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Princeton professor Philip Pettit makes the case for consequentialism on this week’s Philosophy Bites. The voices and elocution of everyone in this interview are worth the price of admission. I love the way they pronounce al-Qaeda (“al-kay-ee-duh”) in particular. Your Thoughts?
Archive for the ‘Contemporary Ethics’ Category
Philip Pettit On How Consequentialism Can Respect The Integrity of Agents
September 14th, 2011 
Daniel Fincke The Objective Value of Ordered Complexity
September 13th, 2011 Daniel Fincke I argue that the word goodness should be interpreted to mean, in the most fundamental sense of the word, “effectiveness”. I also argue that since effectiveness is a factual issue, goodness is a factual issue. These controversial positions of mine raise a lot of thought provoking questions and challenges from readers. I am using this [...]
What It Means To Me To Be Free
September 13th, 2011 Daniel Fincke I think that in some meaningful ways, human beings are free. In a couple of previous posts and in subsequent comments in their comments sections, I have been arguing for the ways that we are not free in a libertarian sense, i.e., our actions are not “undetermined” by forces outside our fundamental control. We are [...]
Posted in Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Ethics, Metaphysics, Metaphysics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Mind 
Tags: Free Will, Libertarian Free Will, Mind, Mind/Body, Self, Soft Determinism, Soft Determinism's Free Will 
5 Comments »Internecine War At Freethought Blogs: Philosopher vs. “Redneck” Edition: Free Will And The Real World Smackdown
September 10th, 2011 Daniel Fincke As far as I have noticed, there has not been a blog war between any of the Freethought Blogs (or, er, since we all moved here anyway) so I was a little trepidatious of going and picking apart the every word of a quick comment on one of my posts by my new favorite blogger, Hank [...]
Posted in Applied Ethics, Applied Ethics, Atheism, Atheism, Autonomy, Autonomy, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Epistemic Justification, Epistemic Justification, Ethics, Ethics, Faith, Faith, God, God, Hypocrisy, Hypocrisy, Metaethics, Metaethics, Metaphysics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Mind, Psychology, Psychology, Social Psychology, Social Psychology Tags: Free Will 19 Comments »The “Moral Argument” For Free Will Is A Morally Troubling, Hypocritical, Faith Position
September 9th, 2011 Daniel Fincke Many who believe that we have free will are what philosophers call “libertarians”. These are not necessarily libertarians in the political sense but in a metaphysical sense. Libertarians conceive of free will as incompatible with determinism. Their notion is that to the extent that our actions are determined by forces or factors which are beyond [...]
Posted in Autonomy, Autonomy, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Disambiguating Faith, Disambiguating Faith, Ethics, Ethics, Faith, Faith, Hypocrisy, Hypocrisy, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy Tags: Determinism, Free Will, Hypocrisy of the moral argument for free will, Libertarian Free Will, The Moral Argument for Free Will 25 Comments »Can Good Teaching Be Measured?
September 8th, 2011 Daniel Fincke In recent posts I have been arguing that if only we interpret the word “good” to mean “effective” we can ground our discussions of values (moral and otherwise) in facts about effectivness. I argue that in that context we can have greater and lesser degrees of goodness, measurable in terms of greater or lesser degrees [...]
Posted in Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Education, Epistemic Justification, Epistemic Justification, Epistemology, Epistemology, Ethics, Ethics, Evidence, Evidence, Intellectual Virtues, Intellectual Virtues, Metaethics, Metaethics, Naturalistic Fallacy, Naturalistic Fallacy, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Teleology, Teleology, Virtues, Virtues 6 Comments »The Contexts, Objective Hierarchies, and Spectra of Goods and Bads (Or “Why Murder Is Bad”)
September 7th, 2011 Daniel Fincke I wrote a post which laid out the cornerstone of my theory of objective value. In it I argued that “goodness equals effectiveness”. Wherever one uses the word “good”, one could substitute the word “effectiveness” and the sentence would mean the same thing. My view is that since effectiveness is clearly a measurable and factual matter [...]
