What if rape at university wasn’t impossible to prove?

Discretion advised if graphic details of this subject upset you.

Somewhere or other, you’ve probably read the last post on this blog by now. Other versions of Maria Marcello‘s article ‘I Was Raped At Oxford University. Police Pressured Me Into Dropping Charges‘ have appeared at the Guardian, the Independent, the Daily Mail, the Tab, the Huffington Post and openDemocracy – the fact it’s the first thing she’s ever written is why you should follow her and why I’m privileged to be her editor. (It’s also why if you’re looking for one, you should hire me. Just saying.)

In the follow-up she published today, Marcello dissects what users at the Mail told her. Among other things, many fixated on her assumed inability to prove she was raped after falling asleep drunk.

I would ask this lady[:] Just what does she know about the event?

If you are so drunk that you have lost your memory or passed out how can you remember if you consented or not?

What evidence can she provide that she said ‘no’ to the main she claimed raped her?

How do you know you were raped if you don’t remember the night? In the period between being put to sleep and waking up with a man next to you, consensual sex could have been initiated, due to the heavy state of intoxication.

If you’re drunk and passed out, then who knows what happened? She could have dreamed the whole thing!

There would little to no evidence to bring a successful prosecution in this case. No DNA, no witnesses, no other evidence apart from a statement from someone who was so drunk they were passed out at the time with only a dim memory as their evidence.

In other words, her assault was just another case of ‘he-said-she-said college rape‘ where nothing could be proved.

As she notes in the sequel, the point of the original post was how much she could prove.

According to the Crown Prosecution Service and the Sexual Offences Act, extreme inebriation makes consent impossible. To prove her attacker raped her, Marcello had to establish a) that she was in such a state and b) that he had sex with her. What evidence did she – or rather, since I was with her at the time, we – have?

Well:

  • We had Marcello’s word, mine and up to three other people’s that she was so drunk she had to be helped to bed (i.e. couldn’t walk unassisted).
  • We had photos and several minutes of close-up video footage taken of her on the floor, unable to speak coherently and obviously extremely drunk.
  • We may also have had forensic evidence of how much alcohol she’d consumed had police physicians examined her. (The CPS advises they present this sort of evidence to courts in rape trials.)
  • We had Marcello’s word that she woke up while her attacker was having sex with her.
  • We had the word of guests who believed this was about to occur when they left.
  • We had the rapist’s statement witnessed by half a dozen people over dinner that he’d had sex with her, and possibly other statements to this effect.
  • We had bruises on her upper thighs and her statement she had difficulty walking, which police physicians would have confirmed had they examined her.
  • We had several used condoms which were presented to police.
  • We had clothes and bedsheets covered in forensics which were presented to police.

This was the case a police official informed she didn’t have once they’d got her upset and alone, before making her decide on the spot whether to press charges. The pretext for making others leave the room, gut wrenchingly, was that she not be coerced out of doing so.

Says Marcello of the official:

She said she got called to investigate a number of rape reports each day and her job involved deciding which of them it was worthwhile to pursue and which it wasn’t. In her opinion, as she made clear from the start, mine fell into the latter category.

I have to wonder: if this wasn’t a case worth pursuing, what was? I’m not a lawyer, but my guess has always been that if she’d been allowed to speak to one before making her choice, they’d have told her it was stronger than average. Even without the forensics, it should have been enough for her college to expel the undergrad who raped her – if a student’s shown to have broken the law any other way, they don’t have to lose a court case before there are consequences.

The received wisdom about rape, especially where alcohol’s involved, is that it’s impossible to prove – a matter by definition of one person’s word against another’s. Since that day in Maria Marcello’s kitchen, I’d always assumed her case must be exceptionally good.

When Stephanie Zvan said this, as so often when I read her, my assumptions changed.

We know victims of sexual assault skew young. According to Britain’s Home Office, women aged 16-19 are at the highest risk of sexual victimisation, closely followed by those aged 20-24, and are four and a half times as likely as the next hardest hit age group to experience rape. (Marcello had just turned 20 at the time of her attack.) In other words, university-age women are the most raped demographic.

