We’ve got another troll in the comments — she wouldn’t necessarily be a troll, except for the dead giveaway of asking the same question a dozen times and running away from any answer any of the non-troll commenters might give. The question is, “Does evolution imply atheism?”, and I’m going to have to disagree with most of the people who have already answered it by giving a conditional yes.
First, let’s clear up the incoherence of the question. I understand it as, “Does understanding science [it’s not just biologists who exhibit this phenomenon!] lead to an abandonment of religious beliefs?”, and that’s the question to which I think an affirmative is the correct answer. It ought to; scientific thinking is corrosive to religious belief. However, it is a messier answer than just a “yes” or “no” can properly address, because most people don’t accept a religion for rational reasons, because people are obdurate animals who don’t easily change preconceptions, and because people have different religious backgrounds that can shape their response to science. Here’s why I think that a general yes is the best answer, though.
First, there is the easy case of individuals coming from a fundamentalist background that hysterically asserts a whole barrage of counterfactual claims: that the earth is less than 10,000 years old, that there is an afterlife in which you will be afflicted with hellfire if you don’t obey their particular and peculiar dogma, that there is a god who cares about your penis and who will take requests for miraculous intervention, etc. Science smashes that kind of faith. I know many people who have left such religions specifically because a little dose of scientific knowledge exposes the fact that their preachers have been lying to them for years. There is a good reason that St Augustine cautioned against the common, standard practice of the biblical literalists:
Usually, even a non-Christian knows something about the earth, the heavens, and the other elements of this world, about the motion and orbit of the stars and even their size and relative positions, about the predictable eclipses of the sun and moon, the cycles of the years and the seasons, about the kinds of animals, shrubs, stones, and so forth, and this knowledge he hold to as being certain from reason and experience. Now, it is a disgraceful and dangerous thing for an infidel to hear a Christian, presumably giving the meaning of Holy Scripture, talking nonsense on these topics; and we should take all means to prevent such an embarrassing situation, in which people show up vast ignorance in a Christian and laugh it to scorn. The shame is not so much that an ignorant individual is derided, but that people outside the household of faith think our sacred writers held such opinions, and, to the great loss of those for whose salvation we toil, the writers of our Scripture are criticized and rejected as unlearned men. If they find a Christian mistaken in a field which they themselves know well and hear him maintaining his foolish opinions about our books, how are they going to believe those books in matters concerning the resurrection of the dead, the hope of eternal life, and the kingdom of heaven, when they think their pages are full of falsehoods and on facts which they themselves have learnt from experience and the light of reason? Reckless and incompetent expounders of Holy Scripture bring untold trouble and sorrow on their wiser brethren when they are caught in one of their mischievous false opinions and are taken to task by those who are not bound by the authority of our sacred books. For then, to defend their utterly foolish and obviously untrue statements, they will try to call upon Holy Scripture for proof and even recite from memory many passages which they think support their position, although they understand neither what they say nor the things about which they make assertion.
Augustine isn’t concerned about the validity of science, of course — he’s concerned that saying materially and obviously false things about the natural world will lead to souls being lost to Christianity. And he’s right. All it takes is knocking out a few of the props holding up religious belief, and the whole house of cards can come tumbling down, with much attendant trauma. The people I know who have experienced the most anguish about evolution and leaving the church come from this kind of background, where the threats to apostates are the most dire and the claims about the world most absurd.
But what of more moderate religious belief? Is that also eroded by science? That’s been my personal experience. I did not come out of a fundamentalist background at all — to the contrary, the church of my youth was relatively liberal about science, and never said a negative word about evolution (or any word, for that matter). Yet at the same time, they made a whole series of strange claims that they insisted were the very foundation of their special religious belief: the divinity of Jesus, the trinity, salvation, original sin, etc. Thinking scientifically means that you question assumptions and that you ask epistemological questions and you try to rationally justify the acceptance of ideas, and that’s the antithesis of religious thinking. If you apply scientific reasoning to even that moderate version of religion, it crumbles — there is simply no evidence for any of their claims.
Of course, some people avoid that problem by simply never thinking scientifically about their beliefs. That’s an easy out, because most beliefs aren’t the product of rational thought, anyway…but it’s a cheat, and it doesn’t negate the idea that science is in conflict with religion.
Does science lead inevitably to atheism? No, because individuals can choose to not think scientifically, but also because what it really does is simply destroy the underpinnings of organized religion — the body of dogma that represents assailable claims of fact. That still leaves a few alternatives, with some refuge left untouched in agnosticism and a kind of mushy deism. Of course, to most people who object to godlessness anyway, those are functionally equivalent to atheism.
As to scientific proof…if we equate the lack of proof of pink unicorns to the lack of proof of a supernatural deity, then of course we’re talking about an apples-to-apples comparison. Of course, speaking philosophically rather than scientifically…the concept of a supernatural deity is a little larger in scope.
Simply put…arguing about the existence of God is not a debate one should carry on from a scientific perspective. That answer has already been debated…and it is no. But since when are arguments about the existence of God ever, ever limited to the scope of science? Two different lenses are at work here and this is not in some odd way like talking about Shakespeare in Calculus class and talking about differential equations in British Literature.
Why are people trying to discern between atheism and agnosticism? They are two different constructs where both can be the consequence of the scientific understanding of the world. No reason to believe, no way of knowing – thus science implies both atheism and agnosticism.
The problem with that is that many theists posit God as a force in the universe, God is an entity that plays some role in human affairs – how else would they even be able to claim anything about God that way? i.e. He’s omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, was the giver of life – and man in his own image, creator of sin, came down to earth to impregnante a virgin with himself, lived a life of chastity then was tortured and died only to rise back up to heaven and take away the sin of his own creation. Not to mention he’s 3 deities in one; he’s the father, the son and the holy spirit. He answered prayers, watches over the world, and when people die he is the enternal judge and redeemer. Those who are virtuous go to heaven and those who aren’t go to hell.
This is a pretty set doctrine for a concept that is unknowable. And most of all, many of those claims are well within the scope of science. Take the interaction away and you have a deist God. And what good does that do a theist?
<pedant>Regarding “the concept of a supernatural deity” – supernatural is redundant here; the set of theists is a subset of the set of supernaturalists.</pedant>
There appears to be some awful fine nits being picked in this discussion. I’m not sure such fine distinctions need to be made. Poe-tay-to, Poe-tah-to. Slice either finely and fry, you have what I call spud flakes.
Another two cents. Carry on.
OT but funny.
http://www.bubbygram.com/zenjewishhumor.htm
The Jew and the Athiest
Nerd, you’re spot on. But I figure by the time the comment count hits the multiple hundreds, a little relaxation of standards is allowed – I know full well Jeff used “supernatural” as emphasis.
I admit my own point was redundant.
Stop nitpicking about the nitpicking. ;)
Evolution does not lead to atheism – only to the rejection of unreason (e.g. a young earth, ID).
Hardline atheists like you, PZ, will never be able to confront the hardline fundies adequately, because in proclaiming your atheism so loudly, you have removed any form of common ground on which to engage them. Some of you, but by no means all, treat all religion with the same contempt that is rightly heaped upon the lunatic fringe (i.e. those same young-earth Creationists), when in fact ONLY a religious person with some philosophical common ground can ease these people back off their precipice.
The hardline atheists fail to understand that the people they are trying to save from (in this instance Christian) fundamentalism have been brainwashed into equating lack of belief in God with lack of a moral compass, and rejection of God with rejection of morality (or even with idolatry). That equation is, of course, complete bullshit – though a believer, I’m no more inclined to believe that than Richard Dawkins is. The fundamentalist preachers who spew this bullshit need to be defeated and discredited on their own ground before their hands can be loosened from the grip they have on their believers.
Science education is a necessary component of the battle for hearts and minds, but the sheep over whom the crazies rule won’t listen to even GOOD science education from a person they (have been led to) believe has abandoned all moral restraint. Religion forms the centre of these people’s lives, and the more you insist that science and religion are utterly incompatible, the more you will drive them away rather than gather them in.
Anton: “All that implies is that a strong atheist can also be a weak atheist. Which is stated by the very article Glen cited, if you bothered to read it–it defines “strong atheist” as a subcategory of “weak atheist.”
No kidding. Did you actually read my post?
eric: “The ‘lack of belief’ requirement is obviously entailed by not believing…”
If strong atheism is not believing, and if weak atheism is lacking belief, then I’m clearly saying that strong atheism entails weak atheism. Hence, you’ve obviously misdiagnosed a nonexistent problem.
“It also clears up your confusion over the word “necessary” above; the author means that weak atheists do not necessarily commit themselves to the non-existence of deities, not that they do not consider the non-existence of deities logically necessary.”
No, this is clearly false. That *can’t* be what the author meant by ‘necessary,’ since *that* would imply that weak atheists *can* ‘commit themselves to the non-existence of deities’; however, this is precisely what weak atheists, qua weak atheists, cannot do. Now, you may want to argue that they can *if they are =also= strong atheists*, but the author is here *clearly* defining weak atheism *in contrast* to strong atheism (note the key word *contrasts* in the definition):
“Weak atheism (also called negative atheism) is the lack of belief in the existence of deities, without a commitment to the necessary non-existence of deities. Weak atheism contrasts with strong atheism, which is the belief that no deities exist, and theism, which asserts that there is at least one deity.”
Since the use of the term ‘necessary’ came in a definition of weak atheism *in contrast* to a definition of strong atheism, your reading is obviously false. Further, the term ‘necessary’ qualifies ‘non-existence’; it doesn’t qualify the commitment of the weak atheist. Indeed, it cannot, since weak atheists make no such commitments.
I’ve shown your reading to be false, so, if my reading of ‘necessary’ stands, then my initial criticism of the definition stands.
You do know that misrepresenting PZ invalidates your contention without requiring further analysis, right?
Science does not undercut the value of some religious texts as philosophical or literary pieces, or the value of some religious practices (such as meditation).
Science does undermine the epistemological value of religious mythology.
Eric,
Yes. And that article agrees with you, which is why your objection holds no water.
Sweet Christmas, you still haven’t read the article?
Paragraph 5:
“A strong atheist is also a weak atheist, but the converse is not necessarily true: a weak atheist may assert there is a lack or absence of evidence for justifying a belief in any deity, but he does not necessarily deny the possibility of any deity’s existence.”
Emphasis mine. Oh, and notice where the second “necessarily” is located?
While you’re catching up on your reading, recheck the definition of “contrast.” “Weak atheist” and “strong atheist” don’t need to be mutually exclusive categories in order to be contrasted. They just need to be different categories.
It is entirely possible to, for instance, contrast the definitions of “French” and “Parisian,” even though a Parisian is also French. As long as “Parisian” and “French” are not equivalent, a contrast can be made.
“You have already argued that nothing should be discounted as impossible”
-No I didn’t. There are many things that are known to be impossible and believing in them would of course be entirely irrational.
“Are you now doing a 180 to agree that religious belief that rests on the hypotheses of impossible events are both irrational and illogical?”
As above, I have never suggested that believing in something that is impossible is anything other than irrational. Since, for something to be impossible, it must have been proven to be the case. However, believing in something which is possible, at least in my understanding of the common usage of this term, is entirely rational. As I said, it is entirely rational and common language usage, for me to believe that my football team will not be relegated right up to the point that it is mathematically impossible for them not to be. Of course I do not know they will be relegated until it is mathematically impossible for them to avoid relegation. After this point, it would be irrational for me to believe that they could avoid relegation. Now of course the difference between the event = {relegation} and the event {a God exists} is that the former is in principle measurable. I know how to form a reasonable expectation based historical data. In other words I can calculate an estimate of the likelihood of relegation. But, I do not know how to make the same calculation for the existence of a God, not least because the object is undefined. Therefore, the likelihood that a God exists is undefined and I am inexorably forced to accept that the probability that a God exists may be any number in the closed interval between 0 and 1. It’s quite simple really.
“Utter nonsense, so far as belief is concerned. I believe Caesar crossed the Rubicon. I believe 5 is a prime number. I believe London is the capital of the UK. You cannot know anything without at the same time believing it.”
But you can believe something without knowing it. I admit that there is semantic ambiguity, but it is my common understanding, at least it is the case in the UK, that to believe is to accept a statement without necessarily having evidence. Implicit is the understanding that there is perhaps a high chance that one might be wrong. Hence, proof is not a necessary condition for belief. However, to know something requires proof. Of course that does not mean that one cannot believe something with proof. However, what sense is there in saying I believe or have faith in or have an opinion about the number pi? In my mind it is meaningless. I know that the number pi exists and I can prove it. But the essence of my assertion is that it is entirely rational to believe in an event which attracts a non-zero probability. And, the event {a God exists} may well attract a non-zero probability Of course we do not know this for sure; but we have no right to assume that it is not the case.
“How can we measure the dragon if it’s an intangible object?”
But I said that “we cannot however measure whether an undefined object is in your garage”. I agree with you and it means that we cannot measure whether a God exists either. Therefore, we cannot say that it is impossible that a God exists. Therefore, the event = {a God exists} may attract a non-zero probability. I do not know that it does, but I cannot assume that it does not. And it is my assertion that it is rational to believe in events that attract a non-zero probability.
“In order for me to refute it, I would have to have evidence that it exists”
Cute! But of course there is a willingness to refute the existence of a God without evidence.
“Either you recognize this, and are being intellectually dishonest, or you are a very confused thinker. I believe it is the former.”
I do not claim to be a literary giant and indeed I find the semantics of language difficult. But, nevertheless, I beg to differ. Innumerable means too many to count. That would be false, since there exists in each case a 1 to 1 mapping with the set of integers; the set is countable. Therefore, enumerable is consistent, if at least to you aesthetically unappealing. I freely admit my grammar is lazy, but that does not make me a liar.
“The statement that god is non-existent does NOT require proof.”
No, you are unequivocally wrong. What if I substituted the words ‘elephants are’ for the words ‘god is’, would the statement then require proof? Of course the answer is yes because it is a direct statement of fact and thus requires proof. The statement that one believes that a God does not exist does not require proof; at least in my understanding of the common usage of the term believe which means to accept a statement without necessarily having proof.
Of course, you can’t prove a negative. But the point of atheist is about belief and not knowledge, we can’t know that God doesn’t exist; we just have no reason to believe she does.
I have tried to answer all of your questions (separately for Nerd). My original reason for posting to this blog was because I strongly disagree with the author. My position was attacked and I have defended myself. I am not a troll nor am I a liar and my reasoning is entirely logical. In my view, the only honest position a scientist can take, in generality, in relation to the statement does a God exist is; I don’t know. We are entitled to our own opinions (read beliefs) but not our own facts (unknown citation). The statement that a God does or does not exist requires proof. It is not available; indeed the probability of the event {a God exists} cannot be defined. Therefore, the method of Null Hypothesis is unquestionably impotent. Occam’s razor fails because we do not know the simplest explanation; indeed as to what is the simplest explanation is the very basis of the argument. We are inexorably drawn to the conclusion that the probability that a God exists may be non-zero. This conclusion simply cannot be honestly or scientifically rejected. I assert that it is, in general, perfectly rational to believe or have faith in or have confidence in an event which attracts a non-zero probability. None of this means a God exists; nor does it mean that it is not rational to believe that no Gods exist. As I said, atheism, theism, agnosticism and science are perfectly happy bedfellows. What do I believe in? Humility, tolerance and democracy; I rest my case and will leave you in peace.
So Rich, before you do. You don’t think that the implications of the ground-up approach that the scientific method provides is a dagger in the heart of the top-down approach as pushed by the religious? Surely there must be some case that since everything is build from simplicity and becomes more complex that an entity such as God can’t just be because it’s immensely more complex than everything else observed in nature. So God would need a cause and a plausible cause too? that the appeal to God is really a non-answer, a deflection of any meaningful construct?
Taking that at face value, in what sense is it rational to believe in something the probability of which cannot be defined, which may or may not be non-zero?
Cf. The Invisible Pink Unicorn, the Flying Spaghetti Monster, or Russell’s teapot.
“Of course, you can’t prove a negative.”
No. It is possible to ‘prove a negative’. Indeed scientific investigation largely depends upon this very notion. If you can prove directly that a statement is true, it means that the converse, or negative, is false. As regards empirical investigations, an estimate, say p, of the probability that an event is true should mean that the probability that the event is false, the negative event, is 1-p. Indeed, if it were not the case, it would not be much of a test would it? However, the key point, is that in order for the latter condition to be satisfied, the event in question needs to be measurable and the event := {a God exists} is quite evidently not.
I do not deny atheism is about belief. Indeed that is the very basis of my assertion! And science is about knowledge – not belief.
Rich,
Your approach hinges on their being no quality of god that can be defined. If you are saying a god with no defined qualities can’t be shown to not exist then you are probably correct. But all religions give their gods at least some definable qualities – infinitely powerful, just, good, etc. – aren’t these qualities able to be shown to be either true or false?
it is entirely rational and common language usage, for me to believe that my football team will not be relegated right up to the point that it is mathematically impossible for them not to be. – rich
More rich rubbish. It is not rational to believe your team will not be relegated if they would have to win the remaining 5 games by 10-0 while three other teams would have to lose them by similar margins, and are having to sell players to stay in business. Rationality implies adjusting your beliefs to the balance of the evidence. This is not a trivial point. By your standpoint, it is quite “rational” for global warming denialists to continue believing human activities are not causing climate change, for anti-vaccinators to believe the MMR causes autism, for others (or indeed the same people) to deny the causal links between smoking and lung cancer. You appear to assume a sharp line between evidence and proof, while in science no such line exists.
