Dear Pat Condell… why this homo-Islamic masochist rejects your anti-Muslim crusade

Dear Pat Condell:

I was recently linked to your ‘How gay is Islam?’ video by a fan of yours quite desperate to persuade me (as a queer left wing atheist blogger) that I need to spend more time attacking Muslims, intent as you say they are on killing me.

The reason you haven’t heard from me till now is not that I was stumped; it’s that the sheer amount of wrong in what you say is so extreme that it’s taken me a week to lay it out.

I’ve even divided my response in two: an extended, detailed examination of what polls on British Muslims actually say, contrary to your assertions, can be found here. (It grew long in the tooth, again, because there’s so much in your statements to correct.) For this post, I thought I’d go through your transcript point by point.

As you know, I don’t like to criticise anyone, but surely the most comically deluded people on this planet, outside creationists, Jehovah’s Witnesses and Scientologists, are idealistic left-wing gay people who think they share a common cause with Muslims as two oppressed minorities when opinion polls tell us that most Muslims are disgusted by homosexuality and think it’s completely unacceptable.

No, opinion polls don’t tell us that, and the single poll you cite contradicts several key claims you make. You’d know this if, in fact, you’d read it.

What is true is that according to the BBC, the ‘Measuring Anti-Muslim Attacks’ hotline recorded 632 incidents of harassment between last February and this March (more than a baker’s dozen a week on average), and a further 212 including 17 violent attacks between Lee Rigby’s murder in Woolwich and the start of June; that Woolwich was followed by attacks on mosques with bombs and knives in Essex, Kent and Lincolnshire, and the burning down of a Muslim community centre in north London; that by May 28, ten mosques had been attacked; that others were vandalised with racist and far-right slogans; that women’s headscarves were reportedly torn off by strangers as they walked the streets, a disturbingly familiar phenomenon today.

I have no idea what it’s like to live through this as a Muslim, and I wouldn’t presume to guess, but I do know what it’s like to feel unsafe in public – to fear going outside for homophobic catcalls from across the road, having objects thrown at me, being spat on, hit and kicked, having possessions grabbed, stolen or destroyed. I know what it’s like to be afraid all the time, and that no one – no onewhoever they are, whatever they think of me – should ever live in fear. I won’t be complicit in that.

What do you know about being queer, or about being a Muslim? (Not about Islam, in principle – about being a Muslim?) And what, in particular, about being a queer Muslim, doubly trodden on and ignored, including by you?

I expect this understanding to be returned, and that other people stepped on, pushed to the margins, know not to do this to me or other queer people. That they sometimes – often – don’t know this doesn’t mean they shouldn’t . Yes, negative views of people who aren’t straight are widespread in the so-called Muslim community; no, this doesn’t legitimise attacking, harassing or demonising Muslims, and it doesn’t free people who know what that treatment feels like from needing to resist it. I’m keeping my end of the bargain.

Among UK Muslims, disapproval is 100%. Admittedly, that’s from a sample of only 500 people who all happened to agree unanimously, but that’s hardly representative. After all, not all Muslims were included, so we can’t reasonably extrapolate anything from it without being racist. That’s a relief. I thought we might have to face an unpleasant truth there for a second, didn’t you?

Note the downsizing on several fronts: from disgust to disapproval, ‘most Muslims’ to 500 in Britain. Note too the treatment of British Muslims as archetypes of opinion in Islam, while citing a poll which shows them as far more conservative than those in Germany or France.

Gay people who look for common ground with Islam are a bit like left-wing Jews who want to boycott Israel. They’ve let their twisted “progressive” politics trump their common sense.

Excuse me: how did we get from ‘a common cause with Muslims as two oppressed minorities’ to ‘look[ing] for common ground with Islam’?

If you want to make comparisons, and your views on Israel speak volumes, I needn’t believe in God, the validity of zionism or the prudence of building a fence around the Torah to think synagogues shouldn’t be smashed, Jews targeted with ethnic slurs or societies and legal systems segregated – I certainly needn’t support the slicing of infants’ genitals, or the herding of children into proselytising schools. I needn’t think any of the above are even remotely good ideas – I don’t. I need only think people have rights.

From your claim – again, against the polls – that Muslims think otherwise and therefore should be shunned, I gather you agree. I can find Islam absurd, while also thinking mosques shouldn’t be banned or bombed, as easily as finding UKIP laughable, deranged and incoherent while not wishing to assault or expatriate its voters. (Come to think of it, I’ve met some sensible Muslims…)

It’s hard to know if they really believe in their fantasy gay/Islamic alliance, or if their “look-at-me-how-tolerant-I-am” Guardianista political correctness hasn’t just mutated into a kind of homo-Islamic masochism.

Independent if you don’t mind. Tribune on the side.

How else do you explain the willingness of otherwise intelligent people to indulge a religion that wants them dead?

Islam doesn’t want me dead. Islam doesn’t want anything. Saying religions want things is like saying homeopathy feels sad or Thatcherism likes watching Countdown.

Almost no British Muslims – one or two percent – support execution for homosexuality. The only other measure of what Islam ‘wants’, it having no single catechism or analogue to the Holy See, is what its texts say, and scripture on its own is a remarkably bad predictor of beliefs or practices within religions. (The cutting of more than one human in ten’s penis, unlike the female version a near-universal practice, would surely rank among Islam’s most undesirable manifestations, but is demanded next to nowhere – indeed, very arguably proscribed – in the Qur’an. Every religion’s texts, conversely, bear long-forgotten commandments.) I’m not interested in what scripture mandates, most of the time, but in what believers in the real world think and do, and British Muslims don’t think what you say.

And not dead in a symbolic or theoretical way, but in an actual string-them-up-in-public sort of way, as they do in the Islamic Republic of Iran where they regard death as too good for homosexuals.

Post-revolutionary, theocratic Iran and its governments being, of course, an oasis of democratic transparency and rule by popular consent, whose public have no history at all of protest or dissent. (This sentence isn’t even coherent. One either regards death as too good for someone or kills them. Both are not possible.)

If they could find a way to kill them twice over they know it would please Allah more than a Tel Aviv school bus suicide bomb, but what can they do? They’ll just have to wait for Islamic science to find a way, and pick up that long overdue Nobel Prize.

There is absolutely no reason – except to make Muslims sound particularly foreign – to refer to the god of Islam as Allah. ‘Allah’ is the Arabic word for God, and nothing more specific; it’s what Arabic-speaking Muslims, Christians, Jews and members of other faiths all call their god. (Among Muslims, heavy use of Arabic is often an Islamist strategy to frame Islam as un-Western and culturally distinct. This kind of racialising discourse, including when non-Muslims adopt it, makes leaving Islam harder for atheists.)

Surely it’s obvious even to the most PC-crippled among us that if any one group of people on this earth should be opposing the spread of Islam with everything they’ve got, it’s gay people. Nothing is a more serious threat to them.

Please don’t use words like ‘crippled’.

Please don’t assume you’ve thought at greater length about the consequences of my sexuality and other people’s beliefs than I, a queer atheist blogger, have.

And once again, the data contradicts this.

Islam will never be remotely gay-friendly. There will never be a pink crescent moon, unless you count gay bloodstains, and good luck finding an Islamic “scholar” who’s prepared to deny that.

Daayiee Abdullah; Junaid Bin Jahangir; Scott Siraj al-Haqq Kugle; Ludovic-Mohamed Zahed; Ziauddin Sardar.

That’s five, as many minutes after a Google search. Oh yes – and about what the data says

It’s true that not all “scholars” feel the same way about gays. Some think they should be stoned to death. Others favour throwing them off a mountain. Maybe on a good day you could even get to choose. In Iran they’ve settled the matter by hanging them from cranes in public. In Mauritania they use the more traditional method, stoning to death. In Saudi Arabia they prefer beheading, as they do for many things in that country, including witchcraft.

British Muslims are overwhelmingly opposed to punishments like these. If you’re determined to homogenise Islam, whose stance is the ‘official’ one: theirs, or the current Iranian, Saudi or Mauritanian governments’? (Mauritania, on a point of fact, hasn’t actually executed anyone since 1990.)

In countries that don’t impose the death penalty for being gay it’s still punishable by flogging and imprisonment.

States whose official religion is Islam (generically or one particular denomination), and/or with a Muslim majority…

…with laws against homosexuality: Afghanistan, Algeria, Bangladesh, Brunei, Comoros, Gambia, Guinea, Iran, Kuwait (men only), Libya, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Palestinian territories (Gaza – men only), Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone (men only), Somalia, Somaliland, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkmenistan (men only), United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan (men only), Western Sahara, Yemen. (Total: 26.5 28.5)

…without laws against homosexuality: Albania, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Burkina Faso, Chad, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Indonesia, Jordan, Kosovo, Kyrgyzstan, Kuwait (women only), Lebanon, Mali, Mayotte, Niger, Palestinian territories (Gaza – women only), Palestinian territories (West Bank), Sierra Leone (women only), Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan (women only), Uzbekistan (women only). (Total: 21.5)

Other countries with laws against homosexuality: Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize (men only), Bhutan, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Cook Islands (men only), Dominica, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Grenada (men only), Guyana, Jamaica (men only), Kenya, Kiribati (men only), Lesotho (men only), Liberia, Malawi, Mauritius (men only), Myanmar, Namibia, Nauru (men only), Nigeria, Palau (men only), Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis (men only), Saint Lucia (men only), Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Seychelles (men only), Singapore, Solomon Islands, Somaliland, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland (men only), Tanzania, Togo, Tonga (men only), Trinidad and Tobago, TR North Cyprus (men only), Tuvalu (men only), Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe (men only). (Total: 40.5 38.5)

(All data: Wikipedia)

And it was announced recently that several Islamic countries are trying to find a medical test to detect gay people and stop them at the border, so disgusted are they by homosexuality.

Not just gay people, actually, but LGBT (including transgender) people. This is alarming and a major human rights concern – much like refusing people entry to Britain, in fact, for being Muslims or coming from a ‘Muslim country’. (If you lived in the ones above, wouldn’t you want to leave?)

If you care so much about human rights abuses, by the way, you should probably stop voting for a party that wants to scrap the Human Rights Act.

They even forced the United Nations to remove sexual orientation from a resolution condemning arbitrary execution, because Islamic countries want the right to arbitrarily execute gay people without being condemned for it, and the United Nations went along with that, which tells us something about the United Nations, but nothing we didn’t already know.

Yes, the six nations of the GCC and 73 other member states of the UN voted for this amendment. Of those 79, less than half (38) were ‘Islamic countries’ by the criteria above.

The concept of human rights is alien to Islam, as we know. The concept of gay rights is an insulting and vile obscenity to Islam, without putting too fine a point on it. Islam does not regard homosexuality as a different lifestyle, but as a disgusting form of sexual perversion on a par with paedophilia or bestiality, that should be severely punished.

Islam doesn’t regard anything as anything. Islam doesn’t have opinions independent of its followers’. (It has holy texts of course, but texts mean nothing without a reader, and again, they’re terrible predictors of what religious groups will think or do.)

While it’s certainly true the kind of Islamist states that have tended to develop in the last 50 years have notoriously poor human rights records, they’re far from unique in this, including among religious states more broadly. Of the non-Islamic countries above that criminalise homosexuality, almost all (41) are majority-Christian.

Further, polling of British Muslims shows high levels of support for secular legal infrastructure, human and LGBT rights and the respectful treatment of gay people.

Islamic preachers often conflate homosexuality and paedophilia, and are not challenged on it because the people they’re talking to generally agree with them.

Yes, it’s generally true that people who go to see people preach agree with them. (Hence the expression ‘preaching to the choir’.) How often do your regular viewers challenge you?

We know that the more Islam there is in a society the more physically dangerous it’s likely to be for gay people.

We don’t. You might, but you need a citation for this if you do.

There’s very little data available about correlation between religion and violent attacks on gay people, or about religious support specifically for these. (Anecdotally, speaking from experience among queer and human rights activists, the countries most infamous for this are generally Jamaica, Russia and Brazil.)

What we do know – from the survey, actually, which you cite to smear Muslims – is that those in Britain, Germany and France overwhelmingly oppose all forms of violence; that homosexuality is legal in almost as many ‘Muslim countries’ as it is against the law, and that substantially fewer states criminalising it are Muslim countries as defined above than are predominantly Christian.

In parts of Europe with high Muslim immigrant populations we know that openly gay men are far more likely to be attacked and beaten up on the street for being gay.

Citation desperately needed, once again.

I found none in the description to your video. I’m also impressed you seem so confident of this, since having been out as queer for the past ten years and a writer, researcher and activist on various queer issues (violence included) as well as religion for a good many of those, I’ve never been able to find a comprehensive study of homophobic assault levels by country. If you know more than I do about this, which you might (but I’d be surprised), why not share your data?

It’s a non-sequitur in any case that if homophobic violence occurs in places with high Muslim migrant populations, Muslims must be the perpetrators – rather like your claim that since 5 percent of Sweden’s populace are Muslims, they must be responsible for its rape statistics.

And there’s a good reason why they don’t hold gay pride marches down Brick Lane.

Actually, assuming by Brick Lane you mean Tower Hamlets and London’s East End, they do.

The march you mean was postponed and reorganised over concerns it would be used as an EDL front – concerns which came not from Muslim groups, but local LGBT ones, and certainly weren’t accompanied by threats of violence.

In a nutshell, gay people, Islam wants your blood, and if you’re ever stupid enough to go to an Islamic country and let them know you’re gay you’ll find that out the hard way.

I have – several times, in Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and Turkish Cyprus (if the latter counts). My pulse persists.

It doesn’t give a damn how tolerant or inclusive you are. It just wants you dead for being who and what you are, and it’s no more open to persuasion on the matter than you would be open to persuasion about letting sewer rats run around your house.

Stop saying abstract philosophies want or give a damn about things; stop calling my sexual identity ‘who and what I am'; start reading the data, which indicates decisively that queer-positive versions of Islam can and do exist, and that Muslims by and large (in Britain at least) are unsupportive of violence or oppression targeting LGBT people, whatever their moral view. (Yes, those views themselves do matter; no, not because they’re a threat to the way of life of gay or straight non-Muslims.)

