’s “overarching value systems.” What I said about money is nothing more than a basic fact that predates all of that lot by centuries. Not sure what your point is here…?

  98. Jemolk says

    John Morales @90 —

    You make it sound like those relativists think it was morally correct in 1940s Germany, rather than that they acknowledge Nazis thought they were morally correct in 1940s Germany.

    Yes, exactly. The problem here for relativists is that relativism offers no way of measuring moral systems against one another at all. In fact, it can’t, because it’s not using anything but the cultural construction of value as a base. Under a relativistic scheme, there is no moral reason to prefer egalitarian systems to Nazism. There may be practical reasons, but relativism means there cannot be moral reasons. This is generally regarded as disqualifying because ethics is generally taken to be something we can use as a guide or as a tool to evaluate our actions and prospective actions, and relativism causes that to disintegrate rapidly.

    How else to improve it, when others’ differs from yours?

    Persuasion. Persuasion is a good option.

    You can argue your morality to the nth degree, and have some recalcitrant person not accept it — and vice versa.

    And if you try to enforce it by fiat, that will only suppress the fractures in your society until they reach a critical mass. It also suppresses further investigation into what the moral facts are. I don’t need all of everyone to accept exactly what I believe is correct. I am open to being wrong on some of the moral facts, and because I believe there are moral facts, I can say that I have made mistakes about what they were in the past and thus could be wrong about other things in the present. The thing here is, I don’t think I necessarily already know the whole moral truth, but I do think I’m finding some answers that get me closer to the truth, at the very least.

    Jim Balter @96 & prior — Moral condemnation of opposing systems is thoroughly inconsistent with both nihilism and subjectivism (of which one variant is cultural relativism; yes, moral cultural relativism is a specific variant of moral subjectivism, and actually one of the ones that is on the surface more defensible because it does not cause morality to freely vary by individual). Subjectivism offers no way to make evaluations across systems. Indeed, it is incapable of offering such a thing. An objectivist can state that Nazis believed they were morally correct and were wrong about this, and in doing so remain consistent. A subjectivist cannot, because there is nothing for them to be wrong about and no greater principle to appeal to. If you are content to be internally inconsistent, then so be it. I hereby grant that you have that ability. What I meant was that it was inconsistent, and that to be consistent, you would have to give one of them up. Or do you mean to claim that genocide is in the eye of the beholder, as it were, since you bring up the comparison with beauty? Subjective judgments exist, but it is not subjective whether or not a genocide occurred, and unless you’re willing to claim that genocide could be good, it would also be contradictory of you to assert that its moral value is subjective. To remain consistent with your stance of morality being subjective, you would have to be prepared to answer the question of “is genocide morally bad” with “it depends on who you ask.” You have to be prepared to say that the changes that took place in Germany post-WWII did not in fact constitute moral progress. The alternative is internal contradiction.

    Now, you could claim that you mean that what we are really saying when we make moral pronouncements is not what we think we are saying, but that runs into its own set of problems. You could claim, as some have attempted, that when we say “x is bad” what we are really saying is “I disapprove of x.” This circumvents around the above problem, but it means that you’re accusing nearly everyone of misunderstanding their own statements and beliefs about morality (a very high bar to clear) and also that moral disagreement is borderline impossible, since we are no longer making claims about reality at all, but merely about our own internal states. To quote Shafer-Landau once more,

    This sort of strategy will work across the board, for all moral claims, and so we can save subjectivism from contradiction. Here are the costs. First, subjectivists have to accuse nearly everyone of misunderstanding their own moral claims. And second, such a view eliminates the possibility of moral disagreement.
    To illustrate the first problem, consider this conversation:
    Me: Genocide is immoral.
    Subjectivist: What I’m hearing is — you disapprove of genocide.
    Me: Yes, I disapprove of genocide. But that’s not what I’m saying. I’m not talking about my attitudes. I’m talking about genocide. You’re changing the subject.
    Subjectivists can’t make sense of my reply here. It’s not that my reply might be false. Rather, my reply is unintelligible, since it assumes that moral talk is about something other than my own commitments. Most of us assume just that.

    This goes on at length, but I’ll end the quote here. This is a book I’m drawing from, which I have open on my lap as I type this, again, written by someone whose job it is to ask and attempt to answer these kinds of questions. Is it not worth considering that there may be something to this?

  99. John Morales says

    CR:

    If morality is objective, it must be the case that all but one morality is less than fully moral.

    No, it’s true that they can’t all be right if they are substantially different from each other, but they can all be wrong.

    Think about it; if morality is objective, then that objective morality must perforce exist. Unless you further hold that that objective morality is also wrong.