In the case of religion, there is no good evidence whatever for the existence of any deity. There is abundant evidence against the existence of the Christian god, but there cannot be evidence against the existence of an infinitely shy god, which is omnipotent, but deliberately conceals its existence. Such a god is in exactly the same scientific position as leprachauns; and it is here that Occam’s razor is invoked. This is often now stated as “Choose the simplest hypothesis”, but in the original it was more like “Do not multiply entities beyond necessity” – in other words, do not assume the existence of anything that plays no explanatory role. Since deities, like leprachauns, play no explanatory role, it is unscientific to postulate their existence. As for rationality, if it is accepted that there is no good evidence for a deity, it is precisely as rational to believe in one as to believe in werewolves, leprachauns, the invisible pink unicorn in my garage, etc. If you want to call this kind of completely unjustified but not disprovable belief “rational”, no-one can stop you, but I doubt whether it will catch on and certainly has nothing in common with current usage.
It is not rational to believe your team will not be relegated if they would have to win the remaining 5 games by 10-0 while three other teams would have to lose them by similar margins, and are having to sell players to stay in business. Rationality implies adjusting your beliefs to the balance of the evidence.
True. Ordinary principles of reason and logic dictate that, unless a claim can be established on the balance of probabilities, there is no reason to accept it. As regards the generic existence of a God or gods, there is no evidence either way; thus there is no particular rational reason to assume a God or gods to exist. As regards specific religious claims – such as the Christian claim of the divinity and resurrection of Christ – their truth cannot be established on a balance of probabilities with the evidence available to us; thus, relying on rational thought alone, there is no good reason to accept those claims.
However, this is entirely distinct from the concept of faith. Thinking rationally, there is no good reason for Rich to believe that his team will not be relegated. But he is still entitled to have faith that his team will not be relegated; and he remains entitled to so believe until such time as it becomes mathematically impossible that his team will not be relegated.
At the same time, that faith becomes more and more irrational as it becomes more and more likely that his team will be relegated. Thus, if there is a fifty-fifty chance that his team will not be relegated, then it is not really irrational for him to believe that his team will not be relegated; but if there is a ninety percent chance (mathematically) that it will be relegated, then faith to the contrary is irrational. Likewise, some religious claims are more plausible than others, albeit that none has ever been backed up by clear and unequivocal evidence. For example, having studied and analysed the historical issues, I find Joseph Smith’s claim to have translated the Book of Mormon from golden plates given to him by the Angel Moroni to be an unconvincing claim. It isn’t disproven, but considering other issues (the known falsehood of the Book of Abraham, for instance, and the lack of any extraneous corroboration whatsoever for the Book of Mormon’s claims), it seems to me highly unlikely. In contrast, claimed events further back in the past, such as the resurrection of Christ, are considerably harder to evaluate; there simply isn’t good evidence either way.
Thus, I would assert that reason and faith are separate from and complementary to one another. Until a claim has been empirically disproven, it is possible to have faith in the truth of that claim; but the more unlikely, on the evidence, the claim appears to be, the more irrational it is to believe in the truth of that claim. Some religious claims have been empirically disproven; none has ever been empirically proven; but the others are of varying degrees of plausibility.
“You don’t think that the implications of the ground-up approach that the scientific method provides is a dagger in the heart of the top-down approach as pushed by the religious?”
No, I don’t. And that it not science. It’s not satisfactory, I know, but the fact that you have not seen a man walk on water does not mean that a God does not exist.
Well no shit, but there’s no reason to believe in a God either. Which precisely what atheism is… it’s not the knowledge that God doesn’t exist, it’s the belief. There’s no reason to believe in God, just like there’s no reason to believe in that dragon, just as there is no reason to believe in Russell’s Teapot. If we see no reason for God, then there’s no reason to believe that God does exists.
“More rich rubbish. It is not rational to believe your team will not be relegated if they would have to win the remaining 5 games by 10-0 while three other teams would have to lose them by similar margins”
You are of course aware that you are taking the point out of context. I was attempting to explain, at least in my understanding, the difference between knowing and believing. And, if you read my post, you will have noticed that I observed that it was indeed possible to calculate a probability that my team might be relegated. My point is that no such calculation is available in relation to the existence of a God. Therefore, I do not know what the probability a God exists is. For all I know, it could be 1.
“and it is here that Occam’s razor is invoked. This is often now stated as ‘Choose the simplest hypothesis'”
But we do not have agreement on what the simplest hypothesis is? Currently, the leading hypothesis for the ‘Theory of Everything’ hinges on the existence of higher dimensions – an object for which no evidence of exists. Is it irrational to ‘believe’ in higher dimensions?
“Your approach hinges on their being no quality of god that can be defined.”
You are correct, I am not arrogant enough to believe that I know enough to be able to say with any degree of certainty that no God exists. I of course accept facts related to specific measurable characteristics.
“Well no shit, but there’s no reason to believe in a God either.”
That is a matter of your opinion, to which you are rightly entitled.
“Taking that at face value, in what sense is it rational to believe in something the probability of which cannot be defined, which may or may not be non-zero?”
I am sorry; this really must be the last one. Strictly speaking, the probability is well defined. It is a real number in the closed internal between 0 and 1. In that sense the probability exists. What is not defined is the calculation, or more specifically, the associated measure space. Therefore, it is perfectly possible for the probability to be non-zero. Indeed it could be 1. My assertion is that it is quite rational to believe in an event which may attract a non-zero probability especially when that number is unknown.
It’s the application of the null hypothesis. Science can’t prove the non-existence of any entity, that should be well established. But why believe in something that has no necessity? What does God do now that science has found the methodology of the bottom-up approach to complexity and life? What function does God serve anymore? Why believe in him? This stems back to exactly what PZ was saying in his post. The scientific method and the scientific way of thinking does away with God and leads to implicit atheism.
What does your God do rich? And how does that fit in with the current knowledge base on the way reality works?
You are of course aware that you are taking the point out of context. I was attempting to explain, at least in my understanding, the difference between knowing and believing. And, if you read my post, you will have noticed that I observed that it was indeed possible to calculate a probability that my team might be relegated. My point is that no such calculation is available in relation to the existence of a God. – rich
Not at all. You claimed a belief was rational; I argued it wasn’t. I noted the difference in the case of God.
“and it is here that Occam’s razor is invoked. This is often now stated as ‘Choose the simplest hypothesis'”
But we do not have agreement on what the simplest hypothesis is? Currently, the leading hypothesis for the ‘Theory of Everything’ hinges on the existence of higher dimensions – an object for which no evidence of exists. Is it irrational to ‘believe’ in higher dimensions?
Talk about taking statements out of context. As I noted, Occam’s original formulation was “Do not multiply entities beyond necessity”, and in the current context, that is far more relevant. God is not necessary, therefore postulating a deity is unscientific. As for higher dimensions, in string theories they play an explanatory role, which deities do not – except in the degenerate case of saying “Goddidit”, which since it could explain anything, explains nothing. In fact, you may have noticed that some physicists criticise string theory precisely because it has gone so far beyond what can currently be tested. It is not irrational to look for ways to investigate the possibility higher dimensions exist – to make predictions that can be tested; it would certainly be irrational to “believe” in them in the sense that theists believe in God. Your notion that belief in gods is rational, by contrast, depends absolutely on there being no way to bring evidence to bear on the question.
My assertion is that it is quite rational to believe in an event which may attract a non-zero probability especially when that number is unknown.
Yet more rubbish, combined with an attempt to blind us with mathematics. The existence of a deity is not an “event”: either a god exists, or no god exists, so the “probability” a god exists is either 0, or 1.
I know you’ve probably signed off by now, but if you haven’t – or if you come back later – I’ll throw this in: would you agree that the christian god of the bible does not exist as he is defined by them – i.e. he is infinitely powerful, loving and just but still allows suffering (as discussed in the problem of evil)?
There is no doubt in my mind that their god doesn’t exist; whether or not some other kind of god – one as yet undiscovered by humanity – exists may be true, but we’re getting to the point of what Dawkins referred to as ‘being so open-minded your brains drop out’.
“You are of course aware that you are taking the point out of context. I was attempting to explain, at least in my understanding, the difference between knowing and believing.”
I’ve just spent the last half hour reading through a large section of this argument (isn’t work great?), and it appears that this is the key point in your misunderstanding. You are artificially separating knowledge and belief. Your arguments seem to assume that there’s a set boundary, when in reality there isn’t.
It’s a semantic issue again – knowledge is simply a very strong belief. Your very first point was:
“Since it cannot be proved that a God does not exist, there is no conflict, in generality, between science and faith.”
Which implies (to me at least) that you assume that science deals in absolute facts. Of course it does not – nothing does. By drawing this artificial separation between belief and knowledge you state that science and faith deal in different realms, and hence do not conflict.
Another issue, which is intricately related is the word “proved”. Again this is dealing with absolutes. Nothing can be absolutely shown to be true. Nothing. Again it’s a semantic issue as to where the line is drawn.
On a final note, it may be mathematically impossible for your team to avoid relegation, but is it impossible that everyone who has anything to do with running that team (players, administration, everyone) drops dead prior to the end of the season?
Hopefully it’s clear what I’m trying to articulate.
Guy
“You claimed a belief was rational”
And I still do, so long as what you believe has not been proved to impossible. In the case of the latter, I would accept the results of an empirical experiment.
“God is not necessary, therefore postulating a deity is unscientific.”
But I am not postulating a God. And I am not suggesting that one needs to postulate a God to understand, let’s say gravity. I am saying that it doesn’t mean that a God does not exist. If that is sufficient for you to assume that a God does not exist – good for you. But it does not represent a proof to me.
“The existence of a deity is not an “event”: either a god exists, or no god exists, so the “probability” a god exists is either 0, or 1.”
And you have the unmitigated gall to refer to my comments as rubbish! Of course the existence of a deity is an event. And ultimately, we may know whether one exists or not. The point is; we do not know now. We do not even know what the probability that one exists might be.
“What does your God do rich?”
I didn’t say I believed in a God.
Of course the existence of a deity is an event. – rich
Crap. It is not an “event” in the normal sense of that word (meaning something that happened or might happen), nor does it fit the specialised sense of “event” used in probability theory.
Probability theory, as I assume you are aware, started in the realm of gambling with dice, where there is a set of possible future events to be considered, each of which can be assigned an exact numerical probability based on assumed symmetries of the situation considered (i.e. that the dice are fair). In the case of events such as horse races, or failure of a machine within a certain time, or a differential diagnosis in medicine, approximate probabilities can be calculated by examining the record of past events in the same class. There are no such symmetries, and no such classes of event in the case of the existence or otherwise of a god: we don’t have a “sample of universes” we can examine to see what proportion of them contain a god. Thus there is no sense to assigning a probability to the existence of a god. You are trying to extend a particular form of reasoning beyond its appropriate sphere, and coming up, unsurprisingly, with rubbish.
“You are artificially separating knowledge and belief”
I do not misunderstand. It may be a semantic issue, but they are in my understanding different. Belief does not require evidence. Facts do. Semantics aside, the important point is that we are permitted to have differing beliefs or opinions or whatever you want to call them, but we are not permitted to have different facts. That is my point.
“Which implies (to me at least) that you assume that science deals in absolute facts”
I have of course been rather loose with my language. When I have referred to proof, I was not intending a direct mathematical proof alone. I thought that in most cases I had referred to a direct proof where there was ambiguity. I would of course accept empirical evidence too. Neither is available.
“On a final note, it may be mathematically impossible for your team to avoid relegation, but is it impossible that everyone who has anything to do with running that team (players, administration, everyone) drops dead prior to the end of the season”
Of course it is. What does that change though?
I didn’t say I believed in a God. – rich
True. But your failure to say you don’t, combined with the abysmal quality of your arguments for the claim that belief in a god is rational, make it entirely natural to assume that you do. Why not just tell us, one way or the other?
“There are no such symmetries, and no such classes of event in the case of the existence or otherwise of a god: we don’t have a “sample of universes” we can examine to see what proportion of them contain a god.”
More insults! And you have finally got it. If you had read my posts, you may have got there earlier. The event {a God exists}, and it is an event and it might happen, is not measurable because it is not associated with a well defined measure space as you have described, albeit in a rather rudimentary way. I am not trying to extend Measure Theory beyond its boundaries. I am explaining why it does not help in this case. Hence, the Null Hypothesis is impotent.
“But your failure to say you don’t, combined with the abysmal quality of your arguments for the claim that belief in a god is rational, make it entirely natural to assume that you do.”
You are at liberty to assume what you like. And you clearly feel well informed enough to afford yourself an additional liberty of being insulting. I am looking for the truth. I am not arrogant enough to suggest that I know what it is.
Yours humbly,
An applied probability mathematician.
Does this fall under the “Keep an open mind, but not so open your brain falls out”?
“Dawkins referred to as ‘being so open-minded your brains drop out'”
This is definitely the last one. I agree with this point and sometimes I do feel that my brains are dropping out. Nick Gotts evidently believes that they have already. But that is not, in my opinion, a good argument for closing one’s mind; that is not the action of an honest scientist.
The event {a God exists}, and it is an event and it might happen
The fact that your tenses do not match might have warned you you’re talking rubbish here. In ordinary language, “a God exists” describes a state, not an event, and as we’re agreed probability theory cannot be applied, it’s not an “event” in that sense either.
I am not trying to extend Measure Theory beyond its boundaries. I am explaining why it does not help in this case. – rich
So why on earth were you babbling about assigning probabilities?
I agree, by the way, that talk of the “null hypothesis” also makes no sense here. It’s not a term I’ve used here. The relevant principles are, scientifically, Occam’s razor; and in terms of everyday rationality, the principle of not believing in something you and other people can’t sense directly, without some reason to do so.
Yours humbly, – rich
Liar.
Rich:
Hm. You’ve just asserted that truly believing in the Invisible Pink Unicorn, the Flying Spaghetti Monster, or Russell’s teapot as actual entities is “quite” rational.
Wow.
You think that the belief that tomorrow the Galactic Confederation will contact planet Earth by means of technology unknown to us and demand all humans paint their noses green on pain of annihilation is rational.
I don’t believe you.
John Morales@547,
Of course (as I’m sure you’re aware) rich doesn’t believe the beliefs that you mention are rational. He may possibly say he believes this, but if he encountered people who convinced him they genuinely held any of these beliefs he would, like any other sane person, classify them as irrational if not insane. I think he’s arguing in “bad faith” here: he’s aware at some level that he’s talking rubbish, but can’t admit it even to himself because he’s both a theist, and someone who prides himself on being rational.
“You think that the belief that tomorrow the Galactic Confederation will contact planet Earth by means of technology unknown to us and demand all humans paint their noses green on pain of annihilation is rational.”
Oh crap. I thought that was NEXT week…..
A lot of fun while I was sleeping.
Rich, there are many scientists who believe in god. As long as they keep their god out of science, nobody cares for the most part. So I don’t see what your point is, but then I’m a working scientist and not a philosopher, so philosophical nitpicking bores me.
If you want to believe in god, fine. Do so. But if you want to convince us, nothing short of Moses’ eternally burning bush found in the Dead Sea is going to be evidence enough. Fine philosophical nitpicking isn’t going to do the job.
“a God exists” describes a state, not an event, and as we’re agreed probability theory cannot be applied,”
What if I write {A_t; t>=0}, A:={A God Exists}, t in R+. Is that precise enough for you?
“So why on earth were you babbling about assigning probabilities?”
I am not babbling at all. I have stated in the simplest language that I can muster, that one cannot assign probabilities. Hence, the method of Null Hypothesis is impotent. Hence, the poster who originally posited that his belief in the non-existence of a God was scientifically based on the method of Null Hypothesis was talking, in your rather vulgar vernacular; crap.
“Liar.”
Whatever.
“I’m a working scientist and not a philosopher, so philosophical nitpicking bores me”
And I am a working mathematician. And I am not trying to convince you or anybody else of anything. I am being asked the questions (and insulted) …
I am not babbling at all. I have stated in the simplest language that I can muster, that one cannot assign probabilities. Hence, the method of Null Hypothesis is impotent. Hence, the poster who originally posited that his belief in the
Chupacabra?
Rich, if you aren’t trying to convince somebody of something, why are you trying so hard to do so? If you weren’t trying to convince anybody, you would stop posting.
Ah, my mistake. I assumed your problem was the former, when in fact it was the latter, or some combination of the two. Live and learn.
Radioactive Parisian fruit fly?
What if I write {A_t; t>=0}, A:={A God Exists}, t in R+. Is that precise enough for you? – rich
The formalism doesn’t make the existence of a god an event, in either the natural language or probability theory sense. Nor, to nitpick, is it by any means obvious times can be indexed using the reals. You’re mistaking a mathematical formalism for the real world – a sadly common error among mathematicians.
Strictly speaking, the probability is well defined. It is a real number in the closed internal between 0 and 1. In that sense the probability exists. What is not defined is the calculation, or more specifically, the associated measure space. It is perfectly possible for the probability to be non-zero. Indeed it could be 1. My assertion is that it is quite rational to believe in an event which may attract a non-zero probability especially when that number is unknown. – rich@532
As I said, babbling about probabilities. Either a god exists, or it doesn’t. Therefore the probability of a god existing, if you want to use that language (it has no useful application here) is either 0 or 1.
To return to a point of substance, you deny the applicability of Occam’s razor with the claim that there is doubt about whether “the simplest explanation” of the world would include a god. As I’ve pointed out, this does not deal with Occam’s original formulation. However, sticking to your preferred version, unless the addition of the hypothesis that there is a god does any explanatory work, it is quite clear that any explanation including the claim “and there is a god” is less simple than one that excludes this claim. you have not attempted to claim that postulating the existence of a god does do any explanatory work. The case is then exactly parallel to adding the claim “and there are leprachauns” to a scientific theory. You might argue that if we were to add “and there is no god/are no leprachauns” we would again be making the explanation more complicated, but (at least in fundamental physics), we implicitly add the claim “and there is nothing else relevant to an explanation of how the physical world operates” – we assert the completeness of our theory, and this covers all the possible extraneous and functionless additions we might make to a theory.