You’ve got more chance of celebrating Christmas in a pub in Saudi Arabia than you have of finding common ground between Islam and homosexuality, and you’ve got absolutely no excuse for pretending otherwise because there’s nothing nuanced about the Islamic position. There is no ambiguity. There is no grey area. There is no common ground. There is no shared struggle. There are no bridges to be built, and there won’t be any until you stop being gay.

Again, what ‘common ground between Islam and homosexuality’ do I advocate by saying people shouldn’t be expatriated, attacked, harassed or slandered for their religion? (Or indeed perceived religion.) This as far as I’m concerned is elementary secularism.

Moreover: attitudes to queer sexuality within Islam are demonstrably varied, often sympathetic and at times explicitly affirmative. Of course gay imams are a fringe, but so were Islamists in 1960. Islam has shown itself to be as malleable and susceptible to evolutionary change as any other religion – there is no reason to assume queer-positive versions are somehow innately unsellable.

Would that option be on the table at all? For the sake of, you know, community cohesion? After all, by being gay you’re being culturally insensitive, disrespectful, divisive, provocative, offensive, Islamophobic and racist. What can I say, people? The bottom line is if you don’t want to be a filthy racist you’re going to have to stop being gay. And when you think about it, it’s really not that much to ask. After all, if you’re not willing to compromise on your sick and sinful gayness, how can you reasonably expect Islam to compromise on wanting you dead? Peace.

Oh, Pat. Stop.

Are British Muslims a threat to gay people? Polling on homophobia, sharia law and violence

I was recently linked to Pat Condell’s newest video, which argues ‘the most comically deluded people on this planet, outside creationists, Jehovah’s Witnesses and Scientologists, are idealistic left-wing gay people’ who ‘indulge a religion that wants them dead’ by opposing his campaign against Muslims, migrants and the left – the likes, in other words, of queer atheists like me, Chris Stedman and Owen Jones. (Vilification by Condell is, I’m quite sure, the first thing apart from the above Stedman and I have ever had in common.)

The video, if you can stand to view it, is below.

Personal as this is, my first response was to fisk it start-to-end – unfortunately, and as I found out quickly, there is simply so much wrong with this that a post comprehensively rebutting it would be very, very long. Responding to Condell is like playing chess against a wasp, as unfulfilling as it is unchallenging, but the argument in question is one atheists need urgently to settle, so I’m splitting my reply in two. The blow-by-blow analysis, including the more philosophical points to be made, will come after this post, which I’m focusing more purely factually on his specific claims about the attitudes of (British) Muslims. These can I think be summarised as follows:

  • Attitudes to homosexuality within Islam are uniform.
  • Muslims find homosexuality disgusting and ‘completely unacceptable’, disapproving of it and supporting a ‘zero tolerance’ policy such as Iran’s, including punishment with death.
  • Muslims don’t support or recognise concepts of gay or human rights, finding them vile, insulting and obscene.
  • Muslims do support extrajudicial homophobic violence such as criminal assaults on gay men.
  • Muslim population growth (and Muslim immigration in particular) thus threatens gay people’s rights and safety.

Based on the former point – his insistence Islam is devoid of nuance, variation or capacity for change – and how he flits confusingly between using UK Muslims’ views and the actions of Islamic governments and lobbyists around the world to buttress his case, it seems Condell is arguing these premises apply to Muslims wherever on the globe they are. (Trying to summarise his claims with accuracy is challenging, in fact, since his statements sprawl so inconsistently.) Odd, then, that despite stating ‘opinion polls’ (plural) support his views, he cites only one survey of British Muslims.

Actually, he doesn’t cite the survey in his video description: he cites the Guardian‘s coverage of it, headlined ‘Muslims in Britain have zero tolerance of homosexuality‘, which features no link to the poll itself. I strongly suspect that despite it being the only statistical research he gives to back up his assertions, he hasn’t read it, since its findings refute several of his main points.

Moral views on homosexuality

Britain’s media, for those still unaware, reports opinion polls notoriously badly, preferring dramatic headlines to detailed analysis not just on Islam, but generally. Publicising them without linking to data is exceptionally bad journalism, and whether you’re a columnist, a blogger or a video maker, it’s almost always better to give links to polls themselves than stories about them in newspapers. Properly carried out and analysed, polls are a powerfully useful tool, but their results – as no doubt will become clear in this post – require careful interpretation. (I’m going to examine several polls of British Muslims which appear relevant here. While I don’t feel like I need to – Condell’s entire case stands or falls on one – the hotly-argued nature of the topic makes me think a meta-analysis would be a good resource for the commentariat as well as atheists.)

‘Most Muslims’, Condell says in his video, ‘are disgusted by homosexuality and think it’s completely unacceptable. Among UK Muslims, disapproval is 100%. . . . [T]hat’s from a sample of . . . 500 people who all happened to agree unanimously.’ The study he’s describing is The Gallup Coexist Index 2009: A Global Study of Interfaith Relations, which examines social attitudes of UK Muslims, comparing them with the general populace’s and of those in Germany and France. The part in question shows participants’ answers when prompted, ‘Tell me whether you PERSONALLY BELIEVE that [homosexual acts are] MORALLY acceptable or MORALLY wrong?’

‘Acceptable’ responses among Muslims ranged from 35 percent in France to 19 percent in Germany and none in Britain.

1

Among the general public, the same responses numbered 78 percent in France, 68 percent in German and 58 percent in Britain. The stark gulf between general British views and those of Muslims makes more sense framed as the product of two general rules: British attitudes are significantly more conservative than those in Germany and (especially) France, and Muslim attitudes more conservative than non-Muslims’, so British Muslims are correspondingly the most conservative group polled.

Whatever else we might say about these figures, it’s notable they contradict in several ways Condell’s assertion that ‘there’s nothing nuanced about the Islamic position’, since ‘Islam will never be remotely gay-friendly’ and isn’t ‘open to persuasion on the matter’, as well as his treatment of British Muslims as representative of Islam at large. Among Islam’s followers, views can and do vary, in line not just with country of residence but also with country of origin and/or ethnicity.

‘Sex between an unmarried man and woman’, on the next page of the study, was deemed morally acceptable by only three percent of British Muslims, compared with 27 percent of those in Germany and 48 percent of those in France, a similar difference of views to that on homosexual acts. Chris Green of the Independent writes that ‘this discrepancy is likely to be caused by the fact that British Muslims mainly originate from rural parts of conservative Islamic countries such as Pakistan, Bangladesh and India, whereas French and German Muslims tend to be from Morocco, Algeria and Turkey‘.

The second point here, moving toward a commentary on the actual views voiced by participants, is that these questions’ formatting is rather odd. Particularly given Gallup later adopt a scaled, 1-5 answering system to gauge support for certain actions (see below), I don’t know why they offer only two possible answers here, forcing individuals polled to call homosexual acts and other examples either ‘morally acceptable’ or ‘morally wrong’. Views in all populations are almost certainly less binary than this – of the 500 British Muslims all of whom ticked ‘morally wrong’ on homosexual acts, how many found them ‘absolutely morally wrong’ (comparable to, say, murder) versus ‘somewhat morally wrong’ or ‘not morally preferable’ (comparable to, say, lying)? If all 500 found homosexual acts analogous with murder or deserving of hanging, results would be the same as if they all found them analogous with telling lies.

Moreover, how does this formatting accommodate participants whose views are neutral or uncertain, when no ‘Unsure/Don’t know’ option is given? Given the general public’s view on this was less than 60-40 in favour of ‘acceptable’, a surprisingly low ratio in itself, it seems plausible respondents who felt no strong attraction to either answer were likelier to opt for ‘morally wrong’ than ‘morally acceptable’, though I’d like to see this properly investigated; certainly, in view of the overwhelmingly conservative leanings of the Muslim population, I can imagine some indifferent or indecisive Muslims defaulting to ‘wrong’ over ‘acceptable’. We can’t know how common this was because the question’s formatting is imprecise, and I wouldn’t like to speculate, but it’s worth considering. Certainly, Condell’s claim the 500 British Muslims surveyed ‘happened to agree unanimously’ implies a greater degree of consensus than was likely the case.

Finally and most importantly, the ‘homosexual acts’ question does not measure disgust around homosexuality or support for ‘zero tolerance’ approaches (this phrase, used in the Guardian and by Condell, is suggestive of hardline stances on crime) – it doesn’t measure tolerance at all, including stances on criminalisation, and it definitely doesn’t measure how many people (Muslims among them) support flogging, imprisonment or death for homosexual acts.

It’s quite possible, common in fact, to find something morally wrong but oppose its prohibition. Among members of the British public Gallup surveyed, 45 percent called abortion morally wrong and 85 percent called ‘married men and women having an affair’ morally wrong:

2

3

While we can’t compare results side by side from separate polls – different polls have different sample groups, questions, orders of questions and so on – research elsewhere shows comprehensively, and as one would expect, that only small minorities of Britons want either to be criminalised. (2-11 percent for abortion, according to various polls collated by Anthony Wells at UK Polling Report; 12 percent for adultery according to a YouGov survey.)

This effect is especially in evidence among religious groups. Catholics might, for instance, find contraception morally wrong while supporting its availability to those who wanted it; Jews might consider eating pork immoral without wanting it banned from supermarkets. Further, if we wouldn’t assume the 42 percent of the British public who called homosexual acts morally wrong support their recriminalisation, let alone violence toward or execution of those committing them, we shouldn’t assume Muslims who gave the same answer support this.

So far, then: Islamic attitudes to homosexuality, while predominantly negative, remain visibly varied, with over a third of German Muslims finding it morally acceptable. Islam is as malleable as any religion, and consensus among believers can and does change over time and between countries. British Muslims in particular unanimously describe homosexual acts as morally wrong rather than morally acceptable according to Gallup, but don’t necessarily oppose their legality or social permissibility.

The emphasis on ‘MORALLY’ of Gallup’s staff when carrying out its poll suggests to me the question is meant to gauge specifically religious attitudes to homosexual acts, rather than what participants thought the civic or social status of those acts should be – nonetheless, it’s very possible interpretation of the question varied. That it was the first one asked seems likely not to have helped this. Believers might understand moral acceptability differently having been asked already about secular social concerns like speeding on the motorway or refusing to vote from how they would after answering specifically religious ‘morality’ questions – condoms or expressions like ‘Oh my God’ for Catholics, sausages or writing ‘God’ for Jews, alcohol or interest-paying for Muslims and so on.

We know 100 percent of Muslims polled called homosexual acts morally wrong, considering them at least to be sinful, but can’t automatically read this as a statement about gay or human rights in a broader social/legal context – for data on this front, we have to look elsewhere.

Sharia, British law and LGBT/human rights

One headline-making survey from YouGov two years ago (Gallup’s data was collected in 2008, and in specified cases 2006-7) gauges agreement across various social strata with the phrase ‘I am proud of how Britain treats gay people’. It seems sensible to treat this as a measure of support for LGBT legal and social rights in the UK, assuming most people considered Britain to treat gay people well – one annoying aspect of this poll was that it didn’t cross-reference by sexual/gender identity, so we don’t know how many LGBT people were surveyed who disagreed because they felt they weren’t treated well enough or hadn’t enough rights. (Bear in mind this is from 2011, before Britain introduced gay marriage.)

On the page surveying various religions, Muslims are tied with Anglicans and Episcopalians as the second-most agreeable faith group (behind Sikhs) at 47 percent agreement each, though Muslims were also slightly more likely (by 19 percent to 12) to disagree.

1

I include this poll largely because it was cited widely by the left as evidence of Muslims supporting LGBT rights in Britain (even while, according to Gallop, considering homosexual acts to be condemned by their religion – the same essentially secularist, if not-unproblematic position advanced by Mehdi Hasan this May). Sunny Hundal at Liberal Conspiracy, for instance, headlined news of YouGov’s findings as ‘Muslims prouder of gay rights than others‘ and wrote, noting its relationship with Gallup’s data, ‘Muslims can agree that Islam does not tolerate homosexuality, while celebrating gay rights enshrined in the law'; LGBT site Pink News, cited by Owen Jones, called the data evidence Muslims are proud of Britain’s gay rights record.

I’m actually extremely hesitant about this interpretation, though no more than any other, for the simple reason this was a poll of 2088 Britons of whom only 42 were Muslims – the margin of error in this subcategory is therefore very wide, particularly as compared to Anglicans (648 were polled) or the non-religious (355). The average error margin for surveys of 1000 people by major pollsters is +/-2-3 percent; for surveys or crossbreaks of 100, it can be as wide as +/-10 percent. Numbers for almost all groups mentioned here are therefore close to meaningless in and of themselves, though they may be useful signs further research is needed: even accounting for the tiny sample size, we’d expect significantly less diversity among Muslim opinion if Condell’s characterisation of them as invariably opposed to gay people’s rights were accurate. (Still, I’d advise extreme caution about trying to extrapolate anything from this table except about non-religious people, Anglicans and perhaps Catholics.)

Where else to turn, then? In 2009, a research group of four in Birmingham (two Pakistani Muslims, two white non-Muslims) polled 1511 Muslims in Alum Rock, a Muslim-dominated part of the city. While I’m usually inclined to take amateur polls with a heavy pinch of salt, their survey work is impressive – the questions, while not always formatted with much nuance, are clear and unbiased, and the sample size is the biggest by far of all polls under discussion here.

3

Asked ‘If your son/daughter came out as gay, would you accept them?’, 1487 participants – that is, 98 percent – answered ‘Yes’. While all Gallup’s British Muslims found homosexual acts morally wrong, then, popular views of them as sinful don’t seem necessarily to impact on behaviour toward gay people. It’s a shame the only survey here to give control data from other religious groups was the unreliable one on ‘how Britain treats gay people': I’d imagine that among Christians who found homosexual acts immoral, for example, answers to questions like this would be fairly similar. (More on the Birmingham data below.)

Another YouGov poll, this time of 632 Muslim and 831 non-Muslim students in Britain during 2008 (the same year most of Gallup’s work was done), asked respondents how much respect they had for Jewish people, atheists and homosexuals.

7

Crossbreaks here are generally – particularly for men and women, and unlike those of the previous poll – large enough, the questions straightforward enough and the answers accommodating enough (unlike in parts of Gallup’s poll) for results to be firmly reliable. They’re also, as it happens, interesting.

Perhaps surprisingly, non-Muslims are ten percent less likely than Muslims (by 56 percent to 66) to respect atheists as much as anyone else. (Muslims are also more likely to have no or not very much respect for atheists, by 11 to 2 percent, but in both cases these are small minorities, and ‘not very much respect’ covers everything between ‘no respect at all’ and ‘the same as anyone else’.)

