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Allen Ault is the retired director of the Georgia Department of Corrections and former warden of the Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison which handled Troy Davis. Ault oversaw executions for the state of Georgia. He is now Eastern Kentucky University’s dean of “College of Justice and Society” and well-informed from an academic perspective about the [...]
Archive for the ‘Moral Psychology’ Category
The Moral Toll of Executions on the Consciences of Executioners
September 22nd, 2011 
Daniel Fincke 
Posted in Applied Ethics, Applied Ethics, Authoritarianism, Authoritarianism, Civil Rights, Civil Rights, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Ethics, Ethics, Law, Law, Law & Politics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, News, News Discussion, News Discussion, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Politics, Politics, Videos 
Tags: Allen Ault, Anti-Death Penalty, Death Penalty, Dennis O'Neill, Ed Schultz, Ed Show, Effects of Executions on Executioners, Georgia Department of Corrections, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison, Jeanne Woodford, Rachel Maddow, Reginald Wilkinson, Rick Perry, Ron McAndrew, Terry Collins, Troy Anthony Davis, Troy Davis 
7 Comments »Defining Intrinsic Goodness, Using Marriage As An Example
September 20th, 2011 Daniel Fincke The other day, I wrote a post exploring a major reason that getting away without penalties would not be enough to make at least some kinds of wrongdoing in our best interests. I was taking one of a few possible tacks at answering Glaucon’s question in Plato’s Republic as to how being a just person might be [...]
Moral Perfectionism, Moral Pragmatism, Free Love Ethics, and Adultery
September 19th, 2011 Daniel Fincke Kelly: You are a moral absolutist, Jaime. Jaime: Nonsense. You are the one who wants to impose monogamy on everyone, whether they like it or not. Kelly: No, when we talked the other day, I conceded it was your right to have whatever kinds of open relationships you wanted. I only said that, given human [...]
Posted in Applied Ethics, Applied Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Autonomy, Autonomy, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Duty, Duty, Ethical Pluralism, Ethical Pluralism, Ethics, Ethics, Love, Love, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Psychology, Psychology, Sex, Virtues, Virtues Tags: Adultery, Anti-Adultery, Anti-Monogamy, Changes in Moral Values, Consequentialism, Marriage, Monogamy, Moral Absolutism, Moral Idealism, Moral Institutions, Moral Perfectionism, Moral Revisionism, Moral Values, Non-Moral Values, Pleasure and Pain, Polyamory, Promiscuity, Utilitarianism 60 Comments »Why Getting Away With Wrongdoing Does Not Make It Worth It
September 18th, 2011 Daniel Fincke This past week across numerous different classes I am teaching in both ancient philosophy and ethics, I have been talking with my students about Plato’s Republic, Book II. We have discussed whether there would be any intrinsic goodness to justice such that it would be in our interests to choose just courses of action even [...]
On Rejecting Faith in Morality
September 16th, 2011 Daniel Fincke Update: Joel Marks has replied to this post and to my first follow up post. I have reedited this post to incorporate his remarks at the end. Joel Marks is at the Center for Bioethics at Yale University and is professor emeritus of philosophy at the University of New Haven. Though writing on ethics throughout [...]
Posted in Atheism, Atheism, Atheism, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Christianity, Christianity, Ethics, Ethics, Love, Love, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Nietzsche, Nietzsche, Personal, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Skepticism, Skepticism 1 Comment »What It Means To Me To Be Free
September 13th, 2011 Daniel Fincke I think that in some meaningful ways, human beings are free. In a couple of previous posts and in subsequent comments in their comments sections, I have been arguing for the ways that we are not free in a libertarian sense, i.e., our actions are not “undetermined” by forces outside our fundamental control. We are [...]
Posted in Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Ethics, Metaphysics, Metaphysics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Mind Tags: Free Will, Libertarian Free Will, Mind, Mind/Body, Self, Soft Determinism, Soft Determinism's Free Will 5 Comments »Internecine War At Freethought Blogs: Philosopher vs. “Redneck” Edition: Free Will And The Real World Smackdown
September 10th, 2011 Daniel Fincke As far as I have noticed, there has not been a blog war between any of the Freethought Blogs (or, er, since we all moved here anyway) so I was a little trepidatious of going and picking apart the every word of a quick comment on one of my posts by my new favorite blogger, Hank [...]
Posted in Applied Ethics, Applied Ethics, Atheism, Atheism, Autonomy, Autonomy, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Epistemic Justification, Epistemic Justification, Ethics, Ethics, Faith, Faith, God, God, Hypocrisy, Hypocrisy, Metaethics, Metaethics, Metaphysics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Mind, Psychology, Psychology, Social Psychology, Social Psychology Tags: Free Will 19 Comments »The “Moral Argument” For Free Will Is A Morally Troubling, Hypocritical, Faith Position
September 9th, 2011 Daniel Fincke Many who believe that we have free will are what philosophers call “libertarians”. These are not necessarily libertarians in the political sense but in a metaphysical sense. Libertarians conceive of free will as incompatible with determinism. Their notion is that to the extent that our actions are determined by forces or factors which are beyond [...]