I note that you resolutely fail to address the point that there is no difference, in your account, between the “rationality” of believing in a god, and believing in leprachauns, invisible pink unicorns, werewolves, aten-thousand kilometre long sentient jellybean that cries whenever anyone eats a little jellybean, etc. If all you are claiming is that belief in god is as rational as belief in any of these things, I think we’ll all be content to leave things there. If not, you need to show what the difference is. In other words, in my vulgar vernacular, put up or STFU.
rich said
As Nick Gotts pointed out already, I think the problem is that you are a confused thinker. I have gone out of my way to make sure you understood that I am not talking about god being an impossibility. None of us are… yet your whole response here asserts that that’s what I’ve done.
Please try again to understand the difference between “impossible” and “non-existent” in the context of this discussion. If I am to posit that god is impossible, I WOULD need to provide proof of that claim. However, if you are to posit that god EXISTS, you need to provide proof. And I am correct to say that while all things are philosophically possible, their reality, or actual existence requires proof before such a claim can be considered truth.
That was, and still is, my point.
“The statement that god is non-existent does NOT require proof.”
Rich wrote:
“No, you are unequivocally wrong. What if I substituted the words ‘elephants are’ for the words ‘god is’, would the statement then require proof? Of course the answer is yes because it is a direct statement of fact and thus requires proof.”
This is where you are wrong. The answer is still no!
You can claim that elephants are non-existent, without anybody requiring proof (yes, because it’s impossible to prove a non-existence, hence why the null hypothesis don’t require proof)). It’s the person that claim that elephants do exist who has to come up with the proof. And in the case of elephants, that’s quite easy to accomplish. In the case of “god”, not so much….
Kel and Owl,
I’m certain my picking the stuff I like out of the bible and ignoring the less savior parts does not meet the standards set by the scripture believers. For me, certain concepts laid out in the Bible even survive if the mere existence of God himself is questionable. Guess I’m lucky I’m only forbidden to reject or have other gods, and he forgot to add “thou shall not doubt me” to the first commandment. So I’m sure I’d get burned at the stake for that interpretation too.
and for cripes sake, rich… get some thicker skin. Stop complaining about being insulted. You’re really not being attacked as brutally as you are portraying. And “martyr syndrome” is just another slice of evidence that makes us think you aren’t being honest about your beliefs.
If I didn’t know better, I’d think you were demanding our respect out of hand… that doesn’t play well here.
“While you’re catching up on your reading, recheck the definition of “contrast.” “Weak atheist” and “strong atheist” don’t need to be mutually exclusive categories in order to be contrasted. They just need to be different categories.”
Again, no kidding. Since I never claimed they are mutually exclusive categories — in fact, since I explicitly said just the opposite — you’re pounding on an open door. But you err here in your analysis of the term ‘contrast’ in this way: while one may contrast categories that are not mutually exclusive, *the differences contrasted* are, by definition, mutually exclusive. Once you get *this*, you’ll see why your reading of the term ‘necessary’ *in the definition* is simply wrong.
“Sweet Christmas, you still haven’t read the article?”
Um, I had read the article, but apparently I read it carefully and, most importantly, *critically*, while you did not. (Note the nice example there of categories that are not mutually exclusive, and of differences that are.) Unlike you, I believe it’s possible for an unsourced article on the internet to be incoherent (you did notice that it was unsourced, didn’t you?). Your entire argument presupposes the coherence of the article, which is why you’re blind to any criticism of it.
“The formalism doesn’t make the existence of a god an event, in either the natural language or probability theory sense. Nor, to nitpick, is it by any means obvious times can be indexed using the reals. You’re mistaking a mathematical formalism for the real world – a sadly common error among mathematicians.”
The event that a God exists, in other words the first time, which may not happen, that a God is detected, is clearly and unequivocally an event in time. I did not specify the exact form of the process because I can’t? This is my point. As regards convergence, I will cheat as usual and make the required assumptions!
“you deny the applicability of Occam’s razor with the claim that there is doubt about whether “the simplest explanation” of the world would include a god.”
No. I deny the applicability of Occam’s razor to determine whether, in generality, a God exists.
“I note that you resolutely fail to address the point that there is no difference, in your account, between the “rationality” of believing in a god, and believing in leprachauns…”
I have addressed this directly and repeatedly. What else can I say? If the event is not measurable, I cannot assume that it is false or true and I am in no position to say which of the un-measurable events to which you refer are more or less likely. Perhaps you are.
“Therefore the probability of a god existing, if you want to use that language (it has no useful application here) is either 0 or 1.”
Not that it matters, but this statement is not correct. The event is true or false, 0 or 1 if you like. But the probability of the event being true or false is a random variable, in other words a real valued function mapping an event to a real number in the closed interval between 0 and 1 (by definition). In this case, the mapping does not exist. This is again, my point.
“You can claim that elephants are non-existent”
Nope. I would require proof. And, you can prove a negative, either directly or empirically, providing the event is measurable. In the latter case, the probability that an elephant does not exist is implied by the probability that an elephant does exist. I am sorry, but you are simply wrong. However, it does mean that scientists should stick to making statements which they can prove and not go about applying the method of Null Hypothesis in circumstances in which it is not warranted.
The event that a God exists, in other words the first time, which may not happen, that a God is detected – rich
“Exists” does not mean the same as “is detected”.
the probability of the event being true or false is a random variable,…
An event is neither true nor false. It makes absolutely no sense to say that that whether a god exists or not is a “random variable”.
in other words a real valued function mapping an event to a real number in the closed interval between 0 and 1 (by definition). In this case, the mapping does not exist
Oh I see, it’s a real-valued function that doesn’t exist. Can you really not see what garbage you’re spouting?
In any case, why not cut the crap and tell us whether you are claiming that belief in a god is more rational than belief in leprachauns, werewolves, invisible pink unicorns, or ten thousand kilometer sentient jellybeans? If you’re not, there’s nothing to argue about. If you are, you need to say why.
“If I am to posit that god is impossible, I WOULD need to provide proof of that claim. However, if you are to posit that god EXISTS, you need to provide proof.”
I am not positing a God exists. I am just asserting that as scientists we cannot reject the possibility that a God may exist and that we have no idea how likely or unlikely it is. That is all. Is that really so hard or contentious? Anyway, whatever you beliefs – good luck with them (and Mr. Gotts, I can assure you that I am sincere).
Rich:
Define “to exist.” Can something exist if its existence is not verifiable (this seems to be what you are claiming is possible for God)? What does it mean to exist if there is no way to demonstrate that existence?
I would define “to exist” as “to be independently verifiable” or, equivalently but in the language of physics, “to have energy.” Does God have energy? If so, God’s existence is in principle verifiable and belief in God’s existence without evidence is irrational.
Incidentally, in what sense does pi exist? Pi is irrational, so to specify it we need an arbitrary amount of precision. But there is a finite amount of atoms in the universe with which we could indicate the digits of pi. We can’t even represent pi within the constraints imposed by material existence; how could it exist? Pi is an ideal like the ideal gas law or a radiating black body. It is not a real thing.
Finally, you’ve been saying that it’s irrational to believe (or not believe) anything without “proof.” But there IS no scientific proof. No such thing. Empirical observations admit uncertainty, and with systemic uncertainty in every step of the scientific process, it is impossible to prove anything. Which, incidentally, means that nothing is actually impossible despite your claims to the contrary.
Let me ask, though: is it useful to you to admit the possibility that leprechauns exist? Does it serve any functional purpose? How useful is it to affirm the possibility of the truth of a non-verifiable proposition?
I understand that “usefulness” is not the same as “truth,” but there is a difference between mathematical truth and scientific truth (see paragraph above re: empiricism). For a definition of scientific truth, I would say that any independently verifiable proposition is defined as “true” (though always provisionally) — notice the close connection between my definitions for truth and existence.
If you think it’s possible to do better for a definition of “truth” or “existence,” please state your case.
“Exists” does not mean the same as “is detected”.
But for practical purposes they do coincide in this case do they not?
“An event is neither true nor false”
An event happens or it does not, it that context it is typically understood to be true or false.
“Oh I see, it’s a real-valued function that doesn’t exist.”
Correct. It means that the probabilities cannot be assigned, as we have already agreed.
“Can you really not see what garbage you’re spouting?”
Perhaps you would like to refer your assessment of Measure Theory to Mr. Kolmogorov.
“If you’re not, there’s nothing to argue about. If you are, you need to say why.”
I already answered this question explicitly. Can you read? This is a science blog right? How can I compare two undefined objects? I cannot distinguish. I’ll make it easier for you; I CANNOT DISTIGUISH.
Humbly, once again.
Is that really so hard or contentious?
It wouldn’t be, but you won’t answer whether you’re saying it’s any more rational to remain agnostic about the existence of the referent of “a God” than that of the cosmic jellybean, or any of an infinite number of frankly silly and unparsimonious ideas.
Is the existence of god more or less likely that the cosmic jellybean? If not (or if less!), then it would seem we all essentially agree. Remaining coy on this point is what’s causing Nick and others to suspect that we do not, in fact, agree.
rich,
If all you are saying is that there is no proof there are no gods, no-one is disagreeing with you. The point of contention is whether it is rational to believe something just because it cannot be disproved.
and Mr. Gotts, I can assure you that I am sincere – rich
Such an assurance is of course worthless if one already doubts the sincerity of the source. I might believe you if you abandon your cowardly refusal to say whether you are claiming belief in a god is more rational than belief in leprachauns. If not, we can substitute “leprachauns” for “a god” in all your utterances here, and you will still stand by them. So, for example:
“it is rational to believe that leprachauns exist”,
and
“as scientists, we cannot reject the possibility that leprachauns may exist and that we have no idea how likely or unlikely it is.”
Dan L. Thank you for your post.
“What does it mean to exist if there is no way to demonstrate that existence?”
That is a very good question. In my opinion, the most informative question so far. Indeed how would one define existence for an undefined object? I do not know. That is in essence my point.
“Incidentally, in what sense does pi exist?”
I can characterize pi even if I cannot write it down. The point is that it is a fact. Do you deny the existence of pi?
“you’ve been saying that it’s irrational to believe (or not believe) anything without “proof.”
No, I said it is irrational to believe in something which is impossible. It is not, in my view, in generality irrational to believe in something which is not impossible (allowing for semantics of course) and I also accept empirical evidence as shall we say sufficient proof, if not a direct proof. Many things are impossible, but only in the context of assumptions. Relatively impossible I suppose you could say. For example, I think we can agree that it is impossible for 2+2 to equal 5 under the usual field assumptions etc.
“How useful is it to affirm the possibility of the truth of a non-verifiable proposition?”
Scientists should of course stick to making statements they can “prove”. That doesn’t mean we should not be interested in truth though does it? And closing one’s mind is not helpful, at least in my opinion. Who knows where thoughts can lead you?
“If you think it’s possible to do better for a definition of “truth” or “existence,” please state your case.”
I am sorry, I do not know a better answer.
“I am just asserting that as scientists we cannot reject the possibility that we live in the Matrix where all we see is actually an illusion and that we have no idea how likely or unlikely it is.”
How do those two statements differ? Or do they?
The point of contention is whether it is rational to believe something just because it cannot be disproved. – Of course it isn’t; but it isn’t necessarily irrational either. This might seem like hairsplitting, but read on.
I might believe you if you abandon your cowardly refusal to say whether you are claiming belief in a god is more rational than belief in leprachauns.
Though I know this wasn’t addressed to me, I will answer that question. Yes, I do think that belief in the Christian God (as an example; the same could be said of some, but not all, other faiths) is more rational than belief in leprechauns, albeit that it is not entirely rational.
What is the difference between belief in God and belief in leprechauns? Both are, in and of themselves, untestable and unfalsifiable; thus one makes a completely arbitrary choice, to believe or not believe. Discussing it is, essentially, just a sophisticated form of navel-gazing. But when one moves away from the unanswerable generic question of “does God exist?” and towards the specific question of “are the claims of religion X valid?”, then the question becomes a different one.
For instance, the specific claim of Christianity – that Jesus of Nazareth was a divine being who was resurrected from the dead – is a material claim of fact, and therefore is, in theory, testable and falsifiable. Unfortunately, its alleged occurrence was so long ago that we don’t have any solid evidence either way – just hearsay and second- or third-hand written accounts which may or may not be accurate – that we can’t make a real pronouncement on the subject. But the point is, Christianity goes beyond asserting merely that “there is a God”, a claim which we cannot evaluate empirically. It claims that a specific person, living in a specific period in an identified Roman province under an identified Roman governor (Pontius Pilate, whose existence has been corroborated from other sources), was physically resurrected from the dead. This is a claim of material fact, and can be tested.
So how does this apply to leprechauns? If one were to assert “leprechauns exist, but they are invisible and intangible, and we can’t identify their effects on the material world”, then this would be an untestable claim, just like a generic claim of the existence of a supernatural God or gods. Thus, there would be no particular reason to believe it; choosing to do so would be arbitrary. But if one were to assert “a leprechaun called Eric appeared to a number of Irish villagers in July 1868 and gave them each a pot of gold before disappearing”, this would be a material claim of fact and therefore, in theory, would be empirically testable and falsifiable. If the only evidence available to us was hearsay and eyewitness accounts, most people would be inclined to be sceptical, due to the lack of strong evidence. But in those circumstances I wouldn’t condemn someone, or label them irrational, for believing in Eric the leprechaun. Would you?
“Is the existence of god more or less likely that the cosmic jellybean?”
So let me get this straight. This is a science blog and you want me as a mathematician to make a statement as regards the comparison between two undefined quantities. I cannot oblige. I do not know how to. I will repeat; I cannot distinguish. If you feel able to make such a comparison, it’s up to you.
“I might believe you if you abandon your cowardly refusal to say whether you are claiming belief in a god is more rational than belief in leprachauns.”
But I have not made this claim. I do not know how to evaluate it. I am not saying they are not the same. I am saying I don’t know.
What is the difference between belief in God and belief in leprechauns? Both are, in and of themselves, untestable and unfalsifiable; thus one makes a completely arbitrary choice, to believe or not believe. – Walton
In the first case, one does not in general choose what to believe; I cannot just decide to believe in leprachauns. more important, whether one adopts such a belief is not arbitrary; my disbelief in both gods and leprachauns is part of a coherent view of what the world is like – so beliefs that are in and of themselves untestable and unfalsifiable can still be adopted or rejected because they follow from (or contradict) beliefs that are testable or falsifiable – in this case, my belief that there is no such thing as magic or the supernatural, which is falsifiable.
If the only evidence available to us was hearsay and eyewitness accounts, most people would be inclined to be sceptical, due to the lack of strong evidence. But in those circumstances I wouldn’t condemn someone, or label them irrational, for believing in Eric the leprechaun. Would you?
I most certainly would label them irrational. Enough is known about the unreliability of eyewitness reports, let alone hearsay, and about the tendency of such claims to turn out to be false on close investigation, for it to be quite irrational to accept an eyewitness report of a miracle or magic event, without at the very least a sheaf of similar independent reports, careful questioning of witnesses, and systematic attempts to find alternative explanations.
rich,
You are now saying you don’t know whether belief in a god is more rational than belief in leprachauns. Since you have said that belief in a god is rational, this means that at the least, you do not know that belief in leprachauns is irrational. In other words, you’re a dingbat.
Rich said “This is a science blog and you want me as a mathematician to make a statement as regards the comparison between two undefined quantities.”
If this is such a big deal for you how could you possibly think it is ok to believe in something with “undefined quantities”?
Whatever an “undefined quantity” is?
Nick Gotts at #574 – we’re really going round in circles here. I don’t think we disagree on many of the key premises here, just the conclusion. Let’s look at it in step-by-step points (keeping the leprechaun analogy, because I rather like it):
(1) If one were to say “leprechauns exist, but they are invisible and intangible, and we can’t detect their effects on the material world”, then this would be an untestable and unfalsifiable claim. Ditto for a generic statement of the existence of a God or gods.
(2) Thus, rationally, there is no obvious reason to believe in a God or gods, any more than there is to believe in leprechauns.
(3) However, if one were to claim “a leprechaun called Eric manifested himself in East Nowhere, County Mayo, in 1868, and gave out pots of gold to all the villagers before disappearing without a trace”, and adduced as evidence some second- or third-hand accounts based on hearsay, this would be, in theory, a testable and falsifiable claim. Ditto for the resurrection of Christ, and for most other purported religious events.
(4) The “Eric the leprechaun” claim of point (3) is not backed up by sufficient evidence to, rationally, merit acceptance. Therefore, reason alone would not motivate anyone to believe in Eric the leprechaun. Again, ditto for the resurrection of Christ, various miracles, et cetera.
Up to this point I think we agree. It’s here that we diverge:
(5) Imagine you read the story of Eric the leprechaun. You research it and review all the available evidence. Based on the information available to you, you cannot be sure whether Eric the leprechaun existed; the purported eyewitness accounts could be simple lies, they could be the product of mass hysteria, they could be distorted third-hand accounts of a perfectly explicable event, or a number of other natural explanations. What does a rational person conclude?
I would argue that a rational person would be open-minded as to the existence of Eric the leprechaun. On the facts, Eric might exist or he might not.
For this reason, for instance, I am generally open-minded as to the reality of ghosts, near-death experiences, occult events, miracles and purported religious experiences, et cetera. There are many accounts of such occurrences, the credibility of which varies drastically – some are undoubtedly fabricated, or have plausible natural explanations – but based on the evidence available, I would never make a sweeping statement such as “ghosts do not exist” or “miracles do not occur”. Rationally, surely one should take the same approach to the divinity of Christ?