000We know that, according to a rightly maligned set of government posters, ‘one in three reported rapes happens when the victim has been drinking’. I’d speculate that since only one in five rapes is reported and alcohol commonly used to dismiss complaints, the real-life figure is higher – and that it’s especially high on campuses and among young people where drunkenness is more common in social settings, men and women live in close quarters and a culture of sexual assault has been widely observed.

‘I’ve heard lots of stories similar to mine’, Marcello writes, ‘from people assaulted [at university].’ All factors suggest the reality we’re looking at is a very high number of rapes that share the broad outline of hers: heavy social drinking, a vulnerable or unconscious woman and a man who ‘took advantage’.

She had, I take it you’ll agree from the list above, a large amount of evidence both that she too drunk to consent and that her attacker had sex with her. But how much more was it than the average woman in her situation has?

Hours afterwards and with law enforcement’s tools, it’s not that hard to prove two people had sex – or at least, that someone with a penis had sex with somebody else in one of the ways the law requires for rape. Often seminal fluid can be found, either in used contraceptives or the when victim is examined. Often there are physical signs they were penetrated, including internal injuries. Often there are external marks left on them or forensics at the scene that point to sex. Sometimes the attacker thinks they did nothing wrong and <i>tells people</i> it happened, in person or by other (e.g. online) means. Sometimes they’re interrupted in the act, whether or not the witness views it as assault.

Many women in Marcello’s situation, I’d guess, have at least some such evidence.

Proving the absence of of consent can be more complex, but it doesn’t need to be when someone’s so drunk they can’t walk, talk or consent to sex. The video footage we had always struck me as an exceptional clincher, but then drunk photos and videos often appear on students’ social media accounts. Even when drunk victims aren’t filmed, they may be seen collapsing or needing help by far more people than a handful in their room – by crowds at a college party, for example. They may be assaulted after receiving first aid, being admonished by bouncers or no longer being served by bar stuff – all evidence of drunkenness. They may still be suffering symptoms of severe intoxication the next day, or have signs of it in their system police physicians can record.

Many women in Marcello’s situation, I’d guess, have at least some such evidence.

It’s still true, of course, that proving rape isn’t quite as straightforward as proving a crime where issues like consent aren’t involved. But it’s not true drunken college rapes are simply a case of he-said-she-said: on the contrary, extreme inebriation where demonstrable makes the absence of consent much more clear-cut.

Writes Marcello:

There would be more convictions if the police process didn’t pressure women with viable evidence to drop their reports. In 2012–13, official treatment of victims like me meant only 15 percent of rapes recorded by the police even went to court.

According to a report at the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, official treatment of victims like her means evidence of vulnerability that should guarantee conviction – including drunkenness as well as things like disabilities – is routinely used precisely to dismiss reports, stop charges being pressed and get rapists off.

The best way to convict more is to stop telling victims with a strong case that they have no evidence.

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Do Muslim international students want segregation? Polling on ISocs, religiosity and gender mixing

You’ve no doubt read by now of the much-maligned support of Universities UK for gender-segregated seating at campus events like those of the so-called Islamic Education and Research Academy, an organisation banned from several universities in Britain whose leaders explicitly oppose feminism and endorse violence against women and whose website doctors out photographs of female speakers offered only ‘to deliver talks, lectures and presentations to and for women‘. (The IERA and groups like it observe a strict taboo on women speaking publicly in front of men, as do a worrying number of Christian groups.) The recent withdrawal of UUK’s position, prompted by cross-party condemnation in Westminster and protests by people on this network, has encouragingly been welcomed and praised.

While their stance officially is under review, it seems unlikely now that anything but prohibition will follow. A more interesting question is how (or whether) it gets enforced – seating practices like this, and a post on the subject is in the works, are more prevalent among student Islamic groups than coverage has acknowledged, and likely to be difficult to police. (It’s important to stress that Islamic Societies aren’t necessarily representative of Muslim students at large – more on this below.) In the mean time, there’s a separate canard I think should be addressed.

The Observer‘s editorial applauding UUK’s retraction, topped with a twinkly-eyed photograph of Richard Dawkins from the Guardian site’s go-to album for any secularist story, states ‘it has been suggested that segregated meetings appeal to overseas Muslim students vital for university finances’ – referring, I think, to the statement by members of Reading University’s (banned) atheist society that authorities feared anti-segregation action ‘might eventually reduce the university’s intake of international students‘, specifically Muslims from ‘hardline religious countries’ whose higher tuition fees education bodies need.