Posted in Autonomy, Autonomy, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Disambiguating Faith, Disambiguating Faith, Ethics, Ethics, Faith, Faith, Hypocrisy, Hypocrisy, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy Tags: Determinism, Free Will, Hypocrisy of the moral argument for free will, Libertarian Free Will, The Moral Argument for Free Will 25 Comments »Offer Nominations for 3 Quarks Daily’s Prize for Best Blog Writing in Philosophy
September 4th, 2011 Daniel Fincke For the third straight year, 3 Quarks Daily will award a prize for blog writing in philosophy. Nominate what you think is the best philosophy blog post from the last year by 11:59pm EST on Monday night (September 5). Below the fold are both the full details of the contest and a very good video interview [...]
Posted in Biology, Biology, Ethics, Evolution, Evolution, Evolutionary Psychology, Evolutionary Psychology, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Psychology, Psychology, Social Psychology, Social Psychology Tags: Cognitive Science, Neuromorality, Neurophilosophy, Patricia Churchland No Comments »Is it Too Risky to Debate Morality's Foundations in the Public Square?
February 28th, 2011 Daniel Fincke Jean Kazez argues that the public square is not the place for atheists to be arguing that science and religion are incompatible. I strongly reject her position on this point because not only do I believe that ordinary people are quite capable of handling a vigorous, no-holds-barred debate about religion but because I believe the [...]
Posted in Atheism, Atheism, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Cultural Secularism, Cultural Secularism, Duty, Duty, Epistemic Justification, Epistemic Justification, Epistemology, Ethics, Ethics, Featured, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, Nietzsche, Nietzsche, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Philosophy Of Religion, Politics, Politics, Religion, Religious Extremism, Religious Extremism, Right Wing Politics, Right Wing Politics, Sarah Palin, Sarah Palin, Secularism, Skepticism, Skepticism Tags: J.L. Mackie, Jean Kazez, Jean-Paul Sartre, Moral Anti-Realism, Moral Error Theory, Moral Realism, Pragmatism, Russell Blackford, Sam Harris, The Death of God 8 Comments »The Role Of Honor In Moral Revolutions
February 24th, 2011 Daniel Fincke Kwame Anthony Appiah explores a thesis I’ve never heard before in his new book, The Honor Code: How Moral Revolutions Happen summarized by Matthew Pianalto: Judged by contemporary Western standards, honour has a mixed moral record. On the one hand, a sense of gentlemanly honour underwrote the practice of duelling, long after it had been [...]
Posted in Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Ethics, Ethics, History, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Virtues, Virtues Tags: Honor, Kwame Anthony Appiah, Matthew Pianalto, Moral Revolution, Philosopher's Magazine 4 Comments »The Religious Conservative's False Choice: "Big Brother" Or "Heavenly Father"
February 23rd, 2011 Daniel Fincke In an e-mail to me, Caroline proposes thought provoking reasons for non-believers to encourage (or at least to not actively discourage) religious beliefs: It would also be nice if people would carry out actions in good conscience of just being decent human beings rather than in fear of reprisal in the afterlife, but as there [...]
Posted in Applied Ethics, Applied Ethics, Atheism, Atheism, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Authoritarianism, Authoritarianism, Authority, Authority, Autonomy, Autonomy, Christianity, Christianity, Civil Liberties, Civil Liberties, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Cultural Secularism, Cultural Secularism, Duty, Duty, Ethics, Ethics, Featured, Fundamentalism, Fundamentalism, George W. Bush, George W. Bush, Hypocrisy, Hypocrisy, Law, Law, Law & Politics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, News Discussion, News Discussion, Nietzsche, Nietzsche, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Philosophy Of Religion, Political Secularism, Political Secularism, Politics, Politics, Psychology, Psychology, Religion, Religion, Religious Extremism, Religious Extremism, Right Wing Politics, Right Wing Politics, Secularism, Social Psychology, Social Psychology, Sociology, Sociology, Theocrats, Theocrats, Torture, Torture, Virtues, Virtues, World Affairs, World Affairs Tags: Political Philosophy, Social Contract, Victor Frankl 4 Comments »I Am Interviewed About My Personal (Atheistic) Religiosity/Spirituality
February 19th, 2011 Daniel Fincke Through Facebook, I was recently contacted by an old friend from high school (who was actually the first girl to go on a date with me). She is working on her Master’s in nursing and has an assignment which involves interviewing people about their views on religion and spirituality, for the purpose of thinking about approaches [...]