Of course, this is perhaps where the analogy ends – since Eric the leprechaun does not purport to promise eternal salvation, nor does he say “Blessed are those who have not seen, and yet still believe.” There is no reason why I would have to make a concrete decision as to whether I believe in Eric the leprechaun, because nothing in particular rests on it. In contrast, Christians believe that the choice of whether or not to have faith in Christ is the most important of all life-choices.
I would argue that a rational person would be open-minded as to the existence of Eric the leprechaun. On the facts, Eric might exist or he might not.
For this reason, for instance, I am generally open-minded as to the reality of ghosts, near-death experiences, occult events, miracles and purported religious experiences, et cetera. – Walton
Walton, I know you believe in all sorts of absurd rubbish, from God to “free markets”. Just because you are excessively credulous, there is no reason I should be. None of these tales of ghosts, miracles etc. have ever stood up to thorough investigation: either they were disproved, or there was simply insufficient evidence to decide if we consider only that specific case. But if we have any sense, we don’t. We ask: if there were any reality to such woo, why has every case where there is sufficient evidence turned out to be explained by fraud, error, or some other natural phenomenon? Why are ghosts, miracles, leprachauns, telepathy, reincarnation, magic, etc. etc. so shy? Why do the kinds of supernatural events reported change over time and space, like fashions? (You won’t find much ectoplasm being produced these days, or many penis-stealing magicians in Croydon.) By far the simplest explanation, and therefore the one we should adopt until it is disproved, is that none of these things exist.
Yet there is not one incident of these things being supported by any verifiable evidence.
Do a search for NDE on this blog and you’ll find some long discussions about those.
blockquote fail but I see Nick addressed what I was saying as I was failing.
Rich:
If you really mean what you’re saying, you actually mean that for anything people tell you exist, you think it’s rational to belive that it might? If that goes for “god”, it goes for The Flying Spaghettimonster, pink unicorns and anything else the imagination can come up with. Do you _REALLY_ mean that?
If I tell you that there are orange dottet Zebras, you will say that there might be? Because you can’t prove otherwise? Or is it_RATIONAL_ to think that I’m full of it, and no such thing exists? So, as long as neither of us can prove that they exist or not, it’s _rational_ to believe it might exist such an animal? I think you need to look up the word rational.
From wikipedia: Rational: Characterized by truth or logic.
If you really mean what you are saying, why are you wasting our time with your delusions?
Posted by: Rev. BigDumbChimp, KoT, OM
Yet there is not one incident of these things being supported by any verifiable evidence.
Do a search for NDE on this blog and you’ll find some long discussions about those.
Chimpy, I have to correct you on this; you you find repeated bugfuck insane ravings from the imprisoned Kenny on the subject.
True. With some of us giving studies and info on how wrong he was.
But mostly bugfucking insanity from K-Toad
eric,
Really? In fact, you’ve actually made both claims.
Mutually exclusive:
“That *can’t* be what the author meant by ‘necessary,’ since *that* would imply that weak atheists *can* ‘commit themselves to the non-existence of deities’; however, this is precisely what weak atheists, qua weak atheists, cannot do.”
Not mutually exclusive:
“If strong atheism is not believing, and if weak atheism is lacking belief, then I’m clearly saying that strong atheism entails weak atheism.”
Oh, and in that latter quote you also defined “strong atheism” as “not believing.” That conflicts with your prior statement that a strong atheist must “assert that god doesn’t exist.” What’s that you were saying about incoherency on the internet?
Sure. So? Look up–your explicit claim, again, was that “weak atheist” and “strong atheist” are mutually exclusive, and that the author of the article also holds this position. You were talking about the categories, not the “differences contrasted.”
Huh. Funny, you weren’t complaining about the sourcing before.
So what exactly is your problem with its being unsourced? Are you claiming that it significantly misrepresents the common definitions of weak and strong atheism? If so, would you like to provide a better-sourced article which would support your original claim that atheism entails “ruling out *any* possible god?”
I mean, the Wiki articles are better sourced, but I really don’t think they’re going to help you on that count….
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atheism
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Weak_and_strong_atheism
Ah, I see. Because you failed to understand the definitions provided by the article, while the rest of us managed to do so, the article is incoherent. The Principle of Anti-Charity, eh?
From picking nits to NDE? What a drop in rationality. Next up, how many angels can dance on the head of a pin.
Rich,
You cannot say a number is “well defined” if it’s the product of an unknown calculation based on an unknown measure space. How do you know there’s a single measure space that would be most appropriate to use here? If there is, how do you know it’s finite and therefore can be normalized to a probability space in some non-arbitrary way? How do you know the set of possible gods, or possible god-run realities, or whatever the relevant set is, is a measurable one?
Walton, I know you believe in all sorts of absurd rubbish, from God to “free markets”.
These things are hardly comparable. I freely admit that I’m fairly unsure as to the existence of God, and I try to keep an open mind on religious and spiritual matters, given the obvious lack of evidence (as we’ve discussed).
In contrast, free markets do not rest on “faith” or “belief”. The free market, as you know full well, is a specific economic model, not a belief system. “Free” isn’t a value judgment; it’s a descriptor of how the model operates (“free” in the sense of “not centrally controlled or managed”, not “free” as in “freedom and apple pie”). The term isn’t trying to imply that the mere existence of market mechanisms makes people “free” on its own (that would certainly be an unsustainable belief). Like all economic models, it doesn’t always work perfectly – market failure is a reality in some areas, because of problems such as negative externalities and the depletion of public goods, of which the market on its own cannot take account. But as a general rule, with some exceptions, it tends to be better at delivering general freedom and prosperity than is government control or central planning. So when I say “I believe in free markets”, this is lazy shorthand for “based on empirical evidence, current economic theory and logical deduction, it can be seen that a free market mechanism is, in most sectors of the economy, the most effective way of achieving economic growth, rapid wealth creation and general prosperity.” It is not comparable to religion in the slightest. It does not rest on “belief” in an abstract, unknowable and inherently unprovable entity.
As you know full well, it is intellectually dishonest to compare “belief in God” to advocacy of a particular socio-economic model.
None of these tales of ghosts, miracles etc. have ever stood up to thorough investigation: either they were disproved, or there was simply insufficient evidence to decide if we consider only that specific case. But if we have any sense, we don’t. We ask: if there were any reality to such woo, why has every case where there is sufficient evidence turned out to be explained by fraud, error, or some other natural phenomenon? Why are ghosts, miracles, leprachauns, telepathy, reincarnation, magic, etc. etc. so shy?
I think you may have slightly misunderstood me. I don’t believe in ghosts, telepathy, magic, etc. Most of it is almost certainly fabricated or the result of hysteria. But I’m pointing out that surely open-mindedness is a better approach to take? If one doesn’t have to make a concrete decision as to the reality of something, why do so?
As regards religion specifically, it is true that most purported divine interventions within recent history are, on the evidence available, highly likely to be fabricated. (Joseph Smith’s claim to have received golden plates from the Angel Moroni being a good example. I mean no disrespect to any Mormons who may be reading this; but I am personally sceptical, based on a thorough review of the evidence.) But when it comes to events further back, we simply don’t have enough evidence to make a clear determination. For instance, I certainly couldn’t dismiss out of hand the Prophet Mohammed’s claim to have received a revelation from God; there isn’t enough clear evidence either way. Ditto for the resurrection of Christ, or (going further back) most of the divine interventions in the Hebrew Bible.
One can of course make the argument – as you have – that if we can thoroughly debunk virtually all purported divine interventions and supernatural occurrences on which there is a substantial amount of available evidence, why shouldn’t we presume that those for which there is insufficient evidence are also unlikely to be true? And that is a strong argument for which I do not have a decisive rejoinder. But I will merely say that some seem to me to be more plausible than others.
I’ve now read all the way to comment 400. By that rate, I should keep up with the end of the thread by tomorrow evening or something…
Comment 140:
How is silence any less physical than a testimony? And why did you suddenly move the goalposts from “scientific” to “physical”?
142:
Are you sure God is the most parsimonious explanation for explicability?
Why do we find it beautiful?
I suppose if we’d find the whole world unbearably ugly, we’d kill ourselves instead of reproducing. In other words, we’ve been selected for finding the world beautiful, the exact same way that we’ve been selected for being afraid in the dark (those who weren’t afraid in the dark have all been eaten by the hyenas).
206:
Sure. After all, it’s — for all I know — just as probable that the Sumerian religion is the right one and everyone’s shadow, completely regardless of faith, works, grace or anything, will go to a dark, depressing underworld and eat mud for eternity, or, on the other hand, that Christianity is right and Hell exists but is empty because God stretches out His hand to everyone after death (this, incidentally, is what I was taught), never mind the possibility that there’s no afterlife at all whatsoever. Given this diversity, apathetic agnosticism is the only feasible option; converting to every religion just in case (see YouTube) is physically impossible.
227:
But what is the point of presenting an opinion without even trying to defend it?
248:
WTF?
(Also, didn’t you know that science cannot prove, only disprove?)
I support Scientific Triassicism!!!
The idea that the truth must lie in the middle is a logical fallacy.
Well, duh. “Evolution” means “descent with heritable modifications”. Individuals cannot evolve, populations do. Don’t use words if you don’t know what they mean. Incidentally, this also holds for “theory”.
304:
Still doesn’t work. Birds appearing at the same time as “fish” and before all land animals contradicts the evidence blatantly. Nice (and very common) try.
314:
This phenomenon is common, though. Compare: Global warming isn’t happening, and it’s not our fault, and it’s actually a good thing, and it’s too late now to do anything about it.
369:
Complete nonsense. The premise is not just wrong, but also unnecessary. If you want me to elaborate, tell me.
Indeed not. And drop the pointless pre-orthographic h already. :-)
398:
Bullshit. In English (and German and French), the word “God” tends to be treated, strangely enough, as a proper name (it’s not given an article and used to refer to one particular god), so capitalizing it makes plenty of sense in those many cases.
I certainly couldn’t dismiss out of hand the Prophet Mohammed’s claim to have received a revelation from God; there isn’t enough clear evidence either way. Ditto for the resurrection of Christ
What about Osiris and Mithras? You can’t possibly consider the modern persistence of an ancient idea in one case versus another to provide support for the claim. If (counterfactually) Mithraism had survived at the expense of Christianity, which petered out (ha!) sometime in the 3rd Century, would you be giving Mithras a pass and scoffing at the clumsy myth of a peasant from an obscure corner of Galilee who was resurrected?
In my opinion, your suspension of judgement on stories with all the hallmarks of myth is entirely misplaced. Nick’s arguments re: ghosts, psychic powers and all the rest apply just as well here. The older the tale, the murkier the facts of the matter, the more likely it is the product of mythmaking, not less.
I will merely say that some seem to me to be more plausible than others.
But on what basis do you make this determination? That’s the point. What makes the resurrection of an individual whose very existence can be called into question more plausible than a kitschy story of divine revelation via golden plates, which at least has a known historical figure as its protagonist?
I’m sorry, it’s clear that you DON’T understand what people are here referring to as a null hypothesis.
One can disprove the null hypothesis “elephants don’t exist” by proving its negation. But one cannot directly prove that “elephants don’t exist.” How could you? You could photograph every square inch of Africa and India, not find a single elephant, give me all this evidence, and I could say “no, silly, elephants live in the arctic!” or on Mars, or in the Andromeda galaxy. You can only ever disprove a negative; never prove one (at least in an empirical context). The fact that I can’t prove that “unicorns don’t exist” doesn’t mean that I can’t rationally believe that unicorns don’t exist. (Then again, you never defined “rational.” For a mathematician, you’re not very good at defining terms.)
Given that one can NEVER directly prove any proposition of the form “X does not exist,” it’s silly to say that a belief of the form “x does not exist” is irrational. If that’s the case, then I’m forced to believe in EVERYTHING if I want to be rational. Literally everything. An uncountable infinity of things.
Incidentally, I already pointed out to you why “proof” is not coherent in an empirical context. Why do you keep demanding something you simply can’t have? Seems a little…irrational. Since proof is impossible in science, just about any possibility is admitted. It’s the mathematicians (myself included, I suppose) that need to keep their minds open.
Speaking of irrational, I assert that pi does not, in fact, exist. You may be able to prove that pi is the ratio of a circle’s circumference to its diameter given the axioms of Euclidean geometry, but that doesn’t mean it exists. See: my definition of existence. Pi doesn’t have an energy and thus it’s not detectable. But then again, you seem to be a Platonist and I am emphatically NOT a Platonist. (Also, this universe is not Euclidean. In general, there are no perfect circles, but if there were, pi would not be the ratio of the circumference to the diameter in general, due to relativity.)
Finally, if you accept my definition of existence and assume that God’s existence cannot be verified, then it is irrational to believe in God and rational not to believe in God. Since God’s existence can’t be verified by one person, it cannot be verified by independent observers, and thus God cannot, by definition, exist.
“Does evolution imply atheism?”
I think another way to answer this question is less philosophical and less general. When I first read the question and title of this article I understood the question to be. “Does evolution disprove god?” One reason for this is because sadly there are many people out there that take issue with evolution and science in general because they think, those like us (atheists) believe it does. So many are absolutely determined to see our position as atheists as a positive affirmation just like their faith is. We all know this isn’t the case. Atheism is not the believe that Christians, Jews, Muslims, ect are wrong. That’s an entirely self centered view to have of atheism.
As an atheist, I think the answer to the question, as I’ve noted I understood it above, is, “No.”
Evolution does not mean that god is not possible. That’s not why it’s such a hit with atheists. The beauty of evolution is that it explains the diversity of life WITHOUT the necessity of god.
That a theist would twist this around and demand that it’s the same thing as saying “God is impossible.” is highly indicative of their intellectual nature.
Of course they don’t, but that’s not the question at hand. It’s if beliefs are irrational if they are without evidence. And it could be argued in a world of bottom-up design where complexity is emergent that a being that defies that principle, one who is the creator of the universe and everything in it, is an absurdity because of the sheer improbability of something like that just existing.
I can verify the existence of a vengeful god, because for my sins, I’ve read through this whole thread. As a noob here, you may not be interested in my opinions, but through the wonder of the internet, here they are anyway:
I think you guys are quite simply talking past each other. I deal with loons on a daily basis: not only religious nutjobs, but new-agey types, parapsychology buffs, occultists, Foucaultian “postmodernists,” et endless cetera. They all seem to be afflicted by the same condition as Rich, which I believe is that while the rest of us have an organ for evaluating probabilities, they have a simple two-position “Belief Switch” inside their heads.
For them, If it’s impossible to mathematically prove that some entity or phenomenon doesn’t exist, that constitutes absolute proof that it DOES exist. Most of us would say that telepathy or clairvoyance or whatever either happens or it doesn’t. If it does happen, it’s by definition “natural” and not supernatural, if it doesn’t, we’re under no obligation to explain it. To these two-toned thinkers, however, just because someone, somewhere has asserted the existence of such a phenomenon, and I can’t prove through my omniscience that it has NEVER happened in the history of the world, that PROVES that it does happen. Q.E.D.
Mathematicians too, seem to think that “non-zero” probability equals “worth worrying about.” There’s a non-zero probability that all the air molecules in this room could find themselves in the opposite half to the one I’m sitting in, but I’m not holding my breath waiting for it, and the probability of that is enormously greater than the existence of the Flying Spaghetti Monster, or YHWH the Wind God.
Trying to talk people into using a part of their brain that doesn’t exist is a mug’s game, I’ve found, but don’t let me put a damper on the argument: I love this blog!
Who is saying God is not possible? Surely taking away the necessity of God would imply there’s no reason to believe in him.
What makes the resurrection of an individual whose very existence can be called into question more plausible than a kitschy story of divine revelation via golden plates, which at least has a known historical figure as its protagonist?
I don’t find Joseph Smith’s claims credible for a number of reasons. Firstly, some years after he claimed to have received the golden plates from which he translated the Book of Mormon, he purchased an ancient papyrus from a travelling salesman. He purported to translate this papyrus, producing a work known as the “Book of Abraham” which the LDS Church still regards today as a scriptural text. At the time, hieroglyphics were unreadable; but since part of the papyrus was discovered in 1966 in the Metropolitan Museum of Art, modern Egyptologists have concluded that it was an ordinary funerary text and had nothing to do with Abraham.
There’s also the fact that the Book of Mormon, while it purports to describe the actual history of tribes of Jewish descent in the Americas, is not corroborated by any secular history or archaeology, and no location named in the book has been positively identified. Furthermore, it describes several animals and plants which are not thought to have existed in pre-Columbian America; and, even accepting the text at face value, the rate of population growth which it describes among the Nephites and Lamanites would have been near-impossible, considering normal prehistoric life expectancy and death rates.
To any LDS readers, I apologise for making disparaging remarks towards your religion, and I have the highest respect for many LDS people. But I must be honest; based on the available evidence, I am sceptical of the basis of the Mormon faith.
As to what makes the claim of the resurrection more plausible, the simple answer is that I’m not sure. I’m by no means a convinced or committed Christian believer. I’m not trying to argue that everyone should believe, only that it’s not inherently irrational to do so.
Okay, Walton, but derive some general principles for me. I don’t need to be told, in specific, why the Mormon foundation myth is ludicrous; it’s ludicrous. I want to know on what basis you suspend judgement on equally ludicrous claims from older, more established traditions.
Criticisms like these, from Shredding the Gospels, are no kinder to the passion accounts of the gospels than you are to the Book of Mormon (and do cut it out with your bowing and scraping to Mormon insanity. It’s insanity, and it’s not respectable in the least):
Mark’s trial is at night. The Sanhedrin was forbidden to hold trials at night.