The same isn’t true for Jewish people: non-Muslims, by 81 to 59 percent, are likelier to have the same respect for them as anyone else, although the numbers of each who have little to no respect are close enough (four percent among Muslims, seven percent among non-Muslims) to be statistically indistinct when error margins are considered – it’s the Muslims who aren’t sure (14 percent, versus 2 percent among non-Muslims) and those who have ‘a lot of respect’ for Jewish people (16 percent, versus 9) who chip away at the ‘same amount’ figure.

On ‘homosexuals’ specifically, Muslims had the same amount of respect as for other people significantly less often than do non-Muslims, by 53 percent to 77, and were dramatically more likely (by 25 to 4 percent) to have little or no respect. Factoring Muslims who have ‘a lot of respect’ or ‘a little respect’ (which from its placement I assume to mean a little more respect than average) for ‘homosexuals’, 62 percent in total have a positive view of their status, compared with a quarter whose attitude is decidedly negative; the remaining 13 percent are unsure.

While it’s probably coincidental considering the previous YouGov poll’s unreliability, the two paint quite a similar picture of a Muslim population polarised on how it views gay people, with a significant minority staunchly opposed but a large number (62 percent here) supportive and the rest undecided. If at first it seems concerning that none of the 632 polled identified themselves as gay or lesbian, only five percent among of the 831 non-Muslims did, numbers well within each other’s error margin. Considering that being either a Jew, an atheist or a ‘homosexual’ is proscribed under traditional and currently dominant versions of Islam (in the latter case, considered morally wrong by all British Muslims Gallup surveyed), we can probably interpret respondents’ declaration of respect for them as support for their legal/human rights, including gay people’s.

The only thing which might affect how much we can read into this poll is that all its participants were students. It’s unclear, perhaps unexpectedly, in which direction this is likely to skew data: earlier in the poll, only 33 percent said when asked that their perception of Islam was very different (11 percent) or fairly different (22 percent) from their parents’, of whom 73 percent (i.e. 24 percent overall) called their parents stricter Muslims than they were, compared with 18 percent (5 percent overall) who said their parents were more liberal.

Assuming they have an accurate perception of their parents’ stances, which seems likely, this suggests the poll’s results are more or less representative of Muslim sentiment at large, with a slight liberal bias. (One other possibility is that Muslims who don’t go to university, or whose children don’t, have significantly different views – this feels plausible, but I’m not sure how to test for it on current data, so for now it’s just conjecture. Moreover, it’s hard to guess just what the difference would look like – on the one hand, we might expect university-educated people to be broader-minded; on the other hand, universities are often, not entirely without basis, accused of being targeted as breeding grounds for Islamist fundamentalism.)

Conversely, data collected by Populus and presented in Living apart together: British Muslims and the paradox of multiculturalism, a report by conservative think tank Policy Exchange, shows Muslims between the ages of 16 and 24 consistently to support more radical positions than their older counterparts, especially those aged over 45. (The Centre for Social Cohesion, for whom YouGov surveyed the students, was run by Douglas Murray and also widely perceived as a rightist group, so we can’t attribute these contrasting findings about Muslim youth’s attitudes to opposite political agendas. In almost all cases, in fact, shouting ‘Right wing think tank!’ is a very bad way to dismiss reputable polling firms’ results when unaccompanied by substantive commentary on survey methods.)

Asked if they agreed or disagreed with the statement ‘If I could choose, I would prefer to live in Britain under sharia law rather than British law’, 37 percent of Muslims between 16 and 24 agreed and 50 percent disagreed, compared with 28 and 59 percent among Muslims generally. (Among those over 45, only 16-17 percent agreed while 75 percent disagreed.)

Populus2

It’s worth noting that Policy Exchange’s final report only shows net ‘Agree’/’Disagree’ figures, conflating participants’ views who said they ‘tend to (dis)agree’ and that they ‘strongly (dis)agree’.

2

This is in itself slightly misleading: while one might think results were simply being summarised in brief, I’d be willing to bet that had the same sample group been asked ‘Do you agree OR disagree with the statement, “I would prefer to live in Britain under sharia law rather than British law”?’, answers would have looked at least slightly different. More importantly, it’s clear those who disagreed did so more strongly than those who agreed. More than half as many participants again strongly preferred British law to those who only tended to prefer it, whereas about equal numbers ‘tended to prefer’ sharia and preferred it ‘strongly’.

Polls on sharia exemplify the press’s habit of sensationalising complex data with misleading headlines. In 2006, for instance, the Telegraph reported on an ICM poll conducted for its Sunday edition with the header ‘Poll reveals 40pc of Muslims want sharia law in UK‘. What ICM actually found looked like this:

1

The first point is that, while it’s technically true 40 percent supported sharia’s introduction, an almost exactly equal number (41 percent) were opposed to it. (Again, the question offers a binary choice – we can only guess whether strength of feeling follows the same pattern Populus identified.) 18 percent also said they didn’t know, suggesting they hadn’t thought enough about what the introduction of sharia law would be like to have a clear opinion on it. A fairer headline, then, would have been something like ‘Muslims divided over sharia in UK’.

More to the point, the association most non-Muslims have with sharia law operating in Britain is the kind of Salafi-style transformation of the UK into a theocratic, totalitarian state like Saudi Arabia or Iran warned of in high-pitched tones by Pat Condell and figures like him. What this question describes, particularly given how UK sharia courts caused a lot of (not unjustified) press furore in 2006 when the poll was published, seems much closer to a parallel legal system for Muslims, contained within the wider infrastructure of British law much like arbitration over workers’ disputes or global trade – these are the kind of things, in fact, that the Arbitration Act 1996 was drafted to govern whose support sharia courts now claim.

There’s obviously still a lot to be concerned about here from a secularist point of view (for the most part, I’m trying to keep personal views out of this post and focus on what polls show), but the issues aren’t necessarily the ones we might assume. Specifically, Muslims who say they support introduction of sharia can’t automatically be said to support British law’s nationwide replacement with rules based on Islamic texts – further, they certainly can’t be assumed to hold a particular view either on whether homosexuality should be prohibited under sharia or whether it should be punished with floggings, imprisonment, execution or at all.

Populus did ask a question gauging agreement with orthodox views on sharia law, in particular ones relating to marriage, conversion and sexuality. While the sample of 191 Muslims between 16 and 24 (compared with 1003 overall) has a wider-than-average error margin, they were significantly more likely than Muslims at large (by 71 to 61 percent) to agree with the statement ‘homosexuality is wrong and should be illegal’. (Bear in mind that the survey switches at this point, for no apparent reason, from asking about degrees of agreement – ‘tend to’ versus ‘strongly’ and so on – to a simple ‘Agree’/’Disagree’ format, and all the potential effects this might have.)

Populus4

Similarly to the point about the meaning of sharia’s introduction, we need to ask what ‘illegal’ means here. 61 percent agree with scholarly tradition that homosexuality should be illegal, but we don’t know exactly what this implies – it might be illegal under sharia law as understood by historical authorities, but then if supporters of sharia today want it as a parallel court system specific to Muslims rather than a top-down national body of law, replacing current legislation, this very possibly isn’t the same kind of ‘illegal’ as burglary or copyright infringement. If nothing else, we certainly don’t know what its consequences would be.

Participants in the Birmingham poll of Muslims were asked both whether they’d like to live under sharia themselves and whether it should apply to non-Muslims. Only 21 percent said they’d like to live under it, and only 2 percent said it should apply to non-Muslims.

1Asked about their attitude to homosexuality and adultery – both things prohibited by orthodox understandings of sharia – respondents’ collective answers on both issues were exactly the same: only 1 percent supporting stoning, and only two percent supporting any kind of punishment. (For reporting purposes, both these results can be glossed as ‘practically none’ when margins for error are considered – in other words, the difference of one percent is probably meaningless.)

2

These figures necessarily include the fifth of participants in the study who said they’d like to live under sharia – so while, in line with Gallup’s findings, they might consider homosexuality to be frowned on in Islam, they oppose the treatment of it we’d usually (and correctly) associate with sharia states.

Among its less specific findings, the Populus poll also shows significant support for reinterpretation of sharia according to human (e.g. LGBT) rights and other ‘modern ideas':

Populus3

Slightly more Muslims polled (45 percent) said sharia should be reinterpreted in line with human rights concerns than said it was sacred and fixed (39 percent), though again the true figures may be about the same. It’s hard to guess how this gels in reality with the views measured by the homosexuality question (and adjacent ones on orthodox sharia positions), and it’s annoying that we don’t know how these findings show up when compared with desire to live under sharia rather than British law – Populus missed a trick, I think, by not asking the ‘reinterpretation’ question separately to participants based on their answer there. (Are the 28 percent who said they’d rather live under sharia contained within the 45 percent who think it should be reinterpreted, or are supporters of reform opposed to living under sharia because they don’t consider it to have been interpreted the right way in its current form?) What is clear is that there’s around 40 percent support both for strict/hardline interpretations and for modernising approaches, further illustrating Muslims to be far from agreed on what institutionalised sharia should look like in Britain.

Compare these findings to YouGov’s poll of students for the Centre for Social Cohesion – remember, this is the survey where 62 percent respected ‘homosexuals’ at least as much as other people. Asked ‘How supportive if at all would you be of the official introduction of Shari’ah Law into British law for Muslims?’, responses were extremely mixed.

1

The Daily Mail‘s coverage of this study as a whole was spectacularly misrepresentative, dressing it up as ‘a survey revealed by the WikiLeaks’ publication of U.S. diplomatic cables’ when in fact YouGov had published it two years before (as is the norm for polling) and claiming ‘40% [of Muslim students] want Sharia law’, conspicuously dropping ‘for Muslims’ to tap into the same paranoia as the Telegraph. In fact, 21 percent of participants were ‘very supportive’, 19 percent ‘fairly supportive’, 16 percent ‘not very supportive’ and 21 percent ‘not at all supportive’, with ’23 percent’ – the most popular category – ‘not sure’.

All these figures are within each others’ error margins, so it’s sensible to treat the numbers as the same to practical extents. Moreover, I’m strongly suspicious of the formatting, which smacks more than anything else in all these polls of an agenda: why is there no neutral option in the middle? Responders who were ambivalent, equally supportive and opposed – which isn’t the same as being unsure – were clearly forced to choose between declaring themselves ‘fairly’ or ‘not very’ supportive, of which the former sounds much more balanced. (A ‘fairly full’ glass, to use a clichéd image, could be either half-empty or half-full; a ‘not very full’ glass sounds distinctly like it has less water in it.)

The same poll’s supplementary questions on religion and government, even adjusting for the sample group’s slight liberal bias, suggested very little support for a violent, theocratic or fundamentalist version of Islam. 68 percent said Islam was fairly or very compatible with ‘the Western notion of democracy’, while a further 19 percent said they weren’t sure. Only 13 percent said it was fairly or very incompatible, and 43 percent said it was fairly or very compatible with ‘the separation of religion and government’, whereas 28 percent said it was incompatible and 29 said they weren’t sure.

3

Extraordinarily high numbers of ‘Not sure’ answers are a recurring aspect of this poll – again, they suggest to me that answerers just didn’t have strong concepts of what things like ‘the separation of religion and government’ actually meant. (Not all that encouraging for secularists, but on the other hand, we might expect committed theocrats or fundamentalists to recognise the term.) Nowhere is this more evident than in answers to the question, ‘How supportive if at all would you be of the introduction of a worldwide Caliphate based on Shari’ah Law?’, where 41 percent said they were unsure. Like most questions on sharia being implemented, this would benefit from greater specificity, but while a hardline hump of about 20 percent seems to persist throughout this poll, two thirds of participants are either unsure (not knowing, I’d guess, what ‘a worldwide Caliphate based on Shari’ah’ would look like, thus probably not supporting it) or unsupportive.

What may be a useful predictor of views on homosexuality and LGBT rights is that while half of participants said they’d be ‘fairly’ or ‘very unsupportive’ if a friend wanted to leave Islam (compared with a quarter each who’d be supportive or were unsure), only 6 percent said they should be punished according to sharia, and only half those people said the punishment should be death. The hardline hump, then, is obviously only so hardline, and I’d guess somewhat tentatively that apostasy and homosexuality, both being traditionally prohibited, would be viewed the same way, just as homosexuality and adultery were in the Birmingham Muslims poll.

45

The Populus poll for Policy Exchange seems to be a bit of an outlier viewed as part of a bigger picture, then, although I’m not sure what’s determining the discrepancy in its results from other polls’, particularly this one’s. Both are studies by respectable polling firms for centre-right think tanks, conducted with large sample sizes – there are some problems I’d identify with their phrasing and formatting, as with most of these polls, but they don’t account for the difference in findings, and the student poll (contrary to what one might expect, perhaps) seems to fall more in line with broader data than Policy Exchange’s.

It may come down to something circumstantial in their methods which I haven’t noticed or they fail to mention – how they polled participants (in person, by telephone or online, for instance), how sample groups were selected and so on. This is the kind of area where a professional polling expert’s view would be much more useful than mine. What we can say, however, is that none of the data supports Pat Condell’s views, either that Islam is set in stone and unaccommodating of diverse views or that Muslims are opposed to human rights or humane treatment of gay people.

Although support for sharia law exists among British Muslims, this appears only to be the view of a significant minority ranging between surveys from approximately 20 to 40 percent (for comparison, about the same as the proportion of the general populace who vote for any of the major parties). Moreover, while advocacy for Iranian-style theocracy does exist among a few percent of British Muslims (see the polls in full for this), sharia as endorsed by these 20-40 percent seems to be understood best as a court or arbitration system specifically for Muslims rather than as the overthrow of Britain’s current political and human rights regimes.

More and better research is needed to determine exactly what most Muslims consider the requirements of sharia to be, including specifically on homosexuality – views here seem to vary – but large majorities support non-religious mainstream law outside Muslim communities, including established human and LGBT rights, and equally large if not larger majorities voice attitudes of acceptance and respect toward gay people, even while dominant understandings of Islam in the UK consider homosexual acts immoral. The people actually endangered by Islamic attitudes to sexuality in Britain are LGBT people within the so-called Muslim community whom Condell ignores while smearing them and it in general. (More on this in the blow-by-blow response, coming up next.)