Posted in Atheism, Atheism, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Ethics, Ethics, Featured, Indie Music, Indie Music, Indie Rock, Indie Rock, Love, Love, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Music, Music, Nietzsche, Nietzsche, Personal, Philosophy, Religion, Religion, Secularism Tags: Eternal Recurrence, Eternal Recurrence of the Same, Existentialism, Jean-Paul Sartre, Martin Heidegger, Stoicism No Comments »What Can An Atheist Love In People's Religiosity?
February 15th, 2011 Daniel Fincke Earlier today, I argued that atheists can vigorously and outspokenly oppose bad faith-based ideas, values, and behaviors, but still love other aspects of the religiosity of their religious friends (and of religious people in general). I argued that religion can be as central to personal identity formation as sexuality is and that to indiscriminately hate [...]
Posted in Atheism, Atheism, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Christianity, Christianity, Cultural Secularism, Cultural Secularism, Ethical Pluralism, Ethical Pluralism, Ethics, Ethics, Featured, Love, Love, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, Prejudice, Religion, Religion, Religious Moderates, Religious Moderates, Religious Secularism, Religious Secularism, Secularism, Virtues, Virtues 14 Comments »Can You Really Love Religious People If You Hate Their Religion?
February 15th, 2011 Daniel Fincke Atheists do not exactly claim to “love sinners but hate sins” (if for no other reason than that most, if not all, of us reject the category of “sin” as a meaningful or valuable way to talk about ethical failure). Also, atheists may be more realistic than to think that we really do, or feasibly [...]
Posted in Applied Ethics, Applied Ethics, Atheism, Atheism, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Cultural Secularism, Cultural Secularism, Ethics, Ethics, Featured, Homosexuality, Homosexuality, LGBTQAA, Love, Love, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, Philosophy, Philosophy Of Religion, Prejudice, Psychology, Psychology, Religion, Religion, Religious Rights, Religious Rights, Religious Secularism, Religious Secularism, Secularism, Virtues, Virtues 15 Comments »Why "Loving The Sinner But Hating The Sin" Is Not An Option When Dealing With Gay People
February 14th, 2011 Daniel Fincke Many a homophobic religious person has infamously claimed that when it comes to gays he “loves the sinner but hates the sin” and many a defender of the full dignity and ethical lives of gay people has judged such a compromised offer of love inadequate (if not insincere). This cannot be because it is impossible [...]
Posted in Applied Ethics, Applied Ethics, Ethics, Ethics, Featured, Fundamentalism, Fundamentalism, Homophobia, Homophobia, Homosexuality, Homosexuality, Hypocrisy, Hypocrisy, LGBTQAA, Love, Love, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Prejudice, Psychology, Psychology, Religion, Religion, Same Sex Marriage, Same Sex Marriage, Sex Tags: Hate The Sin But Love The Sinner, Love The Sinner But Hate The Sin 15 Comments »What Is Love? Here's My Theory.
February 14th, 2011 Daniel Fincke This is a renamed repost of July 24, 2009 post called “How Do I Love Thee? Let Me Count The Ways”: In the first part of this series, I explored the reasons for rejecting “unconditional” love as a candidate for the ideal essence of love since as a concept it is riddled with numerous problems [...]
Posted in Applied Ethics, Applied Ethics, Ethics, Ethics, Featured, Love, Love, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Virtues, Virtues 3 Comments »Jonathan Glover On The Consciences Of Sociopaths
February 14th, 2011 Daniel Fincke The moral philosopher Jonathan Glover interviewed a number of anti-social people, including psychopaths, who have committed serious crimes and live in secure hospitals in order to investigate how they think about right and wrong and what sort of conscience they have. He thinks they have a conscience, but one unlike others’. They have strong feelings [...]
Posted in Applied Ethics, Applied Ethics, Ethics, Ethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Psychology, Psychology Tags: Determinism, Ethics of Punishment, Fairness, Free Will, Jonathan Glover, Moral Responsibility, Moral Sympathy, Nigel Warburton, Philosophy Bites, Psychopaths, Psychopathy, Punishment, Resentment and Morality, Respect, Responsibility, Retribution, Sociopaths, Sociopathy, Sympathy No Comments »Sex And Apostasy
February 9th, 2011 Daniel Fincke Drew Dyck has written a book called Generation Ex-Christian: Why Young Adults Are Leaving the Faith. . .and How to Bring Them Back. I want to focus on just a few passages from his interesting five page article from last fall in last November’s Christianity Today. Unlike many Christians who, despite living in a culture [...]