Mark’s trial happens at the home of the high priest. The Sanhedrin was permitted to hold trials only in the Gazith Hall at the Temple.
Mark’s trial is held on Passover. This is perhaps the greatest implausibility of the story. Jewish law absolutely forbid any such activity on high holy days or on the sabbath.
Jesus is given a death sentence immediately. Jewish law required that a death sentence could not be pronounced until 24 hours after the trial.
Mark has Jesus being convicted of blasphemy for claiming to be the Messiah: Claiming to be the Messiah was in no way blasphemous nor any violation of Jewish law. The Jewish Messiah was (and is) not God. There is no way that a person claiming to be the Messiah could have been convicted of blasphemy.
So? Apply the same scepticism to the Old and New Testaments that you just did to the Book of Mormon. Is there anything in the OT that says that God will ever have a child? The verses that Christians point to in Isaiah and Jeremiah and so on are weak and vague; they certainly say nothing explicit on the topic. Is there anything in the OT about Original Sin? Again, it’s something made up, after the fact, in the NT, to account for what Jesus was supposedly incarnated-and-sacrificed for. And so on and so on.
http://skepticsannotatedbible.com/contra/by_name.html
You reject the Book of Mormon because it makes claims about reality that are demonstrably false. Clearly the OT should be rejected for the same reason, and without the OT, there’s not much point in holding to the NT.
Walton,
In comparing “free markets” to God I was not being disingenuous: both are equally mythical objects of worship. All markets are embedded within larger cultural and institutional structures, all have rules which do not follow from the nature of “a market” in itself, and which advantage some and disadvantage others: what counts as a contract, who can make contracts, under what circumstances can one party back out, what can be used to pay… the list is practically endless. Most capitalist markets, specifically, depend on the power of the state to enforce rules (the only exceptions are black markets). The fundamental problem with both neoclassical and Austrian economics is the belief that markets can usefully be studied outside their cultural and institutional context.
Incidentally, your claim that the term “free market” is not intended to convey approbation is itself highly disingenuous.
“You are now saying you don’t know whether belief in a god is more rational than belief in leprachauns.”
No Nick. I have said that belief in an event which attracts a non-zero probability is not, and I will now use the term, illogical/irrational (same thing to me). Since I cannot assume that the probability of an event which cannot be measured is zero, it is not illogical to believe that it might be true. It’s simple. So simple even say, a biologist, could understand it.
I was then asked to state whether it was more or less likely or more or less rational that a leprechaun or a (G)god might exist. How can I compare two things when I do not even know what they are? On the contrary sir, you are the, what was it, dingbat?
“If this is such a big deal for you how could you possibly think it is ok to believe in something with “undefined quantities”?”
It is the calculation of the probability that is undefined. We know the probability exists, we just don’t know what it is. And, it might not be zero.
The probability of the loch ness monster existing is non-zero too, but the extreme improbability makes it an irrational belief. Nothing can be ever zero, but there sure are some extremely improbable entities and occurrences out there which given their unlikelihood makes them irrational to believe in.
You reject the Book of Mormon because it makes claims about reality that are demonstrably false. – Actually, to split hairs, they aren’t demonstrably false; just highly improbable. It’s not strictly impossible that there could have been Nephite and Lamanite civilisations in pre-Columbian America, building on a large scale and using horses and other draft animals of non-American origin. But it’s highly implausible, given that there’s absolutely no archaeological evidence to support it.
So? Apply the same scepticism to the Old and New Testaments that you just did to the Book of Mormon. Is there anything in the OT that says that God will ever have a child? The verses that Christians point to in Isaiah and Jeremiah and so on are weak and vague; they certainly say nothing explicit on the topic. Is there anything in the OT about Original Sin? Again, it’s something made up, after the fact, in the NT, to account for what Jesus was supposedly incarnated-and-sacrificed for.
I do apply the same scepticism. I don’t accept the Bible as an infallible divinely-inspired whole. I see no reason why the letters of Paul, for instance, should be treated as scripture. They’re simply one early Christian leader’s letters, giving his personal opinions and advice; he doesn’t claim to be speaking for God or to be making infallible statements. His work may be useful to Christians as moral and spiritual guidance, but this doesn’t put it beyond question and debate. So I don’t see why the epistles are any more likely to be infallible than the works of C.S. Lewis, for instance.
And I don’t think the Gospels can be sensibly viewed as infallible accounts either. They contradict one another, for a start, as has been cited above. Moreover, the early Church chose today’s four Gospels, out of a vast number of other texts purporting to recount the life of Jesus (such as the Gospel of Barnabas and the Gospel of Thomas) as, presumably, the most likely to be accurate (though it would seem likely that political considerations also entered into the choice).
But, in fact, it would seem to me that their lack of agreement on the details is not necessarily a weakness, as regards their value as historical sources (though it does give the lie to any notion of infallibility). It shows that the Gospel writers didn’t just copy one another (though Matthew and Luke are thought to have drawn on the same source, the “Q gospel”); rather, they wrote independently and, presumably, from separate oral and written traditions. Thus, where they do agree – which they do on the most important aspects of the story – it would seem that it is highly plausible that those aspects are, in essentials, accurate.
As to your point about the OT: I think the same considerations apply. While evidence shows that not all its details are necessarily accurate – which is unsurprising, since many of the books likely originated from oral historical traditions and was written down a considerable time after the events they recount – extraneous evidence has corroborated many of its historical claims. For instance, it was once thought that the Babylonian ruler “Belshazzar” was an invention by the writer of the Book of Daniel; yet later discoveries of Babylonian records showed that there was a prince regent/de facto ruler called “Bel-shar-asur” during the relevant period. The Book of Daniel gets some details wrong – for instance, Belshazzar was not the son of Nebuchadnezzar; rather, Nebuchadnezzar had been king several years before but was of a different dynasty – so the Hebrew Bible is not infallible; but it is, although demonstrably inaccurate in some details and written from the perspective of a single nation, nevertheless at least as good as any historical source we have from that era.
So I don’t subscribe to Biblical infallibility – how could I, considering that the selection of “canonical” books in modern Bibles was made by the Church in recorded historic times largely for reasons of political expediency? – but I do think much of the Bible is useful as a genuine, albeit partisan and often second-hand, account of historical events. And if it is useful in recounting quotidian events, why reject out of hand its accounts of supernatural intervention?
“If you really mean what you’re saying, you actually mean that for anything people tell you exist, you think it’s rational to belive that it might?”
No, it must be possible. Indeed it is logical not to dismiss the existence of something which has a non-zero probability of existing.
“You cannot say a number is “well defined” if it’s the product of an unknown calculation based on an unknown measure space.”
A probability is a well defined concept. It is agreed that calculation of a probability in this case is not. The whole point is that the event is not measurable.
So it’s rational to believe in Bigfoot, life on Mars or the pan-dimensional travelling Ziltoid the Omniscient because they are all possible (however low the odds are)?
Nick @458, indeed. It’s clear to me that Rich is obviously intelligent but not arguing in good faith.
Walton,
That’s not the way I see it. Open-mindedness refers to not precluding belief in something (call it X) until one has examined all available evidence for X and either found it wanting or not, at which point one is either believes in X or does not, this belief being tentative subject to new evidence.
In ordinary language, scepticism regarding something means one does not believe in that something – is it not yet clear to you that, at least for some atheists who post here, we are sceptical about Deities based on the available evidence?
Also, it seems to me to be mealy-mouthed to say you’re sceptical of the basis of the Mormon faith, unless you’re not in fact also sceptical of the faith itself (which would be odd to say the least).
What disparaging remarks? I see none.
Such unthinking and unnecessary deference and respect for something you consider a false belief is one of the reasons why those beliefs persist.
Here’s that disingeuous qualificaion. Not inherently so, but when combined with empiricism? Hm.
I have said that belief in an event which attracts a non-zero probability is not, and I will now use the term, illogical/irrational (same thing to me). – rich the dingbat
‘”When I use a word,” Humpty Dumpty said in rather a scornful tone, “It means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less.”‘ – Lewis Carroll: Alice Through the Looking-Glass.
Rich, you can’t just define words to suit yourself – at least, not without telling those you are conversing with. In ordinary parlance, “illogical” and “irrational” do not mean the same. If a psychiatrist is interviewing a patient who insists that aliens are talking to him from the shower head, and will shortly appear and enthrone him as Lord of the Earth, she will conclude these beliefs are irrational. They may, however, be maintained with complete logical consistency. If you meant “illogical” from the start, you should have said “illogical” – but presumably, you wouldn’t regard the patient described as holding irrational beliefs – after all, they are not impossible. No-one here has been arguing that belief in a god is logically contradictory. You are a time-wasting dolt and a troll, and I’m adding you to my killfile forthwith.
It shows that the Gospel writers didn’t just copy one another (though Matthew and Luke are thought to have drawn on the same source, the “Q gospel”)
Matthew and Luke wrote directly from Mark. Almost all of Mark is contained in Matthew, and about two thirds of Mark is in Luke. Q was not a gospel in the commonly understood meaning of that term, but a collection of sayings devoid of narrative passages.
rather, they wrote independently and, presumably, from separate oral and written traditions. Thus, where they do agree – which they do on the most important aspects of the story – it would seem that it is highly plausible that those aspects are, in essentials, accurate.
Where they agree are largely the passages that Luke and Matthew lift directly from Mark and their other common source, Q. This is the opposite of “they wrote independently.”
By “the most important aspects,” I can only assume you refer to the passion account. A close reading of Mark (where the others derived the framework of their own passion narratives) shows it to be highly mythologized and comprehensible in the context of the age only via pervasive reference to apocalyptic and eschatological passages from Isiah, Jeremiah and Daniel. In essence, Mark’s passion is a kind of midrash –fictions intended as commentary on scripture; not history, and not even intended to fool any contemporary into believing it was historical.
The gospels are patently theological fabrications, with no more to recommend them as history than the Book of Mormon other than the imprimatur of long tradition.
But one cannot directly prove that “elephants don’t exist.””
I am sorry, but I did not say one could.
#611:
Isiah = Isaiah.
Actually, it is impossible. One of the points made about such Mormon claims is not just that there were civilizations, but that they had battles with metal weapons. Metal does not simply disappear in less than 2000 years; the absence of evidence, here, is evidence of absence.
Unanimity on a central point does not mean that what they are unanimous about actually happened.
There are many different versions of the tale of Red Riding Hood. Does that mean that we can conclude that wolves can speak and wear human clothes as disguises?
Precisely because the alleged supernatural entity about which they claim intervened, if it were real, would speak for itself, and would have ensured that nothing obviously false be recorded as its words and actions.
It shows that the Gospel writers didn’t just copy one another (though Matthew and Luke are thought to have drawn on the same source, the “Q gospel”); rather, they wrote independently and, presumably, from separate oral and written traditions. Thus, where they do agree – which they do on the most important aspects of the story – it would seem that it is highly plausible that those aspects are, in essentials, accurate.
Where is the evidence they wrote “from separate oral and written traditions”, rather than drawing on the same traditions, and made different selections from it, as well as making up bits as each felt inclined? It is highly implausible that, e.g. the resurrection accounts are accurate, not only from internal evidence (e.g. the women in the garden with the tomb at first identified someone who spoke to them as the gardener, and later “realised” it was Jesus. Come on…), but because they describe a miracle, and it is far more plausible that the accounts are wrong than that such an unprecedented event happened. As has been pointed out, the accounts of Jesus’ trial are obviously inaccurate (if not completely invented); the same is true of accounts of the crucifixion (there was no supernatural darkness – Pliny and others who collected accounts of anomalies, would certainly have mentioned it) – so it is wholly irrational to trust the Gospels’ account of a supernatural event, written decades after it occurred. For goodness sake, go and read up on John Frum if you want to know what oral tradition can do in a few decades.
rich,
The general concept of probability is well-defined. It doesn’t follow that a particular application of that concept is equally well-defined.
An even number is a well-defined concept, but “the even number which is between 1 and 5” is not well-defined.
The maximum of a set of numbers is a well-defined concept, but “the maximum of the integers” is not well-defined.
Then “the probability of the existence of God” doesn’t mean anything. It’s like talking about “the square root of the largest integer.”
I would rather want to know how God is supposed to explain it at all. Does God find his own existence explainable and how did he gain this ability?
When there’s zero evidence for something… how is it NOT logical is believe the probability is zero or close to zero.
Also, it seems to me to be mealy-mouthed to say you’re sceptical of the basis of the Mormon faith, unless you’re not in fact also sceptical of the faith itself (which would be odd to say the least).
I was being conciliatory. On the (relatively small) chance that there were any members of the LDS Church reading this page, I wanted to avoid picking a fight, because it’s tangential to the main issue here. Religious beliefs are often very personal, and while it’s essential to be free to criticise and challenge them, I never wish to denigrate the beliefs of others. (Including atheists, for that matter.) But I had to use Mormonism as an example, as it is one of the few religious traditions I know quite a lot about (albeit purely from an academic perspective; I’m not LDS and don’t have any LDS friends or relatives) and am capable of critiquing on an informed level. I couldn’t do the same for Islam, for instance, simply because I’m not all that familiar with its history and theology. This isn’t a discussion about the relative merits of the Latter-day Saint movement, and I didn’t want to make it such.
There are many different versions of the tale of Red Riding Hood. Does that mean that we can conclude that wolves can speak and wear human clothes as disguises?
Fair point, and I didn’t claim it was good evidence. But, to my knowledge, the story of Red Riding Hood has never purported to be historical. (Just as some Bible stories – e.g. the book of Job, or Jesus’ parables – are intended for moral instruction and never purported to be recounting real history.)
In contrast, the Gospels purport to be records of a historical event (though they do not claim to be eyewitness accounts, and almost certainly are not). And though the precise dating is much contested, it’s generally accepted that they were all written within 100 years of Jesus’ death and (purported) resurrection. So while they are undoubtedly distorted by a generation of telling and retelling – hence the differences in the details, and the known errors – it seems perfectly plausible to suggest that they reflect real historical events.
While it’s true that oral traditions can become distorted massively over a few decades – I believe someone above cited “John Frum” and the Pacific island cargo cults – bear in mind that the cargo cults arose in very remote, isolated small communities with primitive cultures. In contrast, during the period in which the Gospel authors were writing, Christianity was spreading across the Roman Empire – for its time, a cosmopolitan and diverse political unit, and one with a tradition of rational and philosophical thought inherited from the Greeks (indeed, the addressing of the Christian message to sceptical Greek, rather than religious Jewish, audiences is a major theme of parts of the Book of Acts and some of the Epistles).
Rich, what you are describing as belief sounds a lot more like what I’d refer to as hope. Non-existence might be a problem for belief, but it isn’t as much of a stumbling block for hope. Anyone can hope for anything, no matter how unlikely. Belief, on the other hand, needs something at its foundation.
Admittedly, I can’t imagine why anyone would hope the god of the bible – a malignant, capricious, despicable monster – exists, unless they’re monsters themselves.
it seems perfectly plausible to suggest that they reflect real historical events.
No, it doesn’t. Read what I wrote above about Mark’s passion as midrash. The gospels are theological fictions, likely not understood by contempoaray readers as anything but. It was later Christian tradition (mid- to late-2nd Century) that turned them into (implausible) histories and thus made the spurious attributions of them to legendary figures of apostolic times.
If there really is no evidence which bears on it, the probability may not be well enough defined to fix at zero.
For instance, if I flip a coin–but tell you nothing about its shape or weighting–would you say the probability of heads is zero or near-zero?
I would say you can’t make a claim about the probability of heads at all. Without additional information, you can’t even begin to form a probability space.
No, it isn’t. For example, see CJO’s link and citations explaining how the alleged trial was completely ahistorical, given both Roman and Judean legal practice and traditions.
Read what I wrote above about Mark’s passion as midrash. The gospels are theological fictions, likely not understood by contempoaray readers as anything but. It was later Christian tradition (mid- to late-2nd Century) that turned them into (implausible) histories and thus made the spurious attributions of them to legendary figures of apostolic times.
I don’t see any decisive or incontrovertible evidence for this assertion; surely it’s just one interpretation? We do know that the Gospels cannot be accurate in every detail, because they conflict with each other, with Josephus’ Antiquities and with other sources on certain details.
But in the end, we have confirmation from archaeological evidence of the existence of Pontius Pilate, and from Josephus of the existence of John the Baptist and his execution by Herod, inter alia. So we know that the background historical context of the Gospels was a real one. While the genre of theological fiction was (and is) prevalent, you haven’t shown me any very clear evidence in support of your assertions re Mark. Given that we don’t know exactly when any of the Gospels were written or who wrote them – we have traditional attributions, but those aren’t supported by the text or by extraneous evidence – how can you make such assertions so confidently?
Admittedly, I can’t imagine why anyone would hope the god of the bible – a malignant, capricious, despicable monster – exists, unless they’re monsters themselves.
This, and not the scientific or historical perspective, is IMO the single biggest problem with Christian belief. The internal inconsistency between the loving God portrayed in the NT and by modern Christian teaching, and the spiteful, vindictive and fiercely nationalist figure of the Torah and Joshua narratives, is too great to easily explain away.
“Admittedly, I can’t imagine why anyone would hope the god of the bible – a malignant, capricious, despicable monster – exists, unless they’re monsters themselves.”
My new signature! Thanks, Wowbagger!
So it’s only the fact that the bible is touted as a historical document that makes the impossible content within more probable? You are relying on anecdotal evidence of people who thought that earthquakes and volcanos where the result of homosexual sex (there are some who still think that btw), and this is for miracles? And you aren’t even relying on them, you are relying on prose written by people almsot 50 years later who never witnessed it themselves. And this was at a time where Jesus had to complete with deities who could do those miracles.