    Because you just feel like arguing/trolling, as you always do.

    Ah yes, that phatic aside you bring out every now and then.

  100. John Morales says

    Jemolk,

    The thing here is, I don’t think I necessarily already know the whole moral truth, but I do think I’m finding some answers that get me closer to the truth, at the very least.

    Well, I can’t stop you from thinking that there is but one proper morality which is applicable to every person in every circumstance at all times everywhere.
    Good luck with that quest.

  101. says

    The problem here for relativists is that relativism offers no way of measuring moral systems against one another at all…

    MY problem with the phrase “moral relativism” is that it’s routinely used as a slur by dishonest Christians trying to discredit any form of morality not directly based on their beliefs. Christian propagandists draw a blatantly false dichotomy between their “absolute” god-given foundation of morality and “relativism” which is allegedly not grounded in anything (and it reminds me of earlier, now-discredited, ideas of “absolute” frames of reference from which we could allegedly measure things like “absolute” velocity, position, etc.).

    Can someone cite or quote an honest definition of what, exactly, “moral relativism” is? Because if not, them I’m inclined to kick the phrase to the curb right along with all the other Christianese phrases I have no use for.

  102. says

    Thanks, John. Not sure I agree with what I’ve read there so far…

    Descriptive Moral Relativism (DMR). As a matter of empirical fact, there are deep and widespread moral disagreements across different societies, and these disagreements are much more significant than whatever agreements there may be.

    Not sure if this is true, though it may certainly seem so when one has first encountered a very different society from one’s own. It seems (to me at least) that over time people of different societies start to see past their most obvious and striking differences and find more common ground — if the people in power let them, that is. There are cases where the people in power in a society — the ones who have the most to lose if their people start changing their ways of doing things — try to pretend there’s no way for their people to find any common ground with any furriners, while their people are, in fact, getting actively interested in the new furrin culture their leaders are trying to shield them from. So in that sense at least, I think I have good reason to be skeptical of DMR.

  103. John Morales says

    No worries, Raging Bee.

    Your point that those Christian types use the term differently to philosophers is relevant to the discussion. Sorta like ‘woke’ is used by MAGA types.

    So, yeah. There’s the philosophical meaning of the term, and there’s whatever it those Christians mean by the term.

    But now you’re aware of both.

  104. Jemolk says

    John Morales @112 — When you phrase it like that, it sounds more bizarre than it actually is. I think there are universalizable principles, yes, but their implementation, and therefore any rules derived from them, necessarily varies based on circumstance. The (thoroughly abstract, by necessity) principles always apply, but not always in the same way. The concept of absolute rules that stand on their own is my biggest gripe with Kantian moral philosophy.

    Raging Bee @113 — The right wing jackasses do have a tendency to hijack words and twist their meanings to be used in propaganda, don’t they? Glad that was cleared up.

  105. John Morales says

    Jemolk, I think I get you.

    Not so much ‘rules’ as ‘guidelines’.

    More important is the spirit of the guideline rather than the letter of it.

    Circumstances apply.

    That sorta thing.

    (We’re not that far apart)

  106. says

    More on moral relativism:

    Metaethical Moral Relativism (MMR). The truth or falsity of moral judgments, or their justification, is not absolute or universal, but is relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of a group of persons.

    This I disagree with more strongly: traditions, convictions, or practices of other people may be different from those of my own people, but consequences of their actions can still be observed, therefore people — both local and foreign — can make valid moral judgments based on those observed consequences. If I see a particular action having harmful real-world consequences for undeserving people, I can validly judge it wrong for that reason, whether it’s happening in my country or another country of which I know little. It’s possible that the people of that other country have some justification for it that I have yet to learn about — but the same could be true of my own country. Either way, I would still be within my rights to seek an explanation, and to modify my judgment of their actions accordingly. I may not have a say in that other country’s laws or policies, but that does not mean I can’t make a valid moral judgment of them based on observable consequences (and besides, I can’t stop others from judging my country’s actions, and I’ve never questioned their right to do so, so it’s perfectly fair to claim a right and at least some competence to judge them as well).

  107. John Morales says

    Raging Bee, that article is an overview of the philosophical landscape in that domain, an adumbration. Notice the Metaethical prefix; that indicates it’s not ethics, but meta-ethics. Essentially, the axioms and rules of inference to which Jim referred, above.

    But kudos for looking into it and thinking about it; much more than most people would do.

  108. tuatara says

    This has been one of the best threads that I have read on FTB. It has been amazingly educational for me so thanks.

