Shermer vs. Pigliucci on Moral Science
On the matter of making morality a science, however, both Shermer and Pigliucci are wrong, for reasons I already spelled out in formal detail in “Moral Facts Naturally Exist (and Science Could Find Them)” a couple years ago, which is chapter 14 of The End of Christianity (pp. 333-64, 420-29). I had previously elaborated on that idea less formally in Part V of Sense and Goodness without God (and further illumination can be gained from my past debate over desire utilitarianism: see Goal Theory Update; and likewise from my discussion of Moral Ontology). Shermer is wrong for all the reasons Pigliucci documents. But Pigliucci is wrong for all the reasons I document. (As a philosopher, Pigliucci would be most concerned to read my chapter in TEC rather than the material in SaG or my blog, which should be viewed as an informal appendix to the formal demonstration of that more recent work in print.)
Pigliucci is thus really just tearing down a straw man here, since Shermer’s awful defense of a science of morality is easy pickings for any well-informed thinker trained to spot a fallacy. I do hope someday Pigliucci will constructively critique my chapter instead, if we want to make progress in discussing a possible research program for a real science of prescriptive (and not merely descriptive) morality. Of course, I say this knowing that in his reply to Shermer, Pigliucci actually agrees with a lot of what I say there. Indeed, my paper uses careful and peer reviewed philosophy to demonstrate what Shermer is trying to argue ineptly with a lot of sloppy inferences and hand waving.
The Specific Point
But what really gets my goat is the way Shermer uses evidence, and one particular example is emblematic. I mean the way Shermer uses a particular research paper, a product of a private think tank (and not something you can find yet in a peer reviewed academic journal as far as I know): Daniel Sacks, Betsey Stevenson, and Justin Wolfers, “Subjective Well-Being, Income, Economic Development and Growth” [PDF here], which (contrary to what Shermer says) is policy paper No. 5230 (October 2010) for the German Institute for the Study of Labor (aka the IZA).
On this Shermer says (my emphasis in bold):
…in a study…entitled “Subjective Well-Being, Income, Economic Development and Growth” by the University of Pennsylvania economists Daniel Sacks, Betsey Stevenson, and Justin Wolfers…they compared survey data on subjective well-being (“happiness”) with income and economic growth rates in 140 countries. The economists found a positive correlation between income and happiness within individual countries, in which richer people are happier than poorer people; and they also found a between-country difference in which people in richer countries are happier than people in poorer countries. As well, they found that an increase in economic growth was associated with an increase in subjective well being: “These results together suggest that measured subjective well-being grows hand in hand with material living standards.” How much difference? “A 20 percent increase in income has the same impact on well-being, regardless of the initial level of income: going from $500 to $600 of income per year yields the same impact on well-being as going from $50,000 to $60,000 per year.” Contrary to previous studies, the economists found no upper limit in which more money does not correlate with more happiness. As well, on a 0-10 scale measuring “life satisfaction,” people in poor countries averaged a 3, people in middle-income countries averaged a 5-6, and people in rich countries averaged a 7-8 (Americans rate their life satisfaction as a 7.4). The economists’ conclusion confirms my moral science theory that the survival and flourishing of individuals is what counts.
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