It’s legend, there may have been a real person called Yoshua but there’s no reason to suggest that he could do anything as reported in the bible, and it would be more credulous to believe that the stories were embellished so that Yoshua could compete with those other mangods around by the time of pagans. If Jesus did indeed exist, he would have been nothing more than a Jewish cult leader. But that’s hardly surprising, there have been plenty of cases throughout history of people claiming to be the messiah and plenty who were around at the time of Jesus.
Walton @619,
Thank you, I now know you were being mealy-mouthed, which I don’t consider an admirable trait.
There’s a difference between denigrating a belief and denigrating the right to have a belief; cf. the remarks I made about inapropriate deference. That you felt the need to pre-emptively apologise for a non-existent offense just in case someone who you consider has a (relatively small) chance of even seeing your post is offended indicates something, don’t you think?
Again, care to address why you felt you had to say that Christian belief is “not inherently irrational”, as opposed to “not irrational”? Because it seems very like an evasion.
Speaking of completely ahistorical stories that were claimed to “reflect real historical events”, consider this:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pope_Joan
There are probably others that I am sure are out there: stories made up, fabricated entirely, to serve a religious and/or political point.
So? Consider how Mormonism propagated through America — were the people who converted to the movement all “in very remote, isolated small communities with primitive cultures”?
Same question with Scientology.
Cults spread through every culture, and manage to trick people of every level of intelligence.
Uh-huh. And because George Washington existed as a real person, we know that he chopped down a cherry tree when he was a little boy, and then told the truth about it to his dear papa.
Come on.
And because George Washington existed as a real person, we know that he chopped down a cherry tree when he was a little boy, and then told the truth about it to his dear papa.
No – just as we don’t give any credence to the apocryphal stories about Jesus’ childhood from the Infancy Gospel of Thomas.
But we are fairly sure, for instance, that George Washington served as a military commander and as the first President of the United States. Just because apocryphal stories about a historical figure are untrue does not mean that the central historical claims of their life are untrue.
Sigh. You were originally referring to Pilate and the Baptist. The central historical claims of their respective lives that have been confirmed archaeologically is that they lived in Roman Judea — not that they respectively judged (and condemned) Jesus, or dunked him in the river.
Jesus is not a historical figure in anything like the same sense as George Washington: there are no contemporary accounts of his life, the later accounts are heavily mythologised, and there are even real doubts about his existence. King Arthur or Robin Hood would be a closer parallel, although I’d say Jesus’s existence was somewhat (but only somewhat) more firmly based.
One thing I always find believers doing is taking the firmly held notion that a man called Jesus lived and from there using it as proof of him being the son of God. What reason at all is there to suggest that if there was a man called Jesus then he must have healed the sick, brought back the dead to life and died to redeem the sins of mankind. It just doesn’t logically follow!
Okay, Walton, here you have another question (since you seem determined to play biblical scholar in addition to your other roles): why do we ignore the noncanonical texts dealing with one Yeshua ben Yusuf, Nazarite?
For that matter, how can you be sure that the texts you hold as authoritative are, in fact, any more or less accurate than ones you dismiss as apocryphal?
Mull that over and get back to us after due consideration, if you would. Study early Church history with a jaded and skeptical eye, perhaps.
I hate to say this, but to a degree rich seems to be trying for the ‘special pleading’ ploy. He may be sincere, but sincerity (like popularity) is no guarantee of truthfulness. Truthiness, maybe…
The MadPanda, FCD
Walton, every bit of evidence you bring regarding the alleged historicity of Jesus to shore up the credibility of belief in Jesus as God (i.e. Christian belief) is trumped in spades by Sai Baba. So, clearly, using your rationale, devotees of Sai Baba are even more rational in their beliefs than Christians are.
Hm, actually, they probably are – so, what does that say about Christian belief? ;)
Hey, good point, John!
Lookit all the neat info we have on Sai Baba! Confirmed birthdate, for one…
The MadPanda, FCD
The idea behind it is that “atheists have denied the Bible, saying that Jesus didn’t exist,” and if they think they have reasonably good evidence that he existed (and I accept it as probable that a cult was built around some Jewish teacher of the 1st century AD), that just blows the atheists out of the water.
Of course, most “atheists” or other evil-thinking persons that they include in the camp of “Jesus-deniers” haven’t denied the possibility that Jesus existed, and likely most actual atheists think it probable that he (though not the mythic Jesus) existed. And it would make no difference to what is properly inferred even if atheists had denied that Jesus existed.
It’s the old false dichotomy that dominates the “thinking” of anti-evolutionists. “They” deny the Bible, and/or creation, and if “they” are wrong about anything (Piltdown, whatever), the Xians automatically win. Basically, your “true believer” is simply wrestling with the Devil and the devil’s followers, and a win is a win. They’re not thinking in terms of evidence, but that the “atheists are against Jesus” or some such thing.
I don’t know if I told you anything, really (this is meant to be more a response to the thread than to a person), but it seemed worth noting once again that we’re simply not dealing with people who are trying to use evidence properly, instead wanting to win against anyone who denies Jesus and Holy Writ.
Glen D
http://tinyurl.com/2kxyc7
Loved seeing Rich and Walton getting smacked down. They appear to lack good thinking skills. Knowing when to call it quits shows intelligence (CoachOlsen, that is a warning for you), but they both failed miserably.
Rich, if you could be honest enough with yourself to know when your argument has been damaged, you would do better. But you are arrogant, and think that there is no rebuttal to your feeble attempts at logic. So you just across as a weasel. I think you’re young. In time you will learn.
Modern Christian teaching tends to whitewash God as being portrayed as loving in the NT, but a careful reading finds that the spiteful and vindictive cruelty is in there as well. The Parable of the Talents is in there, as is the bit about letting the dead bury the dead, and hating one’s parents if one is to follow Jesus, and bringing the sword rather than peace…
There is far too much in the NT that strongly suggests that Christianity was an eschatological cult, and Jesus was a narcissistic, arrogant, cold-blooded cult leader — even assuming he was a real human being.
See also Fighting Words, by Hector Avalos.
Generally accepted by whom? Bishops? The earliest fragment of any gospel is the Rylands P52 fragment which, if it can be said to have a generally accepted date, is paleographically dated between 125 and 150 CE. In reality, there is not a single fragment of any New Testament book that is “generally accepted” as dating to the 1st century CE.
When there’s zero evidence for something… how is it NOT logical is believe the probability is zero or close to zero.
Because there’s no deductive chain of inference to that conclusion. (So many people use the word “logical” without any apparent understanding of what it is.)
But consider this: why do we think there aren’t any precambrian rabbit fossils? It isn’t just because there’s no evidence of such a thing, but because there is strong evidence against them — they are inconsistent with our evidence-based theories.
Ditto with Odin and the Easter Bunny, and God (see the proabilistic arguments against the latter in Dawkins’ “The God Delusion” and Stenger’s “The God Hypothesis”).
Actually, it is impossible. One of the points made about such Mormon claims is not just that there were civilizations, but that they had battles with metal weapons. Metal does not simply disappear in less than 2000 years; the absence of evidence, here, is evidence of absence.
Sigh. These conversations are hopelessly muddled when even the best of the lot put forth like blithering idiots. To show that something is impossible, you need disproof, not just evidence. And you can’t weasel out by taking “disproof” in the informal sense of a demonstration of very low probability because Walton made a point of distinguishing improbability from “strict” impossibility, so you need to logically deduce your conclusion. Which is in fact impossible for the sort of empirical matter you’re discussing.
Sheesh.
In ordinary parlance, “illogical” and “irrational” do not mean the same. If a psychiatrist is interviewing a patient who insists that aliens are talking to him from the shower head, and will shortly appear and enthrone him as Lord of the Earth, she will conclude these beliefs are irrational. They may, however, be maintained with complete logical consistency.
“in ordinary parlance” people misuse words and concepts all the time, and create distinctions between “logical” and “rational” than cannot logically/rationally be supported. Regardless of any imagined “logical consistency”, one cannot logically/rationally deduce a conclusion that aliens will appear and enthrone one as Lord of Earth, even if one is truly perceiving voices coming from one’s showerhead.
If you believe that logic and rationality are so separable, then please explain what determines whether a belief is or is not rational.
Here’s a clue from http://www.google.com/search?q=define:rational
“consistent with or based on or using reason”
“Characterized by truth or logic”
“Using reason or logic in thinking out a problem”
There are of course other definitions, but it’s just plain bad faith to ding Rich (or anyone else) for putting a slash between the two words.
I have said that belief in an event which attracts a non-zero probability is not, and I will now use the term, illogical/irrational (same thing to me).
Saying it doesn’t make it so. Believing something that is implausible, let alone extraordinarily unlikely, is irrational and illogical (regardless of whether those are distinguishable). In fact, even believing something that is more than likely true, but still allows reasonable doubt, is irrational and illogical. (Note: I believe that Obama will probably win, but it would be irrational for me to believe that Obama will win, since I have good reasons for thinking he might not.)
(Strictly speaking, one can distinguish between a belief that is merely irrational because there’s a reasonable basis for doubt, and a belief that is also illogical because its negation can be logically deduced from accepted premises. E.g., a belief that that there is a greatest prime is not just irrational, it is also illogical.)
PZ Myers winning this election is a non-zero possibility. It’s possible that he can get written in on enough ballots and win the election, but it’s an almost incredibly improbable event. It would be very irrational to believe PZ will win, even though it’s a possibility. Just because it could happen, doesn’t mean it’s a realistic possibility. If someone said they had a firm belief that PZ Myers was going to win this election, I would say it’s very irrational.
I think it’s clear that Rich painted himself into a corner trying to support his claim (“I simply said that believing that a God “did it” is not irrational or unscientific unless it can be proven otherwise.”) whilst attempting to maintain an appearance of humble rationality, leading to making ever more outlandish claims (“My assertion is that it is quite rational to believe in an event which may attract a non-zero probability especially when that number is unknown.”), his appeal to authority (“Yours humbly, An applied probability mathematician.”) having fallen flat.
Rich:
Well, not in those very words, but he might as well have. Not to do so is cowardice.
“Then “the probability of the existence of God” doesn’t mean anything. It’s like talking about “the square root of the largest integer.””
I do not agree. The event {a God is detected} (for Mr. Nick) will or will not happen. We know that the probability that it will happen falls in the closed interval between 0 and 1, by definition. We just don’t know what the number is.
“Speaking of irrational, I assert that pi does not, in fact, exist.”- Dan L
If I understand correctly, you define an object which exists as one which can be detected by known physical means. You then use this definition to say that an object that cannot be detected in such a way does not exist. If I am not mistaken, this is tautology which has allowed you to prove that pi does not exist which is plainly absurd.
“In ordinary parlance, “illogical” and “irrational” do not mean the same.” – Nick Gotts
Rational (Definition): Consistent with or based on reason; logical: – Dingbat!
And so Mr Nick, to bring this whole thing to some kind of closure I present the following summary our virtual exchange. You initially demonstrated a complete lack of understanding of elemental concepts of measurably and stochastic processes in addition to an incomplete knowledge of the basic definitions of Measure Theory. Having finally grasped, not without considerable grunting, and ultimately agreed my original point, which was that we cannot construct a coherent experiment to test for the existence of an un-measurable object, you then proceeded to request that I bravely perform a cardinal comparison of two numbers which we both agreed that we could not calculate. You then plunged to even further depths of stupidity to request that I compare the some undefined cardinal measure of the rationality of believing that two undefined objects exist. You then proceeded to draw false conclusions on my behalf on the basis of a comparison which I refused to make for the simple reason that I did not know how to do it. End of term report for Mr. Nick: must try harder and learn to pay attention in class.
My conclusion is that you are either simply retarded or a blog troll or both. I will continue my search for truth in this important matter and leave you to wallow in your mud pit of ignorance and arrogance while waiting for your two randomly oscillating brain cells to collide to allow you to generate an intelligent thought. But of course it is hopeless to try and formulate an expectation of when this event might occur, because it is not an event, and the probability is either 0 or 1 and the continuous time mathematical model we might be tempted to use to formulate such an expectation does not apply to the real world. So with apologies; Mr. Brown, Mr. Wiener and, for that matter, Mr. Einstein, are all delusional. But it doesn’t matter because according to another blogger, even if we could conceive of such a model we would not be able to write down the solution because pi does not exist, because it does not emit energy, which means the solution to the model we can’t apply doesn’t exist, and which means the normal distribution doesn’t exists which most likely means that this blog does not exist. Happily, that would mean that you do not exist which is, in fairness, no great loss to the sum of human knowledge.
For that matter, how can you be sure that the texts you hold as authoritative are, in fact, any more or less accurate than ones you dismiss as apocryphal?
I did in fact specifically address this earlier, at #605. The answer is that I don’t automatically hold anything as “authoritative”. The early Church did cherry-pick documents in determining what would and would not be included in the canonical Bible; although no doubt the origin of the texts was an important factor, it’s also well-known that their choices were influenced by political considerations, namely the need to quash minority viewpoints such as Gnosticism. So I do think it’s useful for modern scholars to read (and critically evaluate) the rejected texts, such as the Gospel of Thomas (as the “Jesus Seminar” does in trying to build a picture of Jesus as a historical figure).
And if you read my post at #605, I did acknowledge that no part of the Bible is likely to be “infallible”; there’s no logical basis from which to treat it as such, given that the Gospels contradict each other and have a few known errors. And as I said, I have no idea why the letters of Paul are included; they are just advice from one early Christian leader (who never met Jesus in person) to various congregations, and don’t actually purport to be the revealed word of God. While Paul may have great persuasive force for Christians, I don’t see why his work needs to be regarded as “scriptural” any more than does that of, say, C.S. Lewis. (And, of course, some of the epistles may not have been written by Paul at all.)
But much of the Biblical narrative can be seen as an account – albeit distorted, partisan, and mostly written down many years after the fact – of historical events. The OT seems, indeed, to be probably much more accurate than was previously thought. For instance, the existence of David and Solomon was questioned by most scholars until very recently, when in 2005 a “large stone structure” was unearthed in Jerusalem that may be the palece of David.
Since I’m overtly rejecting Biblical infallibility and questioning vast swathes of orthodox Christian doctrine, I’m sure that the fundamentalists you all describe would view me as almost as “godless” as you. But I don’t think the Christian tradition ought to be rejected entirely.
Hi Walton. Did you see #636? No comment?
“I think it’s clear that Rich painted himself into a corner”
I did no such thing and I am happy to reveal I accept that a God may or may not exist. How could I support a different conclusion? I continue to assert that it is not illogical/irrational to believe in an event which attracts a non-zero probability. I have stated repeatedly that I will accept the empirical findings of a coherent experiment which indicates that the probability of an event existing is close to zero. In the case of as to whether a small green man lives at the bottom of my garden or a lizard like creature lives in a loch in Scotland, I will accept that conventional methods of detection indicate that the existence of the defined objects is extremely unlikely. What I do not accept is that it in any way indicates that a God in generality, or any other un-measurable object, does not exist. It is therefore both logical and rational, in generality, to believe in a God. And no amount of juvenile references to a variety of pink multi-legged things amounts to a coherent case in contradiction. Furthermore, and it was the point of the original exchange, atheism is a belief. It is in no way supported by the null hypothesis or Occam’s razor as has been suggested by some posts. And as a direct result, evolution does not imply atheism.
Yes it is. There’s no evidence for God, no reason to believe in God, God becomes the ultimate 747 and thus this all implies atheism.
Rich:
Fine, so you must therefore hold that belief the event that “tomorrow the Galactic Confederation will contact planet Earth by means of technology unknown to us and demand all humans paint their noses green on pain of annihilation” is rational, unless you can justify assigning it a zero probability.
You’re in a similar position to that Michael Behe was in the Dover trial, when in an attempt to claim intelligent design was a scientific theory changed his definition of the term so that it included astrology.
Rich:
Well yes, but don’t you consider that the category of beliefs based on evidence is qualitatively different to that of beliefs based on supposition?
The event {a God is detected} (for Mr. Nick) will or will not happen.
Fail. “a God is detected” is not an event, it’s a judgment. There are no definitive tests for the existence of a God. The existence of a God would have to be an inference, bu it would hard for an inference to be rational when “a God” is so ill-defined. How could we even distinguish between, say, Odin and Kal-El in a halloween costume?
A number is chosen randomly on [0,1). What’s the probability that it falls within a given Vitali set?
A number is chosen randomly from the real line. What’s the probability that its magnitude is less than 1,000?
What in the world does this mean?
No, it’s not.
Rich wrote:
A hypothetical for you, Rich:
Let’s say I have a small child, and move to a secluded part of the country – not difficult; I live in Australia and there are many places to which I can go that are remote enough that I can control how much information the child has access to (esp. with the current government’s plans to fuck with our internet).
So, I raise the child without any reference to gods or religion – hardly impossible, or even difficult, since I control information and the child can not access that information his or herself. He/she is, for all intents and purposes, completely ignorant of the existence of even the belief in gods, let alone any information about why he/she should or shouldn’t believe in them. The child is truly atheist.
How, precisely, is that child’s atheism a belief?
rich has already asserted that god is undefined and immeasurable, so by his standards we can’t distinguish between a god and me in a Halloween costume.
Why he thinks it’s possible to “detect” such a god, I don’t know.
Wowbagger, in your hypothetical, I think you have to additionally stipulate that she does not independently postulate one or more deities.
It is my understanding that the interpretation of this site as the palace of David and Solomon is still questioned by most archaeologists, except those who have the ulterior motive of claiming that the site ‘proves’ Jewish claims to ‘ownership’ of all of Jerusalem.
The archaeologist who excavated here was funded by conservative Jews and an American banker with that goal specifically in mind. The interpretation of the dig director , therefore, is tainted by her ‘seek and you shall find’ presumption.