Violence in the name of religion

The final claim to address is that Britain’s Muslims, irrespective of their stance on gay people’s legal or human rights, are supportive of violent, criminal homophobic attacks. To quote, ‘The more Islam there is in a society, the more physically dangerous it’s likely to be for gay people. In parts of Europe with high Muslim immigrant populations, we know that openly gay men are far more likely to be attacked and beaten up on the street for being gay. And there’s a good reason why they don’t hold gay pride marches down Brick Lane.’ (At the risk of sounding like a stuck record, everything about this is categorically and completely wrong, but a full rebuttal is beyond this one post’s scope. Sit tight, it’s coming.)

Assuming the amount of Islam in a society is measured by the number of Muslims, and it’s hard to see how else to quantify it clearly, research on Muslim attitudes to anti-gay attacks specifically, beyond things like the Birmingham poll’s question on stoning ‘homosexuals’, is hard to come by. (If anyone knows of any that I don’t, please let me know.) What we do however have – including in Gallup’s report, the lone one cited by Condell – is consistent polling evidence Muslims are by and large strongly opposed to violence.

Asking respondents to answer on a scale of 1-5 between ‘Cannot be justified at all’ and ‘Completely justifiable’ (if only they’d done that on the ‘homosexual acts’ question), French, German and British Muslims in 2008 were asked to rate numerous actions, among them ‘attacks in which civilians are the target’. Overwhelming majorities in all three countries answered in opposition.

7

99 percent of British Muslims said either that such attacks ‘cannot be justified at all’ (89 percent) or rated them a ‘2’, which I imagine we could gloss as something like ‘Only justifiable in exceptional circumstances’ (10 percent). The remaining one percent answered ‘3’, whose precise meaning Gallup’s researchers queried. The only figure anywhere higher than Britain’s was the 91 percent of German Muslims who answered ‘Cannot be justified at all’, but the difference of only 2 percent is statistically negligible. While British Muslims may have considered homosexual acts most immoral, they were also the most opposed to attacks on civilians.

We can’t interpret this on its own as conclusive, of course, since ‘attacks in which civilians are the target’, while strictly speaking still descriptive of homophobic assaults, is more suggestive either of terrorist activity targeting the West (suicide bombings etc.) or military activity abroad (drone strikes on villages, etc.). Also, no control figures from the general public were given in this question, making a direct comparison difficult – Gallup does, however, cite identical polling from 2006 and 2007 in which nationwide publics in all three countries were compared with Muslims in their capital cities.

8

London Muslims in this period were slightly more sympathetic to civilian attacks than British non-Muslims, but nothing like significantly: 92 percent of the public rated them ‘not justifiable’, a 1 or 2 on the scale of response, compared with 88 percent of Muslims in the capital, but sample error could easily account for this. What does seem noticeable, though again it could conceivably be sample variation, is that 9 percent of London Muslims gave a ‘3’, compared with only 3 percent of the public, showing perhaps more hesitance to answer such a generalised question. We don’t, of course, have data specifically for non-Muslims in London at this time: I’m not sure it would tell us anything very different, but it’s worth bearing in mind.

On ‘use of violence for a noble cause’, an answer which more conceivably could include homophobic assaults (and a much wider range of actions generally) British Muslims were more sympathetic than those in Germany or France – or rather, more polarised.

9

While answers of 2, 3 and 6 were about the same across the board, only 48 percent of British Muslims answered ‘Cannot be justified at all’ compared with 75 percent in France and 80 percent in Germany, and 31 percent answered with ‘4’ (something like ‘Often but not always justifiable’) compared to only 1 percent in both European nations.

This is exactly the kind of finding – though in this case, the ‘homosexual acts’ question jumped the gun – that tends to be shouted in panicked tones by the right wing press, as if to suggest Muslims support jihadism, but the previous question almost certainly rules this out: Muslims are almost all categorically opposed to attacks targeting civilians, so it seems extremely likely those who rated ‘violence for a noble cause’ a 4 (this is where numbers answering ‘1’ have gone, compared with European figures) had something other than terrorism in mind. Crucially, this question isn’t specifically religious: one commonly cited example of violence justified by a good cause would be the Second World War; mine would be the Stonewall Riots.

All we can reliably conclude from this is that British Muslims are less likely to be pacifists than those in Germany or France, which if trends between countries resemble those on sexuality may not be at all unique to them. Control data for the general population would once again be useful here for just this reason – it’s given in the 2006/7 equivalent question, whose results are curiously different.

10

Whereas among Muslims throughout Britain in 2008, only 51 percent called violence for a noble cause unjustifiable (compared with 37 percent who called it justifiable and 13 percent in between), 81 percent of London Muslims in 2006 and 2007 found it unjustifiable, compared with 8 percent for unjustifiable and 11 percent in between – not significantly different from the British public’s views in the latter cases, and nine percent higher on the ‘unjustifiable’ count.

I’ve struggled to account for the discrepancy between the 2006/7 and 2008 results. While the ‘homosexual acts’ data was dramatic, it was also in keeping with established patterns in the data; the difference between Muslim views in these cases (especially in view of questions’ wording and formatting, and presumably administration of the survey, being identical), seems totally anomalous. One possibility I have considered is that since Muslims in capital cities seem more often to have been against all forms of violence, Muslims in London – especially while being polled self-consciously as Muslims in London – may have been primed to interpret ‘violence for a noble cause’ specifically in relation to things like the 7/7 attacks, quite plausibly more of a presence in public consciousness there than across the country. I don’t know though, and I’m very reluctant to advance any solid interpretation without 2008 data from the general public for comparison.

Taking a quick detour, the Centre for Social Cohesion’s YouGov poll of Muslim students included a (widely and badly) reported question specifically on killing in the name of religion. Again, we can’t compare different polls’ numbers side by side, but it may serve to address the question of how many Muslims support religiously motivated violence in particular, which presumably would cover homophobic attacks.

6

1 in 3 British Muslim students back killing for Islam‘ the Mail reported when the poll came out, perhaps the greatest and most outrageous misrepresentation of any data here. While 32 percent did say killing in the name of religion could be justifiable, only 4 percent answered ‘Yes in order to preserve and promote that religion’ – i.e. the kind of violence that commonly makes headlines when fundamentalists plant bombs.

The other 28 percent answered ‘Yes but only if that religion is under attack’, an annoyingly vague statement – what constitutes an attack on a religion? (Most people would, I think, call Muslim participation in the Crusades a justifiable response to being attacked; on the other hand, the Christian right in Britain regularly describes itself as ‘under attack’ when prayers aren’t part of council meetings and so on, so I can’t help thinking this question feels obfuscatory by design. Additionally, the formatting of the question gives no other opportunity for a ‘Yes, sometimes’ answer that doesn’t fall into the ‘preserve and promote’ category, as for instance a more neutral, open-ended statement like ‘Yes, but only in extreme/exceptional circumstances’ would have allowed.) 53 percent answered that killing for religion was never, in any circumstances, justifiable, and given the other findings of this same poll (high levels of respect for ‘homosexuals’ in particular) I’d find it very odd if more than negligible numbers supported killing gay people.

Treating Gallup’s 2008 figures as anomalous, then, what’s obvious is that Muslim populations are likely to be opposed in principle to any kind of violence, presumably including homophobic violence. We can’t compare urban Muslims with nationwide non-Muslims head-for-head, but the trend for 2006-7 Muslims to be more opposed to violence than the general public may be confirmed by Gallup’s finding that particularly religious Muslims were at least as likely to oppose it as less religious ones – possibly more so, though figures are close enough to be treated as the same.

12

In all three countries surveyed, participants who said Islam was important them displayed slightly higher rates of conviction that ‘violence for a noble cause cannot be justified at all’ than those who said it wasn’t important. The 7 percent differential for British Muslims, in fact, is the highest of the lot. All these numbers are near enough that repeat polls might reverse or equalise them, but it’s obviously not true that Muslims’ religiosity makes them more likely to condone violence.

On top of the fact Muslims in general are especially predisposed to pacifism in Gallup’s research – again, the only research Condell actually cites – it may just be possible that how heavily religious they are correlates with how non-violent they are, if only slightly. All this is pretty damning news for the claim Muslims at large endorse homophobic attacks, and given he deems its source authoritative enough to mention no other polls, he has no excuse not to withdraw that claim.

Conclusion

All the data analysed in this post is available online, and I recommend you read it in full yourself (particularly before making wild, unsupported assertions about what polls show Muslims think.) Here they are in order of appearance:

For those who’ve skipped to the bottom, as a tl;dr summary, the landscape they suggest can I think be distilled as follows:

  • Muslim attitudes are often highly varied, in some cases powerfully polarised, including on questions of sexuality.
  • Determinants of this variation, in addition to other less obvious ones, include nationality, ethnicity and age.
  • All of these, age in particular, challenge the view conservative and fundamentalist approaches to Islam are ‘imports’ through recent immigration; their followers are often young, born or raised in Britain, more ‘strict’ or ‘radical’ than prior generations.
  • Most if not all British Muslims consider homosexual acts ‘morally wrong’ over ‘morally acceptable’, but large majorities in various polls tend to express respect, acceptance or otherwise humane responses to gay people.
  • Supporters of sharia law are not an ‘extremist fringe’ as some have claimed, but are a clear minority, with most surveys showing them at somewhere between 20 and 40 percent of Muslims.
  • More and better polling is required on what exactly sharia supporters understand it or its (ideal) function to be in Britain, but advocates almost always desire it as a Muslim-specific legal system within Britain rather than a totalitarian alternative to the country’s current governance.
  • Further, strong appetites exist for reform or reinterpretation of sharia in line with contemporary views on human (and LGBT) rights, although it’s unclear what the relationship of ‘sharia reformers’ to ‘sharia advocates’ is.
  • Muslim support for extreme draconian punishments and human rights abuses such as the Iranian government’s executions by stoning or hanging is extremely low most of the time.
  • More broadly, Muslims are by and large extremely unlikely ever to find violence justifiable, though Muslims polled by Gallup across Britain in 2008 were an unexplained exception to this. (This does not, however, suggest support for terrorism or homophobic attacks, and other data explicitly suggests a near-universal lack of support in these areas.)
  • All of us – think tanks, journalists, agitators on the right and left, opponents of Islam, defenders of Muslims and people who are both – need to become more literate in polling analysis, more willing to survey the bigger picture and less exploitative of polls as propaganda.
  • Polling companies need to be more judicious about wording, formatting and research methods, refusing to use biased or imprecise techniques when agreeing questions with clients (especially those, like newspapers or think tanks, with particular outlooks).
  • Numerous points raised by research above are legitimately concerning for secularists and human rights campaigners – not just the minority of Muslims supporting fundamentalist or violent practices, but the view itself that queer sexuality is immoral (even when no structuralised oppression follows this belief) and the support and continued operation of sharia courts as parallel, separate legal institutions in the so-called Muslim community.
  • These concerns are not well dealt with by smearing, homogenising and misrepresenting Muslims generally, and sensationalist xenophobia which characterises the presence of Muslims as a major threat to ‘the British way of life’ is both unfounded and unhelpful: non-Muslims (or those outside the ‘Muslim community’) are directly threatened very little by the issues above, whereas Muslim women, LGBT Muslims and other parts of that community marginalised by conservative religious tendencies are strongly affected.
  • Atheists, secularists and skeptics should stop engaging in anti-migrant/anti-Muslim racism, taking on the actual problems.
  • Pat Condell should stop citing polls he hasn’t read.

See also: Dear Pat Condell… why this homo-Islamic masochist rejects your anti-Muslim crusade

Gitsupportthisblog

GiTwhyinowhaveadonatebutton

Project Runway: a question of triage (or, How the hell do you win anyway?)

Not for the first time in the last three weeks, I struggled last night to know who should be axed from Project Runway. On contestants’ outfits, I had quite clear views (stay tuned for those); what floored me, as it did last week, was which pros and cons should take priority.

A typical Runway prizes certain qualities – it rates designs by them, and uses them to dispatch losers and choose winners. The series looks for someone with a striking point of view, whose work innovates or is interesting conceptually; for someone who can execute these concepts well, properly sewing or otherwise constructing them; it looks for someone who can edit, shows consistency in all these strengths, and whose work is versatile and varied.

Some of these points can matter more than others. Placed in the bottom two, for instance, badly made but formally ambitious work historically fares better (at least the first time round) than well-finished dullness; a talented contestant’s lead balloon receives more mercy, even when it’s slightly worse, than a third divisioner’s fourth misfire in a row; designers worthy of the final might be sent a friendly warning if they need to show more range, while diverse but less commended work can get its maker invalided home.

An All Stars season poses different questions about triage, and some of these preferences might be reversed. When all the contenders have placed high in previous series, we know each of them has vision and can sew clothes well: a poorly made ensemble might now deserve elimination more than a well made but underwhelming piece, especially when everyone‘s viewpoint is well defined. (Jeffrey Sebelia’s work these past three weeks epitomises this: there’s a strong case for automatic offing from an All Stars contest if you can’t construct things well.) Fashion on the other hand being a fast-moving industry, designers might quite fairly be expected to show evolution. If we’ve seen an entire season of your clothes a year or more ago, Melissa and Daniel, you’ve no excuse to make the same old things you’ve always made.

Observe the clash of these criteria.

MELISSAobverse

Images: Lifetime

These week’s challenge involved cocktail-inspired couture. This was Melissa‘s submission – an asymmetric dress we’ve seen from her a hundred times, with a little too much going on and some minor fit issues, but nothing heinous.

JEFFREYobverse

This was Jeffrey‘s – to his credit, and for the first time in the run, a well-sewn number. Vile, though, in every other way. The fabric is putrid, the collar and chain on the bag unconscionably vulgar and the bodice ill-fitting. Horrid, horrid, horrid.

KORTOobverse

This was Korto‘s – not the nightmare Jeffrey’s was, but certainly not good. The fabric smacks of tacky plastic tablecloth, the belt and bodice of medieval BDSM torture. Nothing between them gels, and each fails on its own terms too. The cut of the dress, as the back view shows, was also weird.

KORTOreverse

Who went? Melissa did – despite her dress being probably the least bad of the bottom three.