The idea seems to spring from the assumption political Islam is a product of immigration, alien to Britain and imported from Sharia states; the reality is that British Islamism is largely a second or third generation phenomenon among the (grand)children of immigrants for whom fundamentalism is partly a misguided attempt at anti-Western cultural authenticity. (This why people like Alom Shaha are regularly smeared as ‘coconuts’, ‘brown on the outside, but white on the inside’, when they leave Islam, and why clash-of-civilisation arguments that portray Islam as essential to particular cultures and in conflict with ‘Western values’ only make things worse – that’s exactly Islamism’s selling point.)

The Centre for Social Cohesion, a conservative think tank now integrated into the Henry Jackson Society which (not) coincidentally funds anti-extremist group Student Rights, major players in the anti-segregation campaign, commissioned a YouGov poll of 632 Muslim students in 2008. I’ve referred to it before because it contained questions on atheists, gay people and sharia – to my knowledge, it’s the only poll specifically of Muslim students that’s been done. 80 of those surveyed self-identified as ‘Not British'; it seems reasonable to assume for the purposes of this post that these were the international students being talked about, since a ‘Partially British’ category (of 125) also existed, and was probably more likely to include immigrants to Britain or those of dual nationality.

What does the data tell us about Muslim international students’ attitudes to segregation, then? Specifically, does it back up the idea a clampdown would stifle numbers and starve universities of funds?

Well… no.

The first thing to say, of course, is that the idea prima facie is implausible. According to the UK Council for International Student Affairs, the number of international students on UK campuses in 2011-12 was 435,230, of whom 177,880 came either from EU countries or China. Of the top ten ‘sending countries’ outside the EU, only four (Nigeria, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan) had double-digit Muslim populations, providing between them 50,845 students, less than 12 percent of the total. Even assuming all of them to be segregation-supporters – moreover, segregation-supporters who wouldn’t study in Britain if it were banned – the hole left by their absence would hardly be gaping or irreparable.

Moving specifically to the findings of the CSC’s YouGov poll, only 21 percent of non-British Muslims were members of their university’s Islamic Society, compared with 26 percent of their British (and partially British) counterparts. 65 percent of British Muslim students weren’t members, rising to 71 percent for non-Britons.

1

This is striking both because it suggests practices in Islamic Societies aren’t at all a good barometer of Muslim student opinion generally and because they’re almost always where gender segregation happens. Of the fifth of non-British Muslims who do belong to one, 15 percent – that is, three percent of the total – were committee members, while only 31 percent went to most or all of its meetings and events (6.5 percent of the total). This compares with a third of ISoc members among British Muslim students (8.6 percent of the total) who attended most or all events, and 61 percent who attended either none or not many (15.9 percent of the total).

In summary: British and non-British Muslim students are about equally likely to be loyal ISoc members. Only 21-26 percent of either were members at all.

One thing that should be noted at this point is that the total of 81 non-British participants probably has a higher than usual error margin – perhaps ten percentage points or more. Unfortunately, there’s not much we can do about this: no other data exists for comparison as far as I know (please tell me in the comments if it does), and true figures could be either higher or lower than those shown here: we can’t second guess them. It’s probably a good idea not to put huge amounts of stock in this data, particular where smaller differentials appear, but there’s nothing else to go on currently.

2

While levels of religious observance aren’t necessarily a predictor of ‘radicalism’ – they can be the opposite – it’s worth pointing out non-British Muslims were again about equal in their use of campus prayer rooms and attendance of Friday prayer, with non-Britons slightly more observant over all in each case but numbers well within each other’s error margins.

28 percent of British Muslims used the campus prayer room between twice a week and daily, compared with 45 percent who’d never visited at all (37 percent) or went less than once a month (8 percent); among non-British Muslim students, a third used the prayer room twice a week to daily, whereas 44 percent had never used it (31 percent) or did so less than monthly (13 percent). 28 percent of British Muslims always attended Friday prayer while 27 percent never did, with intermediate frequencies also near-symmetrical; 34 of non-British Muslims always attended compared with 25 who never did.