Bad archaeology is the same as bad science – don’t start with conclusions and make the evidence fit.
While the find itself is very exciting, as it’s not every day that such a structure from the 10th century BCE is found, it is not evidence for the existence of David and Solomon.
but it’s just plain bad faith to ding Rich (or anyone else) for putting a slash between the two words. – truth machine
No it is not. I gave an example of the difference, you yourself gave one in your very next comment. “truth machine”, my aunt Fanny!
John Morales at #652: Yes, I read #636, but faced with a flood of responses (and since I had to go to a lecture this morning) it wasn’t possible to reply to everything at once.
In reply to #636: Fair point. And though I’m not familiar with Sai Baba, in reading the article to which you linked I would have to say, tentatively, that there is nothing inherently irrational in believing his claims. Of course, I haven’t conducted research into the miracles he purports to have performed – and there were some mentions of sceptical studies in the article – so I wouldn’t presume to make a pronouncement either way. This, you see, is open-mindedness. When faced with an alleged supernatural or divine phenomenon, I don’t see why I should assume it to be untrue until proven otherwise, merely because some other supernatural or divine phenomena in history have been shown to be fabricated. Rather, I keep an open mind, research the available information on the relevant phenomenon, and only then determine whether, and to what extent, it is credible. As I’ve said, I spent months studying and reading about the Latter-day Saint movement, and eventually concluded that, on a balance of probabilities, the Book of Mormon is probably fabricated; but even so, I don’t condemn people for believing it. As to the central claims of older religions, such as Christianity or Islam, there simply isn’t enough concrete evidence either way – so continued open-mindedness seems to be the only logical approach.
So this is not a case of treating Christianity, Judaism and Islam as more credible than other religious traditions simply because of their global popularity, antiquity and institutional inertia. Truth is not determined by a popularity contest. Rather, I am open-minded as to the validity of any spiritual claim, unless and until clear evidence is adduced to establish its probable untruth.
Personally, I’m increasingly inclined towards a pantheistic, universalist viewpoint with regard for various different religious traditions; if there is a God, it seems to me most plausible that He reveals Himself through many of the different faith traditions, albeit that all teach distorted or imperfect versions of the truth viewed through the lens of its social context. (Rather like the Baha’i doctrine of “progressive revelation”.) So I don’t take the Bible literally; it’s a human creation, recording centuries of oral tradition that was no doubt distorted in the transmission, and I don’t see it as containing all truth. But it is nevertheless a useful way of understanding one perspective on God. (I would probably be a Unitarian Universalist, except that I don’t agree with their advocacy of leftist political causes, and they don’t have much of a foothold in the UK anyway.)
John Morales, #661, wrote:
I would hope that, given all the information needed to explain natural phenomena, encouraged to ask questions when the kind of events that lead to magical thinking occur and protected from the indoctrination into religious belief no child would independently postulate one or more deities.
Which’d be a fascinating experiment in itself; unfortunately, I can’t see it getting through ethics.
But if it helps, then yes, the child does not at any point postulate the existence of one of more deities.
Rich:
Does this mean that you think there are events which have a zero probability? I would be interested to hear an example, since I don’t believe that you can have a real-life event which has exactly zero probability. Close enough not to matter practically, but not precisely zero.
If not, then you are effectively stating that there is nothing which it is illogical/irrational to believe. Is this what you are saying?
To pose it simply, are you:
a) Implying that there is nothing which it is irrational to believe
OR
b) Implying that there are events which have exactly zero probability of occurring
And if you wouldn’t mind clarifying:
If you answered a), then what is the meaning of the word irrational to you? Can you think of an example of something which is irrational?
If you answered b), can you think of any real events which have exactly zero probability of occurring?
Guy
It’s because without Paul, and a few other later Xian books of the NT (like the late Gospel of John, and Hebrews), there is no theology, no reason for Jesus dying and being resurrected.
The synoptic Gospels consist largely in the story of Jesus, and Jesus’ teachings, giving little or no reason for a new religion to arise, or for Judaism to shift dramatically (the original Xian desire).
Paul gives a theology, and apparently the most popular version, which tells “why Jesus died,” clearly an issue of great import to the early church. Some complain that Paul founded Xianity, not Jesus, but whatever the merits of such a claim, Xianity (or probably, any Jesus-inspired sect separate from mainline Judaism) would not exist based solely upon Jesus’ teachings.
Glen D
http://tinyurl.com/2kxyc7
Good questions, Guy G.
I never said you did. What you said was that a belief of the form “there is no X” is irrational without proof. I pointed out that there are no statements of the form “there is no X” that can be proved (only disproved). Therefore, by your reasoning, a belief of the form “X doesn’t exist” or “there is no X” is always irrational. Thus, the belief “there are no pink rabbits at the bottom of the ocean” is irrational. Any 8 year old child could tell you that your position is ridiculous.
As I recall, you didn’t object to my definition of existence, nor did you offer an alternative. If you can’t define terms and you don’t object to my definitions, then I’m going to proceed using my definitions.
You are mistaken; this is not a tautology. If you have no grounds for rejecting my definition, then my definition is the best we have at the moment.
Moreover, it is not absurd that pi does not exist. It is no more absurd to say that pi does not exist than it is to say that unicorns do not exist. Neither one has ever been apprehended in nature; both are only encountered within the minds of human beings. There is no a priori reason not to believe that “pi” is an imaginary creature.
You’ve also conveniently ignored most of my points arguing against your characterizations of epistomology. I was trying to give you the benefit of the doubt, but it is really starting to seem that you are not arguing in good conscience.
Anton, I have not had a chance to respond to your last post, so I apologize for this late reply.
I think I see just where our dispute lies, and why we’ve been more or less talking past each other. I take responsibility for the misunderstanding, since I see that some of what I wrote was not as precise as it should have been. Therefore, rather than go back and respond to each point, I’ll make my case as clearly as I can.
Here are the definitions we were discussing (for easy reference):
“Weak atheism (also called negative atheism) is the lack of belief in the existence of deities, without a commitment to the necessary non-existence of deities. Weak atheism contrasts with strong atheism, which is the belief that no deities exist…”
And here is a further claim from the article Glen posted: Strong atheists are also weak atheists.
Okay, here is why I think the article’s content is incoherent.
Weak Atheism is defined as *both* the lack of belief in god(s), and as no commitment to the belief that god doesn’t exist. This seems uncontroversial: it’s the claim made most frequently by weak atheists, both on this blog and elsewhere: “We don’t claim that god doesn’t exist, we merely lack the belief that he does (perhaps because there is no evidence, or perhaps for any number of reasons).
Strong atheism is defined as the belief that no god(s) exist.
Now, the weak atheist and the strong atheist *do* share one common element: both lack the belief that god exists. But here is where we encounter the incoherence I was referring to: weak atheism *isn’t* defined — neither in the article, nor in the posts of most weak atheists — as *only* a lack of belief in god; note, it *also* includes no commitment to the existence of god(s). (Incidentally, this is why weak atheists can be agnostics). But if a weak atheist, by definition, lacks belief in god *and* doesn’t claim that god doesn’t exist, while a strong atheist *does* claim that god doesn’t exist, *then a strong atheist, according to the articles very definitions, cannot be a weak atheist (since you cannot both not claim that god doesn’t exist, and claim that god doesn’t exist). Weak atheism is consistent with strong atheism if weak atheism is defined as *only* a lack of belief in god(s), *but this isn’t what the article says*, and it’s not what weak atheists claim.
I hope that clears things up.
I see Rich still isn’t getting it. First, atheism is not a belief, but rather a disbelief. Look in the dictionary. Making up your own definitions and changing them on the fly may be problem with us following your logic.
Second, your whole exercise, which to me appears utterly illogical, seems to have been done in order to allow for gods to exist. Gods don’t exist, except in various peoples imaginations. If they exist, show me the phyisical proof. Until I will just have to classify with with JK, PM, SF, PR, and a few other godbots who have tried to prove god without showing any physical evidence.
I have no idea why the letters of Paul are included; they are just advice from one early Christian leader (who never met Jesus in person) to various congregations, and don’t actually purport to be the revealed word of God.
Funny, that…
And curiouser and curiouser, by his own account (corroborated, legendarily at least, and in a divergent account, in Acts) Paul visited the Jerusalem leaders (Peter, James “the brother of the lord” et al), who, according to tradition, most certainly DID meet Jesus in person (one of whom is supposed to have grown up with him, fer chrissakes!), and, though they and Paul had numerous disagreements, one of them, to judge by Paul’s writings in reaction, was not a question of the legitimacy of the revelation to Paul.
It’s practically the keystone of the “argument from silence” for the non-historicity of Jesus. If there had been a real, single founder of the early Christian movement, why on earth would his inner circle not question the authority of this interloper, Saul of Tarsus, on the grounds that they had a different experience of Jesus than he did –in the flesh, as opposed to Paul’s visions? Further, why is Paul’s interest in Jerusalem exclusively the church elders there? Why, if a mere decade previous, the savior of the entire world had been crucified, buried, and resurrected there, does Paul demonstrate zero interest in recounting any experiences there and why doesn’t he view his visit as a pilgrimage rather than a meet and greet?
Perplexing questions, I would think, from the traditional view. Taking the assumption that Jesus was a figure of myth, however, the questions just melt away. There was no disagreement about Paul’s authority because his experience with Jesus, though later in time, was of the same character as the experience of the Jerusalem leaders, who had visions, too. It’s not a pilgrimage, because there are no holy sites: there is no tomb in Jerusalem, Golgotha is a squalid killing-field, and nobody of note ever came out of Nazareth.
Of course Paul does claim to be speaking the word of god, revealed to him, directly, by Jesus risen, the Christ crucified. The esteem in which his writings were held by the congregations to which he wrote are a clear indication that Christians of the first generation after the purported ministry and death of Jesus didn’t have a problem with that.
In all of these considerations, we have to be careful of projecting modern attitudes onto ancient minds. There was simply no expectation that a religious figure be anything but a mythical construct. Gentile adherents of 1st-Century hellenized Christ cults (Paul’s audience) would actually have found the notion of a bodily-resurrected crucified criminal quite profane, and, frankly, disgusting.
Glen:
It’s because without Paul, and a few other later Xian books of the NT (like the late Gospel of John, and Hebrews), there is no theology, no reason for Jesus dying and being resurrected.
Oh, there’s plenty of theology in the Synoptics. Problem was, they’re divergent theologies. Paul’s stature in the canon arises, I think, from his abhorrence of schism and his contant plea for unity among the bretheren, even amidst doctrinal and liturgical chaos. For Paul, of course, the issue is that the risen Christ is coming, soon, and He won’t know who are the chosen unless all are one in Christ.
For the later church fathers who preserved his writings as a fundamental part of the canon, these considerations were long ago moot. Jesus hadn’t arrived and it was time to settle in and consolidate power for the long haul. So the establishment of an orthodoxy (by no means a certainty before the fact) benefitted from a founding figure whose over-riding concern was agreement between communities and the unity of worship.
Sure, there’s theology, pretty much Judaic theology, in the Synoptics. What I meant was that there is no (Xian) theology that “explains” what would have to be important to worshippers of a god who allegedly died and rose again.
Jesus in the Synoptics doesn’t differ much from (yes, often divergent) the theology of his contemporaries, unless it’s with respect to his own role as prophet (“godhood” seems to be a later invention).
Glen D
http://tinyurl.com/2kxyc7
I think I’ve finally figured out why arguing with Rich does no good. It’s that pesky term “non-zero.” Obviously Rich believes in the real number line, Cantorian set theory, transfinite cardinals, all that stuff. To him a number can be arbitrarily small and still non-zero.
Cantorian set theory is fascinating in a “far out, man!” slightly-stoned junior-high-school-bull-session kind of way, but it has no application to our universe. If you could measure the diameter and circumference of the observable universe exactly in units of the Planck Length (and ignore its curvature due to General Relativity) you could only determine pi to 62 decimal places. So yes, Rich, in our universe, a number that is sufficiently close to zero IS zero, and the probability of the existence of YHWH is much, much smaller than 10^-62!
Of course, from a mathematical point of view, both Cantorian and non-Cantorian set theory are equally worth pursuing, but if the Axiom of Choice leads to such absurd conclusions, then in the real world, it would have to be considered experimentally disproven.
“and the probability of the existence of YHWH is much, much smaller than 10^-62!”
Actually, one cannot speak coherently about the probability of god’s existence (this is perhaps the single greatest weakness of Dawkins’s ‘God Delusion’). God is defined as a necessary being, so if he exists, he exists in all possible worlds, and if he doesn’t exist, he exists in no possible world. I think the confusion can be cleared up in this way: a unicorn is defined as a horse with one horn. We can ask questions about the probability that unicorns exist, *but we cannot ask questions about the probability that unicorns have horns*. In other words, speaking about the probability of god’s existence makes as much sense as speaking about the probability that unicorns have horns — which is to say, it makes no sense whatsoever.
Lurkbot, you may be on to something. In my business, once something gets “below detection limits”, we ignore it. A purist could argue that we could have a parts per billion impurity, but if we can only measure that impurity to 100 parts per million, the whole parts per billion business is just speculation/sophistry.
“God is defined as a necessary being, so if he exists, he exists in all possible worlds, and if he doesn’t exist, he exists in no possible world. I think the confusion can be cleared up in this way: a unicorn is defined as a horse with one horn. We can ask questions about the probability that unicorns exist, *but we cannot ask questions about the probability that unicorns have horns*. In other words, speaking about the probability of god’s existence makes as much sense as speaking about the probability that unicorns have horns — which is to say, it makes no sense whatsoever.”
There it is! Exactly as I said a while back. To a certain kind of mind, once the existence of something has been asserted somewhere, anywhere, by anyone, the only possibilities are existence and non-existence. The absence of absolute proof of non-existence constitutes proof of existence. Dichotomization in action.
That’s a definition of God. It is certainly not the only one — and I suspect it’s one of the more flawed ones.
Colloquially, perhaps. Yet not necessarily. The word “unicorn” itself means “one-horn”; “horse” is an interpolation. Depending on how carefully worded the definition is, unicorns do indeed exist (any horn-growing animal with one horn), might potentially exist, with technology (genetically modified horse), or almost certainly cannot exist (horse with a horn that can detect virgins and poison).
The same goes for God. If “God” is defined as being exactly equivalent to “The universe, and all its laws and contents”, then obviously God exists. And so on and so forth.
I think we need to formulate definitions a little more carefully than we do before making assertions about whether that which is defined exists.
Well, who died and made god necessary?
I’m being facetious, but, really, I see here the same sleight of hand at work as in the ontological category of supposed proofs for the existence of god. I question that “existence” is an attribute, equivalent to “has one horn,” or any other physical attribute one might assign to the members of a class.
“There’s no evidence for God, no reason to believe in God” – Kel
No, the name for that position is agnostic.
“Fine, so you must therefore hold that belief the event that “tomorrow the Galactic Confederation will contact planet Earth by means of technology unknown to us and demand all humans paint their noses green on pain of annihilation””
– As I have repeatedly said, how can I logically deny an event which is possible. I didn’t say I would believe it.
Rich,
You’re claiming atheism is a belief. It is not. See my hypothetical at #659.
“I think we need to formulate definitions a little more carefully than we do before making assertions about whether that which is defined exists.”
I wasn’t speaking about god’s existence, but about the absurdity of speaking about the ‘probability’ that god exists. If god is defined as a necessary being, then you can’t meaningfully speak about the probability that he exists, since ‘existence’ is part of the definition. Now, don’t mistake this as an attempt to set up and run an ontological argument. It isn’t. Note, I said in post #676 that *if* god exists, he exists in all possible worlds, and *if* he *doesn’t* exist, he exists in no possible world (this is just what it means to say that god is defined as a necessary being — you have only these two alternatives).
Note that I was obviously using the acceptation of the term unicorn. Also note that everything you said about the various possibilities is entirely consistent with what I said (i.e. that we can meaningfully speak about the probabilities of unicorns existing), though it seems to me that in your last example (viz. horse with a horn that can detect poison and virgins) you’ve come darn close to confusing physical or technological impossibility with logical impossibility (i.e. there’s no contradiction involved in your example).
“I think we need to formulate definitions a little more carefully than we do before making assertions about whether that which is defined exists.”
I would certainly agree with this, but I notice that this advice is usually selectively put forth.
Guy – there are of course events which have probability zero. An example, I died yesterday. And, I have repeatedly drawn the distinction between direct prood and empirical proof. Of course, in the latter case the result cannot be zero, except in a degenerate case, but I will accept an estimate from a coherant experiment which shows that the probability of an event is not statistically different from zero. In other words, the Loch Ness Monster.
The upshot is that rich would, if he’s consistent, complain about you telling your child that ghosts don’t exist.
It’s the worst form of pedantry, but it looks like he’s never going to stop while he’s here. He wants words like “atheist” and “agnostic” to be exclusive of each other, and the mere fact that language is hardly that precise eludes his pompous posturing.
Glen D
http://tinyurl.com/2kxyc7
I really cannot be bothered to answer any more of your questions. I believe that I have made my position clear. I do feel bad about lashing out at Nick, even though frankly he deserved it for being a petulant pilluck. Instead I will share something with you. And before any sycophantic bigots the amongst you throw a Carly Simon, I am not seeking your sympathy or acceptance. I left those juvenile tendencies behind a long time ago. I spent this morning with my mother at the hospital. She is the dearest person to me in the world along with my wife and children. We were told she has lung cancer and that it is inoperable. Why am I telling you this? Well you wanted real world. You seem to have a dislike for mathematics (curious for a science blog). This is as real as it gets. My mother is a devout Christian; a proper one who sees only good in people. Her belief in God is the only way that she is going to get through this. Of course this does not mean a God exists, it doesn’t prove anything. But what it does mean is that I have seen at first hand what it means. So please don’t tell me it is irrational or illogical or irrelevant. I don’t know what I believe, but I am quite sure that the answer is not going to be found in a book on the null hypothesis. The best of luck with your beliefs, whatever they are.