Isaac Mizrahi quickly dismissed the thought of axing Korto. There’s an argument an All Stars season should be sudden death, with no consideration of past work, because the standard is so high; that said, I’d tend to share his impulse. Korto shows a definite and strange attachment to butchered fifties housewife silhouettes, put produces work that’s interesting at least. (I loved her look last week.) Of the three of them, she has the most potential down the line.

Do I agree with Melissa going home instead of Jeffrey, then? His days are obviously numbered – I wondered last week why he’s there – and were this not an All Stars run with fewer competitors than usual and a run that needs the length to a) please fans and b) make money, double elimination might well be an option.

What Jeffrey made looked like it had been salvaged from a skip, and not in a good way, but although Melissa’s work was clearly better, it was the same work she did in tasks one and two – the same work she did a year ago. When her range was clearly just as limited as Daniel’s was last week, her viewpoint obviously undeveloped, she was demonstrably unequipped to compete further. I might still, though, have erred on the side of cutting Jeffrey now and her next week. I strongly suspect he’ll be next to snuff it anyway, as she’d have been if he went.

As for the best designs…

VIKTORobverse

Viktor won this week! And flirted sweetly with the bartender serving his cocktail. And was endearing in his workroom camaraderie with Elena. (Fine, I’ll stop.)

I was a great supporter of this dress, and of its brave use of a print. Note how in this respect, Viktor did what Melissa didn’t and moved his aesthetic forward. It paid off.

The parted lower section of the dress was hazardous given its shortness, but the Union Flag cut-outs in the top quite won me over. They may even have worked better in the back:

VIKTORreverse

But the other top two (this week, my rankings matched the judges’ pretty closely) were also strong.

CHRISTOPHERobverse

Christopher‘s work here was utterly beguiling. I’m not entirely sure about the gap between the beads and hem, but the former are perfectly arranged, even if reminiscent of those covers one occasionally sees over car seats. This outfit displays its maker’s muted subtlety at its very best, and while its style is heavily familiar from season ten, he’s shown new variation already in the past three weeks. High praise for this.

ELENAobverse

Elena: cut some of the cutouts out.

This dress was beautifully made, and as was noted at the catwalk show (and sadly isn’t as visible above), the seaming was phenomenally elegant. Why then did she have to overegg the geometric holes, destroying the piece’s understated style? One pair of cutouts would have been fine – the ones at the waist worked rather well. For my taste, there’s just too much going on here.

It’s notable, of course, that none of the top three designs could be worn by a woman keen to cover her midriff. But this is Project Runway – what did we expect?

IRINAobverse

Elena’s piece, the least of the top three, competed once more this week with similarly-named Irina‘s. I don’t understand this season’s vogue for peplums, particularly juxtaposed as here with a sheer, slim-fitting bolero. The combination of leather, gold and lace was winning, though, a gothic biker dressing for a cocktail bar. Très bien. I’m enjoying Irina’s style.

MYCHAELobverse

I’m struggling to grasp Mychael‘s point of view. Even his model looks confused. The strange penchant for leafy, tacked-on embellishments his work this week and last shows feels like a contrivance, the diving neckline and wrapping lower segment of this dress rather bizarre given its (lack of) length. Like Tom Hanks in Big, I just… don’t get it.

SETHAARONobverse

Seth Aaron‘s model looks like she wore a binder for the first half of the day, then cut its middle section out to show her bust. Either (more probably) this detail or the leggings are a detail too far, but the stripe going down the latter’s rather nice, if nothing very striking. It’s a nice enough assembly, but it’s giving me no great impression.

Probably the right result this week, then – the judges were more or less on point, specific commentaries aside. But if Jeffrey doesn’t leave next week, I’ll eat Viktor’s hat.

On Honeygate

Religion’s not the sole unrighteousness
In your philosophy, we’ve learned of late:
Caught in the act (high-minded, humourless)
Hightailing hot goods to an airport gate –
A jar, specifically, of sandwich spread –
Reports relay your patented contempt,
Determining the art of protest’s dead.
Did you expect to be declared exempt
At once, on turning up, from rules in place?
We laugh because your notion customs might,
Kafir, favour you simply for your face
Isn’t far wrong. That onlookers make light
Now of your trouble’s just, if jibe-filled. Honey,
Say what you like – the world’ll say it’s funny.

Project Runway: how (not) to avant garde

As if to quell the steaming rage of fans over last week’s attempt at punk, Daniel Esquivel got sent home on Thursday’s Project Runway.

DANIELreverse

Images: Lifetime

The challenge, an insect-and-arachnid-style avant garde task, prompted better designs than the prior episode’s. Daniel’s even looked quite good from the back.

Flowy chocolate brown ball gown billowing as its wearer walks? I’ll bite. But to view this from the back first illustrates its problems.

DANIELobverse

All Daniel did was make a gown, then add a see-through petticoat and neck brace. (‘You can do anything with silk organza’, he told us last time. I should have guessed he’d try.)

Beyond being as avant garde as porridge, it’s not even that nice a dress viewed from the front. If you’re doing a mullet dress, don’t do one with a drab upholstered bodice and a neckline that spells ‘M’ for ‘misconceived’. The one insectish aspect was the styling, most credit for which goes to hair and makeup.

No quarrel at all with this being sent home, though some viewers appeared to disagree – certainly, it wasn’t the worst thing on the catwalk. That dubious honour goes to this ensemble:

JEFFREYobverse

Oh Jeffrey. You know your reputation’s in decline when your model mounts the catwalk with a bag over her head.

Conceptually, I actually quite liked this: fashion that hints at bondage (as full, opaque face masks can’t fail to do) has definite appeal, and it’s inarguably avant garde. The problem’s the construction: this headpiece is baggy, lopsided spud sack, the trousers woefully lumpy in the crotch and the covered shoe a poorly realised piece of craft project design.

Nothing about those trousers is okay, one leg made out of tacky tablecloth textile, the other inexplicably bright red, in what seems like a shot at edginess that ended up resembling school play couture. (The fit problem above the knee is frightening, too.) And why a huge toilet roll tube sporting a ginger mane of pubic hair tops all of this, I can but guess.

Even that less-than-minor detail’s poorly made, as the rear view shows:

JEFFREYreverse

There’s scraggly, there’s raggedy and there’s just plain bad. (And if you’re making a head-covering mask, don’t leave your model’s bloody hair cascading from it.)

It’s a shame this all obscures the eye-catching, interesting print on the gold fabric of the top – it’s the one good element, but between the textile’s absence from the trousers, the giant cardboard wrap-around and the headdress’s bagginess, there’s almost none of it on show. Look at the texture of the sleeve: a whole, well-fitted bodysuit made out of that might well have won me over.

I’m seriously doubting Jeffrey’s skill at present. Not having seen any of him before this series, I struggle to see why he’s there – this week and last, his outfits have just been so badly rendered I’d be shocked to see them half way through a normal Project Runway series, let alone winning. On the other hand, I see why he survived while Daniel left.

Daniel, like Jeffrey, was a repeat offender in this task. While Jeffrey failed to step up his construction, Daniel failed twice in a row to grasp the essence of the challenge. Asked to do punk, he made a trouser suit and added straw; asked to do avant garde, he made a gown and added organza. It’s clear Daniel lacked range and versatility, making the same outfits we know him for week in, week out. That’s not someone who’s going to last a series. (Unless Jeffrey dramatically improves his execution, on the other hand, I doubt he will. Frankly, I’d send them both home if this weren’t an All Stars season.)

MELISSAobverse

Melissa: similar diagnosis to Daniel. Last week she made something expected, this week she did a cocktail dress with added veil.

While the judges were about right with their bottom three, I’d say this is the most forgivable. It’s better put together by miles than Jeffrey’s get-up, and involves more things I like than his or Daniel’s. It’s certainly not avant garde (though it might be more so if the over-the-top hips were better realised), but the combination of white lipstick, veil and quiff is somewhat chic, the tailoring mostly accomplished and the cutout on the bodice interesting – I only wish it were created in more eye-catching textiles.

MELISSAreverse

The mossy knoll mounted for some reason astride the back is a mistake, as are the garish olive bangle and the dress’s oh-so-strappy straps. It’s a better dress than Daniel’s though, something that might another week be passable – not enough, at any rate, for a red card.

CHRISTOPHERobverse

JESUS FICTIVE CHRIST, CHRISTOPHER. The challenge was about living things. LIVING things. DO NOT MAKE YOUR MODEL LOOK DEAD with pallid makeup, then shade her neck so her whole head looks as if it’s floating morbidly. (I know it’s Hallowe’en week, but just don’t.) Also, like I said last week: edit.

This competed with Melissa’s dress for entry to my bottom three. Eventually it stayed out, at the low end of the middle, since like Jeffrey’s dress this aimed at least for avant garde, even if not perfectly realised. Where ordinarily, Melissa’s dress (and Daniel’s at an absolute stretch) might survive on being competent but dull, this is the avant garde challenge – better, I’d say, to attempt the right aesthetic and go wrong than not engage with it at all.

I don’t know what the Batman-style fins are doing everywhere. I don’t know what the see-through plastic underskirt is for. I don’t know why the model has been given actual saddlebags on her thighs, or why the middle section of the dress is shorter than the sides. The graphic on the front offers some interest though, as do the sandals, the ankle adornments and the Sharon Needles style fingernails visible here:

CHRISTOPHERreverse

If Christopher could only calm things down, he might be a contender.

SETHAARONobverse

Seth Aaron… is it me, or does it seem like he and Jeffrey are here not to intensify the contest, but to prove the winners aren’t always the best?

I’m not sure what to make of this – it looks like a leather and lace petticoat with linoleum tiles set artfully around it. The latter detail is intriguing, and the former might, I guess, have worked, but I don’t see the connection. Apart from confirming numerous designer’s instinct that ‘avant garde’ means ‘whacky makeup’, there’s not much here I find remarkable.

MYCHAELobverse

Mychael: nineties Zygon nun at a rave, in war paint. Seriously, were the judges smoking crack on giving this the win?

There silhouette does, granted, boast an authentic cutting edge aesthetic, but the fabric looks like cheap grey felt to me, green bits stuck on to make it interesting. This might really have worked for me in different fabric, but it just looks sad, and the colour clash combined with the textile means we’re back in school play territory.

Ever since Olivier’s furry blonde caterpillars in series nine, I’m also primed to hate eyebrow embellishments. Even with that moustache, it just looks desperate and tacky.

IRINAobverse

More here from Irina on the theme of attempting avant garde by giving mainstream outfits space-age accessories – in her case, what seems like a giant, furry cock ring. (Notice also the return of last week’s wrist-ribbons, working admittedly somewhat better here.)

There’s a lot, in fact, that I like about this outfit: the eye makeup and nails, the boots, the bodice and the details on the skirt. In fact, if that headpiece had been lost in favour of perfecting the skirt, this might have edged into my favourite three – the stiffness with which it’s held above the model’s legs has definite avant garde potential.

IRINAreverse

If only some form of extra architecture (wires, perhaps?) had held this skirt a few degrees higher, to just out near-horizontally – that might have worked for me.

VIKTORobverse

I should probably admit my crush on Viktor, whose brown eyes and bow ties seduce me every time, but this would have been my pick for the win. I’m not sure I’d have gone with both the yellow forehead and the yellow lips, but I adored this.

Radical, somewhat gender-bending neckline? Check. Intriguing, perfectly painted details on said neckline? Check. Actually-convincing, non-cringeworthy use of nude textile? Check.

The thin braids of the hair are one of the only features in this week’s designs which look insect-inspired, as does the outfit at large, and the draping of the white cloth is exquisite:

VIKTORreverse

At quite the other end of the aesthetic spectrum…

KORTOobverse…olé, tarantula: Korto‘s ensemble was a winning number too. Why both this and Viktor’s outfit were named safe and not placed in the top eludes me.

The trousers are the clear highlight. The way the spiralling ribbon holds the line of lemon on the seam and how it’s maintained in top half of the garment are breathtaking, and the sleeve embellishment on the model’s right wrist is equally arresting. I’m not sure I’d have kept the chunky belt, however – a simple button on the jacket would have left the other details in the spotlight.

That credit Viktor gets for using nude fabric well? Likewise, kudos to Korto for making eyebrow makeup work. The spidery hair is a sight to behold too, and I’m in love with how androgynous this looks from behind:

KORTOreverse

There’s possibly a little too much going on in the midsection, though nothing like as much as in Christopher’s case. Still, this was a hit with me.

ELENAobverse

Was I the only one who thought Elena styled her model after herself? This was the look, other than Mychael’s, the judges came closest to naming the winner – I’d have had no objection at all.

I might somewhat have preferred if the shoulder embellishments had been mounted on ordinary upper sleeves, rather than such bulky, tubular ones. (These bring back unpleasant memories of Elena’s outfits in her season.) The print and the construction are superb, though.

Spoiler-free first thoughts on Thor: The Dark World

Just having emerged from Thor: The Dark World since a friend reminded me to see it, I type this from the Carlisle branch of Waterstones. (From the Costa, that is, strangely if typically built in. The Earl Grey satisfies; milk rationing per cup continues to frustrate.)

Conclusive thoughts on films take time to form, and usually, at least in my case, repeat views. It’s very possible then that I’ll write about The Dark World in more detail down the line, and that feelings I have now will change, but it seems worth giving a brief summary of how it left me. Spoilers are fair game in the comments, but I’ll leave overt ones out for now.

First things first, it’s notable Thor is only the second Marvel franchise from its recent, interlinking stand to get a sequel. Before last year’s The Avengers – I refuse to use the UK title – only Iron Man had received a second film, which itself strayed from the usual sequel format – what weighed down Iron Man 2, to many fans’ frustration, was its use as the first proper chapter of the S.H.I.E.L.D. arc, introducing us to Howard Stark, Black Widow and the gears of S.H.I.E.L.D. itself, important elements in films which followed. World-building of this kind is what’s expected of a series’ first instalment usually, and in terms of branching out the onscreen universe in view, one could say Iron Man 2 served as just that. The Dark World isn’t just the first ‘part two’ since then, it’s the first story within its continuity that doesn’t need to be anything else. (Iron Man 3, released this April, was similarly self-contained, but see the number in the title.)