These differences aren’t really statistically significant: British and non-British Muslim students are about equally observant, and both are somewhat polarised.

3

38 percent of British Muslim students said ‘Islam is a religion whilst Islamism is a political ideology’ while 14 percent said ‘They are both part of the same thing – politics is a big part of Islam’. This compares with 33 percent of non-British Muslims who distinguished the two and 25 who didn’t, a difference which seems significant if still small. Equal numbers in both groups (24 of British Muslims, 23 percent of non-British ones) agreed with neither of these statements, while 24 percent of the British and 20 percent of the non-British group said they weren’t sure.

So non-British Muslim students may be slightly more likely to be Islamists than their British counterparts, but the difference is slight and the figure still only one in four.

Finally, when questioned specifically about women…

4

61 percent of non-British Muslims thought women wearing ‘the hijab’ (this may have been ambiguous) fairly (28 percent) or very (33 percent) important to Islam, while 33 percent thought it not at all important (18 percent) or not very (15 percent). Among their British peers, 62 percent called it important (30 percent very important, 32 fairly important) compared 30 percent who disagreed (18 percent not very important, 12 percent not at all).

Non-British Muslims were somewhat less supportive of the statement ‘It is up to the individual Muslim woman as to whether or not she chooses to wear the hijab’, with 59 percent agreeing compared with 65 of British Muslim students. Notably, the opposing answer ‘Women should wear the hijab – female modesty is an important part of Islam’ (supported by 30 percent of British participants and 38 percent of non-British ones) isn’t necessarily contradictory, but in any case, the differential is again a fairly small one.

Interestingly, no obvious difference can be seen in male and female response to these questions across the sample group as a whole. Of course, we don’t have crossbreaks for how gender and nationality correlate here, and if we did the groups would be too small to interpret usefully. British Muslim students are more likely than non-British ones to say wearing ’the hijab’ is a woman’s choice, but only by 59 to 65 percent. This is quite a useful question, since groups and events where segregated seating is practised tend to require all women present to wear headscarves.

On the direct question of how acceptable it is ‘for men and women to associate freely in Muslim society’, 49 percent of non-British Muslim students said it was very (21 percent) or fairly (28 percent) acceptable, while 33 percent called it ‘not very acceptable’ and 12 percent ‘not at all acceptable’. British Muslim response was ambivalent, with 62 percent saying either ‘not very‘ (30 percent) or ‘fairly’ (32 percent), with extreme stances less popular (16 percent for ‘very acceptable’ and 11 percent for ‘not at all acceptable’).

5

One question that followed (emphasis YouGov’s) was ‘Do you believe that men and women should be treated equally?’ I haven’t bothered to include it here because, as more or less whenever pollsters ask this question, almost everyone said yes – over 90 percent in each national subgroup. It’s almost never a useful question: almost everyone thinks men and women should be equal, but disagree about what this entails. (Asking people if they’re feminists, for example, gets very different results.)

A similar problem may on some level exist with men and women ‘associat[ing] freely’. Exactly what does and doesn’t this describe? Most Muslims, I suspect, would support mosques separating men and women for prayer, and presumably those who called association unacceptable here oppose, say, unmarried men and women socialising together, but would all of them oppose mixed or unregulated seating at public events?

I don’t know. I’m somewhat inclined to think so, though, because the position stated here is so blunt: if believers are willing to say free association of men and women is unacceptable without qualification, it seems likely their views are fairly all-encompassing. We can probably assume, at least, that everyone who said association was ‘not at all acceptable’ is pro-segregation – otherwise, I’ll let you draw your own conclusions. The answers can at any rate be summarised thus:

Aggregate support for and opposition to male-female association are roughly equal in both groups, ranging from 41 to 49 percent. Support, however, was more moderate among British Muslims – among non-British Muslims finding it acceptable, opinions were more evenly split between ‘very’ and ‘fairly’ answers, where British Muslim students strongly favoured ‘fairly’. Students opposed to free association in both groups found it ‘fairly’ unacceptable close to three times as often as ‘very’.

The long and short of it? Educators can relax: Muslim students from abroad won’t flee Britain en masse if segregation’s banned. Nor would much change if they did: they’re only a small fraction of the UK’s international fee-payers, as well as of its campus Islamists and fundamentalists.