    While many of the concepts are completely new to me (many of the terms used have been dictionary page-turners!) I think that I am beginning to inderstand some of the discussion.

    Please, any of you jump on me if I go astray here, but I am enough of an insider in two very different cultures to be able to offer some insight from that dual perspective, if I may?

    My indigenous ancestors were quite happy to eat the bodies of their fallen enemies. The reasons they were happy to do so were varied, but included the utility of feeding hungry victorious combatants, the desire for revenge best given by turning your enemies into faeces (this was probably the most common reason), and even the belief that consuming the bodies of the brave fallen somehow imbued in the eater some of that courage. Their cosmology allowed them to veiw the practice in these, for them valid, ways.

    On my European side these practices were of course considered some of the greatest depravities a human could undertake. Equally, on my European side, private ownership of land is the height of civility. But in indegenous terms, private ownership of land engenders dispossession which leads to poverty which could lead to killing other people simply for food so private ownership of land was considered immoral.

     

    In 2003, Fijians from the village where a Reverend Baker was killed and eaten in 1887 formally apologised and asked for forgiveness from the missionary’s descendents. I am sure the Fijians are still waiting for an apology from the xians for their side of the bloody history since their ‘discovery’ of Fiji.

    I guess that what I mean to say is that morality is fluid.

     

    The NZ maori have a saying that goes something like this – He kai kei te pito o oku ringa which translates to There is food at the end of my hands.

    To my simple mind this saying would appear to at least begin to point toward the direction where we may hope to find an objective morality if one even exists.

    Equally simplistically I get the sense from the discussion above that any objective morality rests entirely upon a full disclosure of human nature, which is probably entirely impossible to achieve.

    And even more simplistically, the great US declaration about the pursuit of happiness being a fundamental right would seem to me to be a source of untold immorality. For example, shitting in Donald Trump’s shoe would make me very happy!

     

    The scumbag that inspired the OP is entirely ignorant of any alternative morality than the one he believes is objective becuse of its alleged divine origin, but because that divinity is a matter of faith it is in fact entirely subjective morality.

     

    But I am not sure that I am even anywhere near understanding what has been discussed above, so all that I have said here may well be way off the mark. If so I am sorry for intruding on a subject I freely acknowledge that I know so little about. I am happy to be corrected and/or guided in the subject by your eminent intellects.

  109. hemidactylus says

    @122- tuatara
    Yours was a very insightful contribution. Thanks. I had never considered the satisfaction one might get from pooping out their enemies. It’s graphic, but I can kinda get the sentiment.

    I have reservations toward the notion of an objective morality myself. Others don’t share such a reservation. The OP gets at it being transcendent of self-serving consideration (not taking candy because not wanting your own candy taken…fear of consequences). There are self-serving reasons for integrating into a social group (survival and flourishing) and fear of shame, punishment and ostracism go a long way toward that.

    Not acting on immediate impulses (taking candy) involves reflective self-control or ordering of desire. Is it desirable to want to take that candy? Over time a routinized nonconscious impulse can counteract the acquisitive one. More automated and less reflective (efficient).

    And yes much of human nature remains to be known…

  110. Markus Schäfer says

    I was scrolling over the article a bit too quickly and read “The only perfect external source is goo!” and it didn’t register as implausible to me.

  111. consciousness razor says

    John Morales:

    Think about it; if morality is objective, then that objective morality must perforce exist.

    You were talking specifically about the ones which different actual societies or different actual people in those societies do in fact have. None of those need to be completely correct or even partially correct.

  112. John Morales says

    No, CR, I was not — and neither was my interlocutor.

    Let me break it down for you:

    Subjectivism, however, is not viable as a realist view of morality.

    Really? Fact is, different societies have different moralities, and even within those different people have different moralities.

    If morality is objective, it must be the case that all but one morality is less than fully moral.

    Is that really the stance you propose?

    So, the proposition put to me is that subjectivism as a stance makes no sense if one additionally accepts the existence of external (mind-independent, that is) moral facts.
    (Which is true, but trivial)

    My response was to the effect that since observed moral systems differ (and implicitly) that therefore what we observe is apparent subjectivism, and then to offer a contrast with the implication of objectivism (not the Randian kind).

    (‘Twas a snippet from a larger comment which itself was a snippet from a larger conversation. And you should by now know — I’ve noted it enough times — that I tailor my comments to whomever I address)

  113. charvakan says

    My response to theists who claim objective morality:

    Objective morality exists
    Raping children is objectively immoral
    Yahweh got children raped (Numbers 31:18)
    Yahweh is objectively Immoral

    Which of these premise you don’t agree with?
    If not we can agree on the conclusion!