Cutting to the case then, or at least the highlights, there are lots of things in this film to love, above all its cast and their performances. If his place with Tom Hardy and Ben Whishaw as one of film’s next great Britthesps were still in any kind of doubt, Tom Hiddleston’s scenery-chewing, even in barren wastelands and glorified CG slagheaps, clinches the deal, as does his stamina for moral line-treading even three films in. Christopher Eccleston, contrary to almost everything you’re likely to have read, is neither underused nor overkill as villain Malekith (whose skin, disconcertingly I felt, appears to darken as his evil grows). While I wouldn’t have said no to more of him, I didn’t feel like I missed out. Supporting actors round out the cast well on all sides, though there are perhaps a few too many – with names in play like Hopkins, Skarsgård and once-again-sidelined Rene Russo, alongside Alice Krige in a delightful bit part, it’s a shame not to give some of them more time than they get here.

Praise goes too to a smörgåsbord of gorgeous moments, from the Ancient-Norse-meets-science-fiction space battle through gleaming towers and spires half way through to the wondrous, under-utilised setpiece of a warehouse found early on by children which defies physics (floating trucks and all) and the climax of the film in Greenwich, where loveably unsubtle Thor looks valiantly out of place in greyscale London (brace for a tube gag almost as good as when Skyfall did it) and which plays out like Man of Steel was made by someone competent. It’s a shame The Dark World opens, in seemingly dogged keeping with the formula from Thor, with a voiceover from Odin, when either of the first two might have made a stunning introductory sequence. The warehouse in particular evokes Guillermo del Toro’s style, which one feels filmmakers hoped to suggest with the Dark Elves’ design.

It’s not as funny as reviews suggest, or at least I didn’t find it so. I’ll grant that I saw it, as I often try to with new films, in a nearly empty cinema, and the group dynamic of a packed house often helps with comedy, but then again, I fell about watching Iron Man 3 in a comparable sparse room. This said, some moments play fantastically. Half way through or so, Loki especially receives some quite wonderful quips, delivered rapid-fire like Roger Moore’s in The Spy Who Loved Me (Bond fans may be reminded, specifically, of Barbara Bach’s van-driving scene). A metereological slapstick sequence in the first hour – yes, this is now a concept – offers surreal genius, as does the groaning slide of battling demigods down the glass side of London’s gherkin. One more serious gambit which impresses is a loyalty-switching, limb-severing development far less expected than it should have been, testament to the acting chops of all involved.

It’s The Dark World‘s script, unfortunately, which lets it down. The picture wanders aimlessly for much of its just-less-than-two-hour length, some elements included for no clear reason – among them, for example, a battle and later callback on a forested, seemingly Asian planet and a sketchy lecture-giving scene from Skarsgärd. The effect is most of the film’s gratifying action and fun being left to its second hour (web commentary so far gets this weakness spot-on), and as Den of Geek note in their spoiler-filled analysis, it never seems quite to know what to do next, and lacks in this sense the integritas of its predecessor. The plot’s MacGuffin, a haze of swirling, evillish red-black mist, and Malekith’s designs for it never quite work; I never really understood, nor cared much about, just what it did or how he planned to threaten/end/rule the cosmos with it. Two major deaths take place, neither of which entirely worked for me: the first, while not the one I expected on buying a ticket, bumped off a character I hadn’t much invested in to start with; the second, conversely, predictable while anticlimactic and emotionally unconvincing. There’d more to be said on both counts, but let’s hold that discussion in the comments.

Joss Whedon, we’d been told, gave this script a once-over polish – certainly, his work shows through in the jokes and camera phone moments. Perhaps producers went to him sensing things weren’t quite right yet, but if so he seems to have been too sheepish to advance the radical rewrites this really needed. Still, as a whole this a quintessentially good film, neither very good nor unsatisfactory – three stars, perhaps. Marvel’s Avengers series has still to give us a bad entry, and while overall this might be one of the weaker ones, it’s pretty fulfilling watched with managed expectations and a sense of fun.

Godlessness in practice: help workshop KCL atheists’ code of conduct

King’s College London has an atheist society. Technically, an Atheist, Humanist and Secular Society. As is at times the case with student groups as leaders graduate and momentum dissipates, a new committee recently revived it following a dormant period.

While I’ve never attended KCL, I worked peripherally with the group some time ago before activities slow down, and I’m a member of their Facebook page (link above). One of the new guard’s main concerns is making the society more socially conscious and less exclusionary, welcoming a wider range of demographics – the kind of change it’s been said any number of times is needed in secularism. To this end, they’ve introduced a code of conduct, both for Facebook threads and live events.

Joe Stammeijer, the group’s president, has this to say:

It’s not just a comments policy, it’s a behaviour policy. It’s a start on how we want representatives of the society to behave in whatever [KCL]AHS space they find themselves in.

I find this, needless to say, strongly encouraging. The idea that to build an actual movement, we need more than just shared nonbelief – that we need anti-harassment rules and disabled access just as we need fire plans, that just-being-an-atheist shouldn’t be our community’s only requirement, that we can’t and shouldn’t include everyone? This isn’t an idea for which we should still need to argue, and it’s gratifying to see it implemented close to home.

This being said: the code of conduct is at present far from perfect. Its writers know this. Deemed to be necessary and drafted quickly, it borrows heavily from KCL student union’s central ‘safe spaces policy’, and we’ve all of us seen what happens when SUs’ rules are heavy-handed. In atheist groups especially, where certain amounts of controversy are bound to be bred, that documents like this not be over-restrictive is as vital as their presence and effectiveness.

For this reason, society members have decided on a two-week process of review, in which they’ll take suggestions for improving and finalising their rulebook. I’ve offered them this blog as a place to workshop it, and they’ve agreed – in other words, they want your views.

I’m making this an open thread. Below, I’m posting the code of conduct as it stands, with blow-by-blow thoughts on it. In the comments below, please add your own.

Note: this is a discussion about which guidelines should be introduced, not whether any should be. If your view is that secular groups shouldn’t have rules – that codes of conduct, anti-harassment policies and so on aren’t things we should be introducing – or if debating that view interests you, please hold that discussion somewhere else. Constructive thoughts on how this document could be improved are welcome; whether this group needs or benefits from one at all is not up for debate on this page, and comments discussing that will be removed. Take it elsewhere. (I’m happy, for example, to examine that on sites where this is posted.)

Here is the KCL group’s current policy; here it is again, in full, with added comments. (Share yours underneath.)

* * *

KCLAHSS Code of Conduct

By its very nature, an atheist, humanist and secular society will be a centre of controversial debate. We may criticise religions, the arguments for and against them and also the acts of the religious. We may impartially critique those who identify as adhering to a faith, in regards to their religious belief and practice, religions as independent entities or, any ideas for or against religion more broadly. Held within this is the idea that we may criticise a God, gods or prominent figures of any given faith as we consider this to be an idea contained within the religious infrastructure. However, it is important that amidst this challenging debate we hold to strong humanist principles and that we do not slip into prejudice. In order to facilitate this, the following policy has been drawn up with a heavy basis in the KCLSU Safe Space policy, and as always the KCLSU safe space policy applies to any KCLAHSS space. In addition to this, the process for complaints and action to be taken in the event of breach of this policy has also been detailed below. The entirety of this document relates to any KCLAHSS space – online or offline.

  • Regarding the whole document, and especially the multi-clause sections below, the basis of this in student union policy shows through in bureaucratic legalese. This is something of which to be careful: plain English matters, as Orwell writes, but matters particularly in rulemaking, where meaning needs to be as clear as possible. The anti-harassment policies of these secular organisations might make effective style models – it’s important documents like this don’t end up sounding amtlich(My impulse is that the language of ‘safe space’ obfuscates rather than elucidates, and those whose behaviour codes like this serve to address will by and large be inexperienced with it.)
  • To avoid verbosity, one concise phrase to sum up the butt of our critique: ‘religious bodies, beliefs and practices’.

1. Policy

1. As King’s College London Atheist, Humanist and Secular society we assert that no person or persons within the society (or those who come into contact with the society) should suffer (from any member, or, person within a KCLAHSS space) harassment or intimidation due to discrimination related to gender identity, sexual orientation, trans status, marital status, disability, culture, ideology, race, religious belief, age, socio-economic status, maternity/paternity status or any other group with which they identify.

  • Firstly, it’s worth saying harassment and intimidation aren’t things people should suffer at all, even if not on any of these bases.
  • Secondly, we’ve seen at LSE what happens when anti-harassment language is used to censor and silence satire. Clearly not everyone distinguishes reasoned critique and abuse in the same way, so there needs to be some clear illustration of the differences as the atheist group sees them. For instance:
    Criticism etc.: telling others their views are flawed or mistaken; satirising major religious bodies, beliefs or practices; blasphemous imagery; ethical condemnation; blocking on social media or declining to interact in person.
    Harassment etc.: bringing up (including tagging) Facebook page members specifically to insult them; making and distributing derogatory images; threats (violent or otherwise); unwelcome or uninvited physical contact (sexual or otherwise); physically following individuals around; publicising others’ private details (e.g. address, telephone number) without permission. (All of these, I’m afraid to say, are things I’ve encountered in the secular community.)
  • Thirdly: considering many social concerns raised here – gender identity, disability, race, etc. – are ones which don’t affect a large proportion of the atheist group’s current members (hence, in part, this code of conduct’s introduction), how will awareness of relevant issues be improved? Are some areas here ones in which most members lack extensive knowledge, and may not always notice problems? Would it be a good idea, for example, to provide links at the top of online spaces to blogs/video series/organisations dealing with intersections of atheism with these things, which might be used in reference when such topics are discussed or to raise consciousness in general? (This isn’t necessarily an issue for a code of conduct, though it might be. Is it worth, for example, having dedicated, qualified admins to monitor discussions around sexuality/race/disability etc. and act as go-to moderators in disputes?)

2. Criticism of any aspect of any culture, ideology or religious belief should be entirely free from criticism of the individual presenting or promoting the aforementioned culture, ideology or religious belief. Ideas should stand on their own merit, and their critique should not be merged with the critique of their author(s).

  • ‘Culture': often a thorny, unhelpfully ambiguous word. Perhaps best avoided here. What qualified as a culture anyway? Is there a better, more precise term?
  • ‘Ideas should stand on their own merit’ – a good thought, but can be misleading in practice. Context matters at times; the person saying something, events prompting it and occasion on which it’s said might all affect the subtext, and subtext matters.
  • What I sense this is trying to say is that critique of religious bodies, beliefs or practices should never translate into endorsement of violence, oppression, dehumanisation etc. of individuals based on religious identity. If so, say that instead?

3. The society does not recognise criticism of any culture, ideology or religious belief as carried out per section 1.2 to be equal to intimidation, harassment or discrimination as mentioned in section 1.1.

  • This is where the student unionese gets in the way – similarly to the last point, it seems to be making the important distinction between satire and criticism directed at religion and repression or persecution of religious groups, but this gets lost.

4. Any person or persons are free to present (in any KCLAHSS space) any culture, ideology or religious belief regardless of the opinion or official standpoint of the society, unless by presenting said culture, ideology or religious belief the author(s) are in breach of sections 1.1 or 1.2.

  • Again, the style here makes the real point, which is important, rather obscure.
  • I’d also like to hear some specific examples of viewpoints unwelcome in the society’s spaces. Fundamentalists? The political far-right? Homophobes? Transphobes? How does this apply to speakers, rather than online users/individual members? Are these people no-platformed? (Given the reference to removal of those who promote such attitudes, I assume so.)

5. Offense is not equivalent to intimidation, harassment or discrimination. The society fully expects that by presenting some of its core beliefs (for example, the non-existence of any god or gods and therefore the false nature of any religion) some individuals will take offense. The protection of free speech is a core tenet of the society, and as such the society must prioritise the preservation of free speech over the prevention of offense, unless said speech is in breach of sections 1.1 or 1.2. All cases must be taken on an individual basis as assessed by the committee, and when necessary, KCLSU.

  • It’s a good idea, I’d suggest, to acknowledge the distinction between the ‘offensiveness’ of actions deemed to be harmful (e.g. racist or transphobic abuse, jokes about rape, derogatory language regarding mental health) and the ‘offensiveness’ of violating arbitrary faith-based religious taboos, e.g. drawing prophets, naming pineapples Muhammad, screening Monty Python’s Life of Brian.
  • What would harassment of or discrimination against religious groups look like, as opposed to doing things which might offend believers? What would some forms of it be?

6. The committee reserve the right to adjust this policy at any point if they deem it appropriate. The committee will try to inform all members of any changes, but are not responsible for any issues arising as a result of any member not being aware of the most up to date version of this policy. The most recent policy version can be requested from the committee at any time.

  • How can it be ensured this code of conduct – a better, less officious term than ‘policy’ – remains reasonable, and stays both relevant and open to change? How can members make sure it’s updated when necessary, considering committee members (especially at present) are by and large not from the marginalised social groups who might seek amendments/additions here? Conversely, how can the committee be held to account and prevented down the line from making unreasonable amendments? (Would it for instance be useful to consider suggested amendments at periodically, e.g. at the end of each term? Should only committee members be able to propose these?)

2. Process following a breach of the Policy

1. Discrimination can occur whenever it is not consciously challenged, and while it is the responsibility of any KCLAHSS member to actively avoid and prevent intimidation, harassment and discrimination, the society appreciates that recognising individual acts in a society where discriminatory language is commonplace can be challenging. For this reason, the society engages in an active “call out” policy – if any member sees language or behaviour they believe to be intimidating, harassing or discriminatory, the individual using said language or behaviour can be “called out” and told that their language or behaviour is not acceptable. The called out individual must then apologise, clarify any misunderstood intent and the discussion or event can continue.

  • ‘Recognising individual acts in a society where discriminatory language is commonplace can be challenging’ – in other words, it should be recognised that exclusionary statements or actions aren’t usually maliciously intended. Important, that.
  • While this may be controversial, I’d personally avoid the term ‘call out’ – it has rather combative connotations as opposed to, say, ‘flag up’. (I know this is spin, but in the light of the previous point, I feel there’s a case for setting a more cooperative tone.)
  • I’m not sure that compelling people to apologise seems fair; it seems like it might well prompt less-than-genuine apologies anyway. Perhaps a better suggestion would be that people whose actions have been questioned should acknowledge the objection?
  • Also, and I don’t think is a trivial point: should this response be automatically required as soon as a complaint is made? Isn’t it, in fact, the job of moderators or committee members to mediate/rule on complaints at moments like these, so the policy isn’t abused?