Posted in Applied Ethics, Applied Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Ethics, Ethics, Metaethics, Metaethics, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Teleology, Teleology Tags: Why Murder is Bad, Why Murder is Wrong 7 Comments »Santorum’s Hypocrisy and Backwardness on Questions of Epistemic Authority
September 1st, 2011 Daniel Fincke My thoughts:
Posted in Applied Ethics, Applied Ethics, Christianity, Christianity, Civil Rights, Civil Rights, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Cultural Secularism, Cultural Secularism, Ethics, Faith, Faith, Free Speech, Free Speech, Gay Marriage, Gay Marriage, Gay Rights, Gay Rights, Homophobia, Homophobia, Homosexuality, Homosexuality, Hypocrisy, Hypocrisy, Law, Law, LGBTQAA, Philosophy Of Religion, Political Secularism, Political Secularism, Politics, Politics, Psychology, Psychology, Religion, Religion, Religious Extremism, Religious Extremism, Religious Moderates, Religious Moderates, Religious Rights, Religious Rights, Right Wing Politics, Right Wing Politics, Roman Catholic Church, Roman Catholic Church, Same Sex Marriage, Same Sex Marriage, Secularism, Separation of Church and State, Separation of Church and State, Teleology, Teleology, Theocracy, Theocracy, Theocrats, Theocrats, Videos Tags: Rick Santorum 5 Comments »What I Think About Metaethics
September 1st, 2011 Daniel Fincke To get new readers caught up and to inspire all of you to resume old conversations and to get new ones rolling, periodically I will write posts which tour you through my archive. In each post I will briefly summarize the positions I have taken in the past and provide links to the posts where [...]
Gays, Jesus, and Judging
July 6th, 2011 Daniel Fincke In response to my earlier post praising a young Christian man who reached out with love to what he thought was a lesbian couple being berated by a cruel and judgmental waitress, Justin writes: Not to point out the obvious, but homosexuality is a sin, You have indeed not pointed out anything obvious. Homosexuality is [...]
Posted in Christianity, Christianity, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Ethics, Ethics, Featured, Fundamentalism, Fundamentalism, God, God, Homophobia, Homophobia, Homosexuality, Homosexuality, Jesus, Jesus, LGBTQAA, Morality, Morality, Nietzsche, Nietzsche, Philosophy Of Religion, Religion, Religion Tags: Immoralism, Moral Reformation, Moral Reformers 2 Comments »Is it Too Risky to Debate Morality's Foundations in the Public Square?
February 28th, 2011 Daniel Fincke Jean Kazez argues that the public square is not the place for atheists to be arguing that science and religion are incompatible. I strongly reject her position on this point because not only do I believe that ordinary people are quite capable of handling a vigorous, no-holds-barred debate about religion but because I believe the [...]
Posted in Atheism, Atheism, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Cultural Secularism, Cultural Secularism, Duty, Duty, Epistemic Justification, Epistemic Justification, Epistemology, Ethics, Ethics, Featured, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, Nietzsche, Nietzsche, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Philosophy Of Religion, Politics, Politics, Religion, Religious Extremism, Religious Extremism, Right Wing Politics, Right Wing Politics, Sarah Palin, Sarah Palin, Secularism, Skepticism, Skepticism Tags: J.L. Mackie, Jean Kazez, Jean-Paul Sartre, Moral Anti-Realism, Moral Error Theory, Moral Realism, Pragmatism, Russell Blackford, Sam Harris, The Death of God 8 Comments »The Role Of Honor In Moral Revolutions
February 24th, 2011 Daniel Fincke Kwame Anthony Appiah explores a thesis I’ve never heard before in his new book, The Honor Code: How Moral Revolutions Happen summarized by Matthew Pianalto: Judged by contemporary Western standards, honour has a mixed moral record. On the one hand, a sense of gentlemanly honour underwrote the practice of duelling, long after it had been [...]
Posted in Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Ethics, Ethics, History, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Virtues, Virtues Tags: Honor, Kwame Anthony Appiah, Matthew Pianalto, Moral Revolution, Philosopher's Magazine 4 Comments »Dawkins Against Religion's Claim To Superiority Because It Offers Absolute Morality
February 24th, 2011 Daniel Fincke This is one of the most concise, eloquent, and accurate statements on the problem with religious absolutism in morality and the superiority of secular, non-absolutist approaches to morality I have ever heard. And it is certainly Dawkins’s best 2 and a half minutes on the topic of morality I have ever heard: Thanks to Lucy. [...]
Posted in Atheism, Atheism, Atheism, Atheist Videos, Atheist Videos, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Authority, Authority, Bible, Bible, Christianity, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Ethical Pluralism, Ethical Pluralism, Ethics, Ethics, Fundamentalism, Fundamentalism, Islam, Islam, Koran, Koran, Metaethics, Metaethics, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, Philosophy, Philosophy Of Religion, Religion, Religion, Secularism, Videos Tags: Absolute Morality, Non-Absolute Morality, Richard Dawkins 2 Comments »The Religious Conservative's False Choice: "Big Brother" Or "Heavenly Father"
February 23rd, 2011 Daniel Fincke In an e-mail to me, Caroline proposes thought provoking reasons for non-believers to encourage (or at least to not actively discourage) religious beliefs: It would also be nice if people would carry out actions in good conscience of just being decent human beings rather than in fear of reprisal in the afterlife, but as there [...]