And no Glen, I would not complain about teling a child that a ghost does not exist. You are at liberty to believe waht you want about ghosts. I tell my children to keep an open mind. it’s the only scientific thing to do.
And if we define “being” as including “has empirically demonstrable attributes”, then we have defined god out of existence.
Heh.
“almost certainly”
The earliest definition of agnostic I heard was someone who didn’t believe in god, but was seeking proof for god. An atheist was just an agnostic who gave up the active search. So in my mind, the two words overlap a great deal. Trying to totally separate them seems like a waste of effort.
Correct me if I’m wrong but atheism, by definition, means without a belief in god or gods; the prefix a- meaning ‘without’.
While an atheist can believe there is/are definitely no god/s, it is not a necessary condition for atheism. As per my hypothetical upthread, I can be without the belief in something if I’ve never heard of it – I don’t need to know that it doesn’t exist before I can lack belief in it.
No, it’s both! Agnosticism deals with knowledge, atheism deals in belief. I don’t see any reason to believe in God so I don’t believe in God, hence I’m an atheist. I also don’t know for sure that God doesn’t exist so I’m a weak agnostic.
In short atheism = not belief. agnosticism = not know. The definitions overlap because they deal with two seperate issues. How is it you can not grasp this?
Well I didn’t say that you’re consistent, having left that question completely open.
The scientific position is, of course, that you are not at liberty to believe what you want about ghosts. That is to say, legally one may believe that they exist, and scientifically it is not absolutely forbidden to believe in ghosts (science is not about censorship), but the important thing is that scientifically you cannot claim that the non-zero possibility of ghosts existing leaves any meaningful chance that they do. In normal parlance, we would simply say that they do not exist.
Unfortunately, your position would allow IDists endless scope to complain about its virtual shut-out from science due to its lack of evidence. For the mere positing of a “designer,” no matter how bizarre its penchant for designing life to look exactly as expected by design, might make its “possibility” something legitimate to bring up in science, in science classes. Likewise with the FSM, Plato’s Forms, Hindu myths that a god is dreaming this world, etc., etc. I have to wonder if sneaking ID into science class isn’t behind your countless attempts to impose meanings onto terms that are not understood by others according to your desires.
I think that none of us consider some sort of ID to have a non-zero possibility, after all. Which is totally superfluous to what science is about–this being finding evidence in favor of hypotheses while generally remaining falsifiable by possible future data. We say that life was not designed, for the very fact that we have not found evidence of design in life, outside of our own genetic engineering projects.
To be sure, we also do not base science on non-zero possibilities, meaning that a pedantic insistence upon the non-zero possibility of ID does not affect science (after all, science is well aware of the fact that non-existence is difficult, often impossible, to demonstrate). So you may not be pushing ID, I really don’t know. My main point is that science is interested in being able to state with high probability (that’s the goal, not always the practice) that something is or is not the case.
After all, species are declared extinct from time to time. Occasionally this turns out not to be the case–the coelacanth being a famous example. Science does not mope when it turns out that it is wrong, because it considers itself to have a non-zero possibility of being wrong, in all of its statements (in many cases certain facts, “laws,” and theories are considered to have a negligible possibility of being wrong). Most scientists are only too happy when declarations of extinction turn out not to be the case, aside from diseases.
Much of what goes by the term of “atheism” today takes science as the model means of coming to determinations about claims outside of human affairs (and many of the latter as well). This is why “atheists” don’t mind saying that “god is extinct,” to go for the analogy (except that god presumably never existed). That way “God” isn’t the subject of endless discussions about “possibilities,” we just toggle to the most probable position on the matter, thus cutting through a lot of useless discussion.
Glen D
http://tinyurl.com/2kxyc7
“The scientific position is, of course, that you are not at liberty to believe what you want about ghosts…the important thing is that scientifically you cannot claim that the non-zero possibility of ghosts existing leaves any meaningful chance that they do. In normal parlance, ***we would simply say that they do not exist***…***My main point is that science is interested in being able to state with high probability (that’s the goal, not always the practice) that something *is* or *is not* the case***…”God” isn’t the subject of endless discussions about “possibilities,” ***we just toggle to the most probable position on the matter***, thus cutting through a lot of useless discussion.”
Ah, Glen, you’ve just proven two of my points.
First, most atheists who *claim* to be weak atheists aren’t *really* weak atheists.
Second, weak atheism is little more than a tactical position, *especially* when so-called ‘weak atheists’ claim scientific support for their position. When it suits them, they’re perfectly happy to claim that they believe it to be the case that god doesn’t exist (usually when ridiculing an ignorant theist, or when trying to showcase their scientific bona fides); however, on other occasions (usually when they run into a theist with a modicum of philosophic training), they hide under the ‘weak atheism’ claim in a cowardly attempt to escape any onus in a debate.
You fool, strong atheism covers weak atheism too.
Again, if there is no reason to believe in God, why believe? There’s no reason for belief, so they are atheist by default.
*snort*
Oddly enough, those “theists with a modicum of philosophic training” are often all too eager to avoid any sort of rigorous definition of God, and for any particular definition, they will definitely avoid the question of on what basis they can make any epistemic claim to that definition without empirical evidence in the first place.
Theology is fundamentally dishonest.
AKA professional sophist/apologist tapdancers armed with intellectual dishonesty directly proportional to the aforementioned ‘training’, and every evasion technique in the book.
Which is great for winning arguments, but useless for actually achieving anything of substance.
Rich:
No. It’s just that metaphysical issues are not decidable mathematically, though you’re not the first person to try to befuddle us.
That you’ve ignored Anton @658 does not mean you dislike mathematics – but it does seem like avoidance and it addresses your probabilistic claims.
Even I, with little training, get his point even if I can’t mathematically demonstrate it – the probability is undeterminable but infinitesimally close to zero.*
So, why bring it up? That’s argumentum ad consequentiam, which may be applicable to ethical calculus but certainly not to logic.
—
*feel free to correct me.
Walton @664, thanks for the response.
I see you got my point, which I shan’t belabour other than to suggest you consider how, if the mythologising of self-proclaimed prophets or Avatars can occur so quickly, even in modern times when scientific thinking and a large knowledge base is available, then how much more powerful and profound would it be in ancient times.
As an aside, why do you speak of God? Is polytheism somehow inferior or less convincing? If so, is it because it predated monotheism or because it seems to you (ahem) less coherent?*
*Consider those rhetorical questions, I’m not asking for a response. :)
Maybe you died yesterday, were resurrected, and forgot about it. Assuming that the existence of a god has a non-zero probability, and there is a non-zero probability of it being the Christian God (hence all powerful), there is surely a non-zero probability that he intervened and then made you forget about it.
Yes, it’s a trite explanation, but that’s the point. However unlikely it is, you’ve stated that you don’t find it irrational to believe it, since it has a non-zero probability. And what exactly is your criterion for determining whether something is statistically equivalent to zero? You have to draw a line somewhere. Is it at 0.0000000001 probability? Or 0.00000000001?
I’d be interested to know whether you accept my hypothesis that you died yesterday having a non-zero probability. Yes I know that it is of course for every practical reason zero, but it is not precisely zero. And if so, do you think that it is rational to believe that you did die yesterday?
To be honest, I don’t believe that you honestly think that it is rational to believe something just because it has a non-zero probability of being true. You gave the example of the existence of the Loch Ness Monster as having a probability no different to zero. That might be true for practical purposes, but I would say exactly the same thing about any one specific definition of a god. I would assert that both are as unlikely as to be practically zero.
Since you give the Loch Ness Monster as an example, does this mean that you find belief in the Loch Ness Monster to be irrational? If so, what is the difference between that and a god? I really don’t think that you can honestly say you are being objective. It seems that you have said things in haste because they back your assertion that belief in a god is rational, and are now unwilling to back down, despite numerous examples.
An interesting progression.
Rich @371: Since it cannot be proved that a God does not exist, there is no conflict, in generality, between science and faith.
Rich @379: What I am saying is that until proven otherwise, believing in general terms in the existence of a God, to the extent that does not contravene known facts, is entirely rational and not at all unscientific.
Rich @ 653: I continue to assert that it is not illogical/irrational to believe in an event which attracts a non-zero probability.
me @ 655: Fine, so you must therefore hold that belief the event that “tomorrow the Galactic Confederation will contact planet Earth by means of technology unknown to us and demand all humans paint their noses green on pain of annihilation” is rational, unless you can justify assigning it a zero probability.
Rich @ 682: “Fine, so you must therefore hold that belief the event that “tomorrow the Galactic Confederation will contact planet Earth by means of technology unknown to us and demand all humans paint their noses green on pain of annihilation””
– As I have repeatedly said, how can I logically deny an event which is possible. I didn’t say I would believe it.
Apparently, quotemining is acceptable to Rich.
Rich, I call you out as a liar (cf. Rich@543: “I am looking for the truth.”).
Your original assertion was that such a belief is not irrational, now it has become not logically deniable.
“I didn’t say I would believe it” – if you choose not to believe that which is (according to your own assertion) rational, then you are not seeking the truth.
Bah.
—
PS Others have pinned Rich down on other points; they’re probably not as obsessive as I in pinning down disingenuity.
Bah at myself too, I rushed the final part.
” … if you choose not to believe that which is (according to your own assertion) rational …”
is poor reasoning. I retract that entire sentence.
But I otherwise stand by the post, and its intent.
“You fool, strong atheism covers weak atheism too.”
Not in all cases; it depends on the definitions you’re using.
Are these two propositions consistent?
(1) I only lack belief in god’s existence, and do not claim that god doesn’t exist.
(2) I claim that god doesn’t exist.
They’re not consistent, so the next question is, do they accurately represent the claims of weak (1) and strong (2) atheists? The answer is obvious — just read the comments on this blog.
Evolution (or any science for that matter) are not incomatible with the tenets of liberal, non-literalist forms of religion. But that is because the tenets of such religions are so vague and nebulous as to not be contradicted by anything.
However, the mode of thought which leads scientists to accept evolution is incompatible with accepting religious claims.
These two different compatibility claims are frequently confused.
Note, I said in post #676 that *if* god exists, he exists in all possible worlds, and *if* he *doesn’t* exist, he exists in no possible world (this is just what it means to say that god is defined as a necessary being — you have only these two alternatives). – eric
Which is why “necessary being” is nonsense. A “possible world” is simply one of which a consistent description can be given. Consistent descriptions can be given of worlds both with and without a being with any self-consistent set of attributes.
Oh?
Remind me again what the difference is between (¬X) and ¬(X).
And for that matter, the difference between ¬X and ¬¬¬X.
eric:
Then what should we think of your retreat into a hair-splitting argument about the distinction between “weak” and “strong” atheism, as if that would settle the issue, when Glen originally pointed out “weak atheism” only as a counter to your ignorant claim that atheism must by definition “rule out” any possible god? And now suddenly you are an expert on the different definitions of atheism and how atheists use these definitions to hide from theists. Yeah, right.
John,
Actually, that wasn’t my point, although certainly it’s possible that the probability of God could be (with suitable assumptions) infinitesimal. My point was that, sometimes, probability is not a meaningful concept.
My first example:
A Vitali set is a collection of numbers which is non-measurable. It’s not that its measure is zero, or infinitesimal…it simply doesn’t exist. Essentially a Vitali set is not the sort of entity for which measure, or “length,” means anything. Therefore, it’s impossible to plug it into a probability calculation.
rich argues that, even if we don’t know how to do the calculation, we can still say the probability is between 0 and 1, because probabilities always are–but in this case, there may not be a probability to fall between those bounds.
By analogy, the sign of a number is always positive or negative. But what if you want the sign of sqrt(-1)? Well, there isn’t one. You can’t just say, “I don’t know the sign, but it must be positive or negative, because signs always are.” The concept of “sign” is simply not appropriate for imaginary numbers.
My second example:
The set of real numbers in the interval (-1000,1000) is certainly measurable. The problem here is that the appropriate probability distribution is not specified, and there’s no way to choose a probability distribution which isn’t completely arbitrary. You can’t choose a uniform distribution over the real line, because the real line is infinitely long–that would imply that the distribution is zero everywhere, from which it would follow that there’s zero probability of choosing a number at all! Which is absurd. But if the distribution isn’t uniform, then maybe it peaks near zero and the number chosen will definitely fall in (-1000, 1000). Or maybe it peaks near -4000 and the number chosen will definitely not fall in (-1,000, 1000). Who knows?
So you would have to take all the possible probability distributions into account. But that requires making a probability distribution of the distributions! And so on ad infinitum. The original question about “probability” just wasn’t well-enough defined to have a meaningful answer.
So there’s not much point talking about whether a god–of the ineffable, unpredictable, omnipotent sort–is likely to exist. Even posing that question assumes knowledge about the “set of all possible universes” which we don’t have. What we can say is that a god’s existence provides no explanatory value not matched by simpler hypotheses, so there’s no point believing in one.
eric,
No problem; mine was also delayed.
But that’s not how you interpreted the article’s definition the first time. You said that its definition meant that weak atheism was “without a commitment to the *necessary* non-existence of deities”–emphasis yours. You said that this meant weak atheism could involve commitment to the belief that god doesn’t exist, provided it didn’t claim that god’s nonexistence was logically necessary. In which case it would also be strong atheism, and therefore the definitions provided didn’t adequately distinguish between the two flavors.
That was your argument in #487. Did you not mean to say that?
By the way, I think that your initial reading of the definition was literally correct–if you looked only at that one sentence, at least. The author’s placement of “necessary” was clumsy.
Actually, multiple weak atheists on this very thread have said that weak atheism can involve the claim that god doesn’t exist. We particular weak atheists may not make that claim, although Kel may–I’m not sure–but that doesn’t invalidate the definition we provided.
But if you choose to define weak atheism as ruling out that claim, you can reasonably do so. Certainly, many people do define weak atheism that way.
Again, that’s not only not how I interpreted the article, it’s not how you initially interpreted it either. Under that interpretation, you would have had even less justification for saying that the article fails to distinguish between strong and weak atheism–the two positions would have been mutually exclusive!
But it doesn’t really matter. Provided you recognize the existence of a flavor of atheism which at least permits lack of belief without a positive belief in the nonexistence of gods, Glen has made his point. Contrary to your claim in #464, atheism does not entail ruling out any possible god.
Eric, can you answer this. Without a reason to believe in God, why should you? That is implying atheism. In the case of God what is the difference between absence of evidence and evidence of absence?
Anton,
I appreciate the clarification.
I confess I had to look Vitali sets up, and the whole concept is way above my head (it reminded me of the feeling I had in early high school, when during a library browse I found a book entitled something like Elementary Number Theory, and on examining it found it utterly incomprehensible. Elementary did not mean what I thought it did!).
Here again you’re over my head – I presumed that you were referring to a continuous uniform distribution (ie that the interval (-1000,1000) is equally probable to all other intervals of the same “size” within the reals given a random selection).
PS Excuse my poor terminology, it’s been a more than quarter century since I studied mathematical statistics.
And please don’t bother to explain it further, to me anyway – I’ll take your word for it pending others’ objections :)
I don’t think it’s necessary to concede eric’s implicit argument that the matter rests on the definition of weak and strong atheism – then attempting to define away weak atheism as a dishonest ploy.
I am happy to make the claim that gods don’t exist, and admit that I don’t know for sure, but science can only support provisional claims anyway so I don’t see any principle that would absolutely rule out using science to argue for explicit atheism. Whether we want to call that a type of strong atheism or explicit weak atheism is not very important.
John,
Aww, please? I like to hear myself talk.
They are very counter-intuitive. Some mathematicians reject them entirely, but it’s hard to do that without rejecting the Axiom of Choice, which most mathematicians would also find counter-intuitive.
That’s certainly what most people would intuitively like to pick–the trouble is that there is no such probability distribution if you’re dealing with an infinite interval.
After all, a probability distribution has to integrate to 1. But if the value of a uniform distribution is anything other than zero, then over an infinite interval, it’ll integrate to infinity! And if it’s zero, it’ll integrate to zero.
Geometrically, think of it this way. What’s the area between the x-axis and an infinitely long horizontal line? Either zero, or infinite. You can’t get 1.
So any probability distribution over an infinite interval has to peak somewhere, maybe in more than one spot, and then taper off towards zero on both ends.
This is, by the way, one more reason why most fine-tuning arguments are silly. “Fundamental Constant X has to lie within this narrow range for life to exist! What are the odds of that happening?” Well, you don’t know the odds. Maybe that narrow range happens to be where the probability peaks and the odds are really good. Or not. Who knows?
windy: I agree. Personally, I don’t want to say that hazy deist gods don’t exist, because their existence doesn’t matter empirically, so it seems more parsimonious to say nothing about it. On the other hand, most of the gods people actually worship would have an empirical impact if they existed, and in that case, I think science certainly has something to say about it.
Anton, you wouldn’t happen to be a teacher, would you? :)
That actually makes sense to me, and you’ve reawakened my understanding of some long-dormant concepts, thanks!
Regarding the fine-tuning arguments, I’ve certainly used that argument before; another argument is, of course, that they refer to “life” rather than to “life as we know it”.
(replace “life” with “spacetime continuum” when the fine-tuning claim shifts to physics).
Yep. And, they’re basically trying to half-ass a Bayesian argument without the prior probabilities for god vs. no god, and without the conditional probabilities for life-as-we-know it given either no god, or any god other than the one particular one they’re plugging.
‘Tis a trainwreck.