Posted in Applied Ethics, Applied Ethics, Atheism, Atheism, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Autonomy, Autonomy, Christianity, Christianity, Cultural Secularism, Cultural Secularism, Ethics, Ethics, Featured, Fundamentalism, Fundamentalism, Hypocrisy, Hypocrisy, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Prejudice, Psychology, Psychology, Religion, Religion, Secularism, Sex, Social Psychology, Social Psychology, Sociology, Sociology, Why I Am Not A Christian, Why I Am Not A Christian Tags: Sex and Faith, Sex and Religion, Sexual Ethics, Sexual Experimentation, Sexual Hypocrisy, Sexual Values, Young Adult Sexuality 8 Comments »TOP Q: “Do Children Have Higher Moral Status Than Adults?”
February 9th, 2011 Daniel Fincke In his book Moral Status and Human Life: The Case for Children’s Superiority, law professor James Dwyer argues that children are not merely equal to adults in moral status but actually have a higher moral status than adults. Below is a brief video in which he sketches out the broad contours of his thought on moral [...]
Posted in Abortion, Abortion, Applied Ethics, Applied Ethics, Autonomy, Autonomy, Bio-Medical Ethics, Bio-Medical Ethics, Civil Rights, Civil Rights, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Duty, Duty, Ethics, Ethics, Featured, Law, Law, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Teleology, Teleology, Today's Open Philosophical Question (TOP Q) Tags: Children, Children's Rights 2 Comments »Rejecting And Reconciling Moral Intuitionist Ideas With My Naturalist Account Of Goodness
January 30th, 2011 Daniel Fincke In reply to my post, Against Moral Intuitionism, James Gray defended his moral intuitionist leanings against my attacks on them. He starts by quoting me: But many people can be and have been persuaded that goodness is not a property of things but rather of people’s attitudes towards them. The very existence of anti-realists about the existence [...]
Posted in Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Epistemic Justification, Epistemic Justification, Epistemology, Epistemology, Ethics, Ethics, Evidence, Evidence, Featured, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy Tags: Moral Intuitionism, Self-evidence 3 Comments »What Does It Mean For Pleasure And Pain To Be “Intrinsically Instrumental” Goods?
January 30th, 2011 Daniel Fincke In reply to my post, Pleasure And Pain As Intrinsic Instrumental Goods, James objects: You are defining pleasure as intrinsic instrumental good. This is obviously not intrinsic goodness as I define it at all. Instrumental goodness is not intrinsic goodness. A successful pleasure instance is an intrinsically good instance of pleasure in-itself and for-itself, just for being [...]
Posted in Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Ethics, Ethics, Featured, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Torture, Torture Tags: Instrumental Value, Intrinsic Instrumental Value, Intrinsic Value, Objective Value, Pain, Pleasure, Values 6 Comments »Moral vs. Non-Moral Values
January 28th, 2011 Daniel Fincke In a recent post I distinguished numerous times between moral and non-moral values and between different sorts of intrinsic and instrumental goods. James Gray asks for clarifications about how I use these terms: First, I don’t know that it matters to call something a “moral value.” Of course, there are instrumental values concerning morally neutral [...]
Posted in Ethical Pluralism, Ethical Pluralism, Ethics, Ethics, Featured, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Teleology, Teleology, Virtues, Virtues Tags: Moral Values, Moral Virtues, Non-Moral Values, Non-Moral Virtues 13 Comments »Against Moral Intuitionism
January 27th, 2011 Daniel Fincke In the series of posts I began on Sunday and which has continued through this morning, I have developed and defended my naturalistic approach to understanding value as a realist. James Gray, despite being a moral realist, has balked at much in my attempts to do this and it has become increasingly clear that the [...]
Posted in Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Epistemic Justification, Epistemic Justification, Ethics, Ethics, Evidence, Evidence, Featured, Metaethics, Metaethics, Metaphysics, Metaphysics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy Tags: Alasdair MacIntyre, Emotivism, Error Theory, G.E. Moore, Intuitions, Moral Anti-Realism, Moral Intuitionism, Moral Realism, Robert Audi, Values 6 Comments »Pleasure And Pain As Intrinsic Instrumental Goods
January 27th, 2011 Daniel Fincke In recent posts I have been arguing that there is one sense of the word “good” which can be analyzed in terms of facts and that this is the kind of “goodness” which we can consider a real part of the world. This real, intrinsic, factual sense of goodness is its meaning as “effectiveness”. We [...]
Posted in Applied Ethics, Applied Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Autonomy, Autonomy, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Ethics, Ethics, Featured, Historical Ethics, Historical Ethics, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Nietzsche, Nietzsche, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Problem of Evil, Problem of Evil, Teleology, Teleology, Torture, Torture, Virtues, Virtues Tags: Bernard Reginster, Pain, Pains, Pleasure, Pleasures, Will to Power 5 Comments »
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