2. Any individual not willing to publicly call someone out for any reason may request that a committee member do so anonymously on their behalf.

3. If the called out individual disagrees with any particular event of being called out then this is irrelevant as far as their immediate actions are concerned. For ease of preserving a safe space and because all individual events cannot be predicted and described in this document, any act of being called out must be followed by action as per section 2.1, and any disagreement can be followed up with committee who will discuss the event with the individual. The committee will decide whether the original call out was appropriate, and any further complaints may be taken up via the official KCLSU complaints procedure.

  • This is at times difficult to read.
  • Similarly to the previous point: how are disruptive individuals to be dealt with who abuse the system by facetiously/hyperactively making complaints – for example, users online who register objection to this code of conduct by ‘calling out’ every other comment? Would it be fair or reasonable to expect everyone else to apologise, as per 2.1?
  • It seems to me that some way of discouraging that sort of exploitation of the system (i.e. obviously frivolous use of the sanctions in place) would be a good idea, although the phrasing of a rule to do that would need to be precise and carefully thought out.
  • More pragmatically, though: decisions about whether a particular complaint/’call-out’ was unfair/facetious/frivolous/unwarranted probably aren’t ones that can or should always be made after the fact by formalised process. It seems a good idea that there moderators/committee members/volunteers be trusted at times to uphold or dismiss complaints. (This is, after all, why they have to be elected.) If they fail to do this responsibly, formal procedures can always be taken to deal with that – this seems preferable to me to taking all complaints equally seriously, then evaluating their validity by official process later on, but I might be wrong.

4. The process for managing complaints has been taken directly from the KCLSU safe space policy. Any member of the KCLAHSS committee may act upon a complaint by:
a. Giving the complainant a platform to express their complaint.
b. Reiterate to speakers and those in attendance of the Safe Space policy and issue them with a warning that they can be asked to leave an event/space.
c. Ask any speakers or students complained against to leave.
d. Work with any security put in place to remove speakers/ attendees.
e. Make KCLSU aware of any complaint or incident that has violated the policy

  • Again, I think committee members/admins probably should be able to dismiss complaints when they judge them to be made in obvious bad faith by trolls, provocateurs etc. In case important, legitimate complaints were dismissed in error – which I wouldn’t expect to be all that common, officers hopefully being sensible and having good judgement – putting in place grievance or complaint procedures against committee members or admins at regular opportunity may be a good solution. (Allowing any of these to be aired and discussed at meetings, say, once per term.)

5. The escalation procedure for managing any breach of policy is as follows:
a. Call out
b. If repeatedly called out or if an individual fails to respond appropriately, or if the committee deems the transgression severe, the committee will contact the individual privately to detail to the individual where they have broken official policy and warn against future offence. This is considered the first and final written warning.
c. If the individual fails to show commitment to changing their behaviour, or if they continue in severe transgression or if the committee deems it the most appropriate step, the individual will be removed from the space, with the aid of KCLSU security if necessary.

  • Should the ‘private, individual contact’ step always be necessary? On Facebook pages, for instance, might not the occasional user be so absolutely, obviously out of line – threatening violence, or using extreme slurs – that immediate expulsion would be warranted? This would, of course, need to be kept in check. My suggestion would be that a specific list of behaviours be drawn up and stuck to which could prompt removal without warning.
  • How does this apply, moreover, at physical events, where private contact can’t always be established?

The committee are ultimately responsible for the upholding of this policy, and any member who feels the committee have failed in their duty is asked to inform them, or KCLSU as soon as possible.

* * *

Your thoughts, readers?

When Project Runway tried to do punk

Shortly after Dom Streater’s unexpected but not undeserving Project Runway win, the programme’s latest ‘All Stars’ series is upon us. Greta remains in hibernation; Tom and Lorenzo, citing fatigue, have opted out of coverage. It falls to me then, I suppose, to talk about it for the moment.

‘Your first challenge starts right now’, contestants from past seasons were informed as things began, ‘and it features one of the biggest trends of the year; punk!’ Alyssa Milano, Heidi Klum’s less German counterpart for All Stars, deserves praise for delivering this line without a shred of irony. Punk isn’t punk, near-necessarily, if it’s a trend – mass producing its aesthetics for commercial gain perverts literally wholesale an intrinsically anarchist, anti-consumerist approach to art and fashion.

Project Runway in particular is everything punk isn’t: corporate, profit-oriented, concerned with ‘looking expensive’ over ‘looking cheap’. It prizes quality designs tailored expensively from costly fabrics, favouring ones its experts see ‘flying off the shelves’, offering luxury technology, gainful employment and thousands of dollars to its winners – emerging triumphant from the current series, we were told within an instant of the ‘punk’ task’s introduction, will mean $750,000 worth of rewards.

It’s a series, moreover, whose stylistic impulses are painfully mainstream. Runway punishes clothes in which its wispy models are found to look ‘fat’, which bear overtly sexual overtones or aren’t ‘age-appropriate’, or which appear the products of untrained, inexpert, do-it-yourself labour. How any well-received design it featured could conceivably be punk is hard to know. Guest judge Debbie Harry, as she perused the challenge’s results, noted how high-waisted most ensembles were, suggesting the preferred ‘hourglass figure'; you wouldn’t see it in such excess, almost certainly, on visiting a punk bar, and a collage of women’s footwear there, we can be sure, wouldn’t look like this.

Shoes

How many women in the punk scene wear high heels like these? And isn’t it time Runway had a ‘flat footwear’ challenge – sneakers, sandals, Doc Martens, Brogues? (Images: Lifetime)

The real challenge here was to approximate – actually, appropriate – punk in a catwalk-friendly way, drawing on its outer hallmarks while in keeping with the fashion industry’s particular ideals, eschewing any deep sense of counterculture. That’s a hard balance to strike, and no doubt a harder one to judge. How do you mark designs consistently with Project Runway‘s main criteria (flawless and expert execution, saleability, a veneer of wealth) while asking that they mimic a style deviant by definition from those aims?

Contestants’ work and comments on it, perhaps due to this paradox, both ended up all over the place. Even the top-ranked trio of outfits looked wildly different from each other.

JEFFREYobverse

Third season winner Jeffrey Sebelia‘s design was, true to his roots and to his credit, the only one that really looked punk. That’s why I might well have sent him home for it.

I see a real punk woman wearing this dress; I see her making it herself, and I watched a bona fide punk rocker cut it. It looks pulled together from found material, sewn in a cellar with a foot-powered machine or else by hand; it’s owner didn’t buy it, dons what she likes and doesn’t care about what’s in.

It does not look like a winning Project Runway dress.

The shoulders aren’t even; the peplum seems pointless, and pointlessly huge at that; it looks lumpy, formed from disobedient fabric which is probably one textile too many here. The leopard print lapels are similarly shapeless, and Jeffrey had to fight pre-catwalk to press them into serviceable shape; the organza skirt looks amateurish, added perhaps to cover up an error in the black skirt underneath, and doesn’t seem to go with them or the black leather of the jacket. Though it doesn’t show up in this image, its finish looked rough and ready on the programme, nowhere more than in its messy-looking hems.

It’s a great dress by punk standards, but a misfire by Project Runway standards (at least, those which it usually applies). Crucially, the fact it sails so far into authentic do-it-yourself aesthetics means it fails to tread the fine line between punk and catwalk which this challenge demanded.

SETH

Seth Aaron Henderson, winner of season seven, had the opposite stumbling block. I see some punk here – the tartan and the braces in particular – but it feels obvious to the point of superficial gimmickry, and the rest has serious problems for me.

Coupled with the belts’ chunkiness and the deeply un-punk PVC-esque sheen of the jacket’s fabric, the fact we’d see bare breasts on its removal drives things overtly into sex shop territory. There’s nothing wrong with this, particularly – plenty of well-made fashion hints at kink – but since clothes like the ones evoked here (fitted, rubber, explicitly sexual in function) are found mainly in commercialised kink, on sale in red light districts, and not worn day-to-day, it teeters into looking costume-like.

The gothic horror style of the sleeves, straitjacket-like, and their red, Dracula-style lining doesn’t help – and costume qua costume, especially the kind one pays to rent and wear, isn’t a punk reference point.

More positively by far…

ELENAobverse

…I’ve no dispute at all with Elena Slivnyak being named the winner. Initially unsure of how to give her look an edge, she turned the jacket backwards when her model mentioned wearing clothes the wrong way round from time to time. See the reverse:

ELENAreverse

Perhaps what I like best about this concept is that while not focusing too much on the details, one could almost think the model – typically slender and small-chested – was facing forward, before noticing seemingly twisted, mutilated limbs.

That subtext’s gruesomeness means the outfit somehow speaks to the tortured, mangled aesthetic collision of the challenge, as if Project Runway itself had to be twisted out of shape to make punk work. The implications of violence and, again, a straitjacket give the garment an air of confrontation and discord at total odds with its colour palette, that of a Twister ice cream.

That aggression, channelled into style and grace despite itself, is definitively punk – a clear winner.

CHRISTOPHERobverse

A close second for me was Christopher Palu‘s design. Ordinarily, I’d say judges were right to rule this ‘safe’, but the absence of anything else I liked beside Elena’s look bumps this up into my top category, even if still a rank below her design.

It might have been a winner, had Christopher not snatched defeat from victory’s jaws by overworking it so much – the entire getup, an intriguing jeans-and-cardigan-of-post-apocalyptic-future number, was simply in dire need of edition.

Credit indeed for making something interesting and graceful out of safety pins, rather than using them for use’s sake (see below), but between those, the asymmetric layering, the the cape effect, the unorthodox hem of the grey tunic and the strange chain cross-formation, there’s just too much going on here.

Things only get more hectic when the model turns around:

CHRISTOPHERreverse

Christopher. Really. Edit.

A good catwalk piece nonetheless – perhaps the attire of a drama student in the eighties, punk-inspired dystopia of Mad Max.

The judges’ other picks for safety were, to quote Bill Bailey, about as punk as Enya.

DANIELobverse

Daniel Esquivel made a fitted black trouser suit! Not that he’s ever done that before.

Don’t worry, though – he put a garish, hot pink bale of straw around his model and a stripe across her face to stop us noticing. Somehow, I still did.

If anything this is futuristic, but even then, it’s only because of those details and the over-the-top shoulders. Very well made, but the thousandth time round, who cares? It’s not interesting, and it’s definitely not punk. Clear bottom two material for me, and might very possibly have gone home – I’d certainly rather see more from Jeffrey than from Daniel.

IRINAobverse

Neon straw does not a punk aesthetic make, Irina Shabayeva, nor tortured ribbons around wrists.

This was a confused look. The hair is punk, the ribbons reminiscent of Avril Lavigne ten years back and the dress more goth in my eyes than anything. Points here too for using zips interestingly, but they feel arbitrary. Without that pattern of clenched metal teeth, what would be punk about this?

The crisscrossing straps don’t help, and things take a serious turn for the worse from the rear view.

IRINAreverse

Those points for using zips interestingly? Lost, for failing to use one as, well, a zip. That undone fastening looks like the model got caught undressed, perhaps with an attractive stranger, fleeing the scene without stopping to do things up. (Punks don’t flee, and when they show things, it’s on purpose.)

KORTOobverse

Film noir Amy Winehouse, bouffant drearily deflated. Earnestly though, this silhouette says fifties housewife and the details on top do nothing to obscure that.

The collision of a pleated-looking skirt, sultry cutouts and chains in the back is jarring, too.

KORTOreverse

Nul points, Korto Momolu.

MYCHAELobverse

True of Korto’s chains and just as true of Mychael Knight‘s safety pins, holding a bodice together that appears to be made from low grade serviettes. Impeccably cut perhaps, but this is a cocktail-cum-sundress with steampunk eyewear, and ‘steampunk’ isn’t ‘punk’.

MELISSAobverse

Melissa Fleis made something I liked, and which felt punker by far than most of its competitors. Like Daniel’s work here, of course, I liked it the first five times I saw from her too, but something about the dress – its mixture of print and asymmetry, perhaps? – very much works, and the jacket frames it edgily.

It might be that Melissa’s familiar aesthetic was just suited to this challenge, and I shan’t blame her for that. Top three for me, if the least of those three. Judges didn’t care for it, but I did.

ARIobverse

Ari South. Oh Ari. You should not have gone home for this.

I’ll admit Ari – Andy when she placed third, prior to transition, in season eight – is a personal favourite of mine. I’d looked forward eagerly to seeing what she’d offer this time round, and will defend her to the death.

Granted, it’s far from exquisite. I don’t know what the swathe of lime green fabric there is doing, and I want to get rid of the necklace. The jacket has unmined potential. The shorts are well made, if not very punk.

I can’t agree with the judges that nothing here was punk in any way – the jacket’s collar and lapels feel vaguely biker, which developed further might have chimed with the relaxed shirt underneath. Turning what were trousers into the jacket’s sleeves was a stroke of brilliance; I only wish I could tell that’s what they were. (Some pockets or turnups featured there, say, could have saved this.)

In any case, this was competent if uninspired, and the styling hits the right note. This should not have placed in the bottom two.

VIKTORobverse

Neither should this, Viktor Luna‘s equally pedestrian-but-inoffensive effort. I can’t say how much it pained me seeing him and Ari, two champions of mine, as bottom two.

Yes, there are definite problems with this. The styling – bag, hair, shoes – kills the entire outfit, particularly in the latter case. (Team those trousers with a sneaker and their punk potential would light up.) If the jacket had shorter or more fitted, that might have saved it, and as judges said, the copper details needed more establishment.

But this ensemble and Ari’s, worse than Daniel’s tranquiliser of a trouser suit? Irina’s era-confused party dress? Korto’s waitress-at-a-funeral, Mychael’s heiress in space, Seth’s kinky vampire sex pirate? Viewers were spoilt for choice as far as better candidates for offage go.

One can’t help wondering if the poorly-defined, paradoxical nature of the challenge allowed judges freer rein than usual to expel contestants of their choice, criteria for success being less clear and more open to debate than ordinarily they’d be.

Let’s hope for a return to normalcy next week. My verdict, in the mean time:

Winner: Elena
High: Christopher, Melissa
Safe: Viktor, Ari, Seth, Irina Mychael
Low:
Jeffrey, Korto 
Eliminated: 
Daniel

A very British nightmare: 28 Days Later, Danny Boyle’s anti-imperialist zombie flick

Spoiler warning with immediate effect.