Posted in Applied Ethics, Applied Ethics, Atheism, Atheism, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Authoritarianism, Authoritarianism, Authority, Authority, Autonomy, Autonomy, Christianity, Christianity, Civil Liberties, Civil Liberties, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Cultural Secularism, Cultural Secularism, Duty, Duty, Ethics, Ethics, Featured, Fundamentalism, Fundamentalism, George W. Bush, George W. Bush, Hypocrisy, Hypocrisy, Law, Law, Law & Politics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, News Discussion, News Discussion, Nietzsche, Nietzsche, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Philosophy Of Religion, Political Secularism, Political Secularism, Politics, Politics, Psychology, Psychology, Religion, Religion, Religious Extremism, Religious Extremism, Right Wing Politics, Right Wing Politics, Secularism, Social Psychology, Social Psychology, Sociology, Sociology, Theocrats, Theocrats, Torture, Torture, Virtues, Virtues, World Affairs, World Affairs Tags: Political Philosophy, Social Contract, Victor Frankl 4 Comments »TOP Q: “Do Children Have Higher Moral Status Than Adults?”
February 9th, 2011 Daniel Fincke In his book Moral Status and Human Life: The Case for Children’s Superiority, law professor James Dwyer argues that children are not merely equal to adults in moral status but actually have a higher moral status than adults. Below is a brief video in which he sketches out the broad contours of his thought on moral [...]
Posted in Abortion, Abortion, Applied Ethics, Applied Ethics, Autonomy, Autonomy, Bio-Medical Ethics, Bio-Medical Ethics, Civil Rights, Civil Rights, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Duty, Duty, Ethics, Ethics, Featured, Law, Law, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Teleology, Teleology, Today's Open Philosophical Question (TOP Q) Tags: Children, Children's Rights 2 Comments »Rejecting And Reconciling Moral Intuitionist Ideas With My Naturalist Account Of Goodness
January 30th, 2011 Daniel Fincke In reply to my post, Against Moral Intuitionism, James Gray defended his moral intuitionist leanings against my attacks on them. He starts by quoting me: But many people can be and have been persuaded that goodness is not a property of things but rather of people’s attitudes towards them. The very existence of anti-realists about the existence [...]
Posted in Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Epistemic Justification, Epistemic Justification, Epistemology, Epistemology, Ethics, Ethics, Evidence, Evidence, Featured, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy Tags: Moral Intuitionism, Self-evidence 3 Comments »What Does It Mean For Pleasure And Pain To Be “Intrinsically Instrumental” Goods?
January 30th, 2011 Daniel Fincke In reply to my post, Pleasure And Pain As Intrinsic Instrumental Goods, James objects: You are defining pleasure as intrinsic instrumental good. This is obviously not intrinsic goodness as I define it at all. Instrumental goodness is not intrinsic goodness. A successful pleasure instance is an intrinsically good instance of pleasure in-itself and for-itself, just for being [...]
Posted in Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Ethics, Ethics, Featured, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Torture, Torture Tags: Instrumental Value, Intrinsic Instrumental Value, Intrinsic Value, Objective Value, Pain, Pleasure, Values 6 Comments »Against Moral Intuitionism
January 27th, 2011 Daniel Fincke In the series of posts I began on Sunday and which has continued through this morning, I have developed and defended my naturalistic approach to understanding value as a realist. James Gray, despite being a moral realist, has balked at much in my attempts to do this and it has become increasingly clear that the [...]
Posted in Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Epistemic Justification, Epistemic Justification, Ethics, Ethics, Evidence, Evidence, Featured, Metaethics, Metaethics, Metaphysics, Metaphysics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy Tags: Alasdair MacIntyre, Emotivism, Error Theory, G.E. Moore, Intuitions, Moral Anti-Realism, Moral Intuitionism, Moral Realism, Robert Audi, Values 6 Comments »Pleasure And Pain As Intrinsic Instrumental Goods
January 27th, 2011 Daniel Fincke In recent posts I have been arguing that there is one sense of the word “good” which can be analyzed in terms of facts and that this is the kind of “goodness” which we can consider a real part of the world. This real, intrinsic, factual sense of goodness is its meaning as “effectiveness”. We [...]
Posted in Applied Ethics, Applied Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Autonomy, Autonomy, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Ethics, Ethics, Featured, Historical Ethics, Historical Ethics, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Nietzsche, Nietzsche, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Problem of Evil, Problem of Evil, Teleology, Teleology, Torture, Torture, Virtues, Virtues Tags: Bernard Reginster, Pain, Pains, Pleasure, Pleasures, Will to