Content note: fictional scenarios mentioned of infanticide, racially motivated violence and (separate) sexual harassment, enslavement and attempted institutional and ritualistic rape-to-impregnate in a post-apocalyptic horror context.

Atop the Big Brother house, picking the undead off by long-range rifle through its outer fence, characters in Charlie Brooker’s Dead Set (Channel 4, 2008) wonder why zombies overrunning Britain gather outside. ‘Some kind of primitive intuition’, offers gauche outsider Joplin. ‘Don’t forget, this place was like a church to them.’ It’s a hat-tip to Dawn of the Dead, George A. Romero’s film whose walking dead are drawn by a instinct to a shopping centre where survivors hide; iconic scenes show them traipse brainlessly down retail aisles, hardly distinguishable from their former selves. Dead Set‘s treatment of reality TV reprises this as well, and both stories (if Brooker’s more overtly) are satirical, picturing consumerism’s nosedive into actual flesh-eating.

Zombie narratives make thought-provoking commentaries since they differ from us only in being dead – we see in them a duller, hungrier echo of ourselves, one less pronounced in vampires or werewolves, and their worlds feel instinctively like places ours has the potential to become. Loving genre parody Shaun of the Dead (2004) plays with this theme, and Dominic Mitchell’s social realist horror series In the Flesh, screened earlier this year on BBC Three, is built around it, but Danny Boyle’s 28 Days Later was the film to codify the zombie flick as social criticism, reviving and updating it as a cinematic form. Its creatures, not zombies in strict terms at all, are raging, hyper-violent Britons, driven by fictional infection to mindless hostility; the aforementioned stories all owe something to it, and repeat views leave me more and more convinced it’s a horror of national identity.

Released ten years before the 2012 Olympics, whose opening Boyle would stage as a collage of British cultural iconography, the same hand is still visible at work in it. Bleak as it is, the film’s landscape is packed with imagery of this sort: a deserted London’s skyline, silent at its outset, a red bus on its side as if lying wounded; the black cab in which characters flee the city; the ruined castle where they picnic and stately home where they seek refuge; Manchester’s smoking ruins and the Lake District’s glacial valleys. Boyle’s Olympic ceremony leaps implausibly to mind in certain scenes, as a looted supermarket’s trolleys glide balletically into shot, horses canter unaware through English fields and wind turbines whirl next to the M6. Moments like these alternate surreally with ones of undiluted horror, suggesting the two might be sides of one coin. As we switch from pastoral idyll to Wyndhamian hell and back again, Cillian Murphy forced in his first major to end a feral child’s life, the thought occurs that what the script calls a ‘diseased little island’ might itself teeter between the two – that both are part of Britain’s character, infection merely letting them resurface.

Christopher Eccleston’s grotesque but somehow dignified commandant, Major Henry West, leads a troop of human villains who by obvious design (perhaps to emphasise this point) bring empire to mind. Lamenting his soldiers grow lebensmüde in their fortified, once upper class estate and sanctioning the rape of survivors Hannah and Selena (Skyfall‘s Naomie Harris in an early part), he confesses ‘I promised them women, because women mean a future.’ That Selena is black, a fact would-be perpetrator Corporal Mitchell fetishises, gives the soldiers’ planned sexual violence imperialist connotations, and procreation here seems little more than pretext for it: if pregnancy is what they want and not just an excuse, why Mitchell’s harassment of Selena on meeting her? Why no question of her current fertility, or whether ambiguously adolescent Hannah can conceive at all? Why force them, as West’s underlings do, to dress up in scarlet ball gowns?

Aptly-named West’s real motive may be as as colonial as his chaining and yoking the infected soldier Mailer, also black. ‘What do nine men do except wait to die themselves?’ he asks while justifying his scheme, hinting at homophobic paranoia – is West afraid the homosocial interplay of his brigade (‘You killed all my boys’, he later tells Murphy’s protagonist), unchecked by ceremonial sex with women, might flower into eroticism? These attitudes to sexuality, gender and race, ones Britain exported worldwide at its historical brutality’s peak, are dormant mainstays here of its establishment, reawakened by the (not quite) zombie plague. Even West’s voice implies he aspires to this regime, Eccleston’s native Salford showing through the major’s plummier, affected vowels, suggestive of a man with establishment pretensions, determined to appear above his roots.

A newer imperialism features too, if subtly, in Boyle’s film, released a year or so post-9/11 in Britain and mid-2003 stateside. Its opening shot, inserted perhaps during the War on Terror’s genesis, shows scenes of police attacks on British demonstrators, public chaos in the Middle East and topoi which would otherwise become familiar in the years after, before cutting away to reveal these on television screens, shown forcibly to a chimp clad with electrodes. The rage virus’s spread, about which nothing else is indicated, begins when animal advocates release infected chimps from this laboratory; should the fact this is the sole hint viewers get at the infection’s origins tell us, on some impressionistic level, that world politics Britain was entering at the time somehow created it? That the rage of rioters, soldiers and war victims the chimps are made to watch somehow transfers to them, and subsequently infected humans? Major West, at dinner with the film’s protagonists before revealing his men’s plans, comments that ‘people killing people’ is all he remembers seeing before the outbreak, ‘which to my mind puts us in a state of normality right now.’ The violence of the infected stems, it seems, from that already harboured and practised by Britain, especially through military men like him.

The corollary of this, embodied in Selena and Jim’s relationship, is that whatever use compassion has as an antidote to carnage, it has here and now. Their love story, a better one than zombie films have often told us, lies improbably at the film’s core: Selena, hard as nails and able to dismember her infected friend initially, regains some measure of humanity from Hannah and Jim during the film, despite initially warning him ‘If it happens to you, I’ll do it in a heartbeat'; Jim, initially reluctant to kill and slowing the party down, unearths his lethal side in order to save her and Hannah at the climax. When Selena, mistaking him for one of the infected as he kills Corporal Mitchell with his bare hands, hesitates to attack, Jim tritely, knowingly remarks ‘That was longer than a heartbeat.’ The moment their attitudes meet in the middle is when we know they care about each other, a balance between callousness and mercy being struck which offers some degree of hope, as if walking that fine line might be what saves them, and stops our own society’s collapse into an abattoir. Boyle’s film is a British nightmare, a horror of things lurking in our nation’s woodwork and what might befall us should we fail to toe the line.

Gitsupportthisblog

GiTwhyinowhaveadonatebutton

Updates on student union goings-on at LSE

Abishek Phadnis, one of the students castigated at LSE for donning Jesus and Mo t-shirts, gives his version of events in an account at Trending Central. Given the swamp of student union trouble waded through by atheists there in the past, he’s had no end of practice drafting succulently barbed rebukes; this latest doesn’t disappoint.

The trouble with advertising yourself as an institution for people who enjoy being “challenged intellectually, socially and personally” is that some of us will actually believe it, and expect you to live up to that promise by being a haven for free inquiry and free expression.

Paul Thornbury, the Head of LSE Security, was summoned to inform us that we were not behaving in an “orderly and responsible manner”, and that our wearing the t-shirts could be considered “harassment”, as it could create an “offensive environment”, which is an absurd claim to make of wholly innocuous t-shirts whose writing, in any case, is obscured unless you stop, stare and squint at the right angle while the wearer is still. And that’s if you visit the Atheist Society Stall, never the most popular hangout for deeply religious people anyway.

Mr Thornbury was unmoved by our arguments, and had us surrounded by security guards, with the warning that should we disobey his command, we would be dragged out. Browbeaten and awaiting a clearer interpretation of the rules, we said we would temporarily put on our jackets, and so in a surreal sequence, the Head of LSE Security hovered about us like a short-sighted tailor, assessing whether we had concealed enough, pausing to protest at one point that the word “prophet” was visible from a certain angle. He then deputed two guards to stand in the aisle, facing our stall, to stop us attempting to take our jackets off and to shadow us wherever we went till closing time.

Shortly after midday, Deputy Chief Executive O’Hara descended on us, demanding we take the t-shirts off as per his instructions of the previous day. We explained to him that we had redacted them this time, and offered to use our home-made tape to cover any other areas he wished to see covered. Our concessions came to nought. He refused to hear us out, and left, warning us that he was summoning LSE Security to remove us from the premises.

Surprisingly, several hours passed before their next move (a curiously tardy response for an administration purporting to counter harassment), in which Mr Thornbury reappeared near closing time, armed with a letter from the School Secretary Susan Scholefield, which claimed that since some students found our t-shirts “offensive”, we were in possible breach of the LSE Harassment Policy and Disciplinary Procedure. It claimed that our actions were “damaging the School’s reputation” and concluded by asking us to “refrain from wearing the t-shirts in question and cover any other potentially offensive imagery” and warning us that the School “reserves the right to consider taking further action if warranted”. On our way out at closing time, we saw Mr Thornbury, General Secretary Stoll and Deputy Chief Executive O’Hara skulking in the corridor, accompanied by a posse of security guards. They shadowed us to the exit.

Mr Stoll and the School have some nerve to claim that we were threatened because “it was feared” that we would “disrupt the event”, when in fact the event was progressing perfectly smoothly until it was disrupted by the ham-fisted intervention of the student union. We strove to remain calm, pacific and reasonable, standing our ground even as we were subjected to a barrage of increasingly egregious demands and jostled by security guards. If harassment is, as the LSE Harassment Policy defines it, anything that “violates an individual’s dignity and/or creates an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive environment”, then we were harassed.

Our critics contend that we were being needlessly inflammatory. Quite apart from the cliché that the people who rule over us are the people we cannot criticise, do these people genuinely think it is a waste of time and effort defending freedom of expression from religious reactionaries? Could they suggest a better cause? Perhaps they will be swayed by the fact that the gifted cartoonist whose t-shirts we wore publishes his work under a pseudonym because of threats to his life.

These sickly invocations for decorum are of a piece with the risible claim made by Mr Stoll and the School that their clampdown was prompted by the fear that we were sabotaging the prospects of a sanitised Fair “designed to welcome all new students”, and that our t-shirts and posters were welcome once this delicate initial period had passed. We have good reason to doubt this.

For one thing, Mr Thornbury contradicted it with his warning that we would be evicted if we were ever seen wearing these t-shirts on campus again. And just last year, our efforts to better signpost ourselves for Muslim apostates on campus by adding “ex-Muslim” to our Society’s name (on the lines of ex-Mormon groups in the U.S., and for the same reasons) were gratuitously frustrated. First, the Union ordered us to prove “clear cooperation with the Islamic Society” before they would consider our application; then, they backed out with the wet excuse that the change could jeopardise the “safety” of ex-Muslims in our group, which came as news to the ex-Muslim organisations on whose insistence we’d sought the change.

But it isn’t all gloom.

In one of those beautiful little ironies of life that makes even a staunch atheist like me wonder if there might, after all, be a god, the LSE student newspaper reported in its edition of October 3 that LSESU had been rated the worst Students’ Union in London[.]

General Secretary Stoll, everything about whom smacks of New Labour, invited me last week to correspond with him about his student union’s actions, offering to comment on the record (i.e. for this blog). Our exchange of emails looked like this:

Hi Alex

How do you want this to work? You send some questions and I answer? Would just want to point out now that Im [otherwise engaged] all day, so you’ll probably have full answers to any questions by tomorrow night at the latest. 

Hope this is okay,

Regards

Jay

All right, let’s begin like this.

Since your official statement from Friday, while failing to mention details like attempts to confiscate society material and use of security staff, doesn’t challenge your atheist society’s account of what took place on Thursday, I’m assuming you don’t dispute it.

Perhaps you could start by explaining how that society’s treatment by LSE’s student union and staff is justified: why forcing them to cover their t-shirts (below), surrounding them with LSE security, trying to expel them from the building and threatening disciplinary measures was a fair course of action.

I’d like you to answer both in terms of ethics and of how they were breaching regulations – including specifically LSE’s harassment policy, which School Secretary Susan Scholefield told the group prohibited these t-shirts.

Thanks.

Alex

Hi Alex

Sorry to have to renege on this, but I have been advised by the LSE to not give further comment as we are releasing another official statement today. Further, I will be addressing the Union at our General Meeting where I believe the National Collective of Atheist Societies will be present – so there won’t be a deficit of accountability!

Again, apologies for the inconvenience but as Im sure you will appreciate, the press situation is constantly changing and we have to act accordingly.

Best

Jay

The statement in question says nothing very new:

At the LSE Students’ Union Freshers’ Fair on Thursday 3 October two students from the LSE SU Atheist Secularist and Humanist Society (ASH) wore t-shirts that were clearly designed to depict Mohammed and Jesus in a provocative manner. A number of students complained and the ASH students were asked to cover their t shirts by representatives of both the School and the SU.

This has led to a great deal of debate on social media platforms and concerns that the School will stop students from wearing similar t shirts at an event hosted by ASH on 15th October, the topic of which is the wearing of the Niqab. This is a student society event, open to the public, and utterly in the spirit of LSE’s commitment to free speech and the discussion of contentious issues. It will be chaired by Professor Chetan Bhatt, the Director of LSE’s Centre for the Study of Human Rights.

The event is quite different to the Freshers’ Fair, which must be accessible, inclusive and welcoming and which was in danger of being disrupted. The School hopes that those attending the event on 15th October will do so in a spirit of open discussion and respect and that any views expressed – orally, on clothing or however – will be in this spirit.

The School and the SU would also like to put on record concern over the nature of some of the social media debate, which has been highly personalised. The good campus relations group at LSE will take forward work to discuss the issues raised by the recent events in a calm manner that can further understanding, bring reconciliation and continue to make LSE the centre of global debate on the issues that matter to us all.

It’s a back-to-front approach to free expression, to say nothing else. If for instance LSE’s Islamic Society want to prohibit cartoons of prophets at their meetings, that’s up to them – communal spaces are exactly those from which heretical items shouldn’t be banned.

I’m inclined anyway not to trust the competence of a body whose work on ‘good campus relations’ starts with threatening and trying to intimidate people who wear blasphemous t-shirts. (‘This is an inclusive event,’ they told the atheist group, as Jesus and Mo‘s author puts it. ‘Get out!’) I’m especially disinclined to trust a student union whose staff and representatives seem unwilling, pressed over and over again, to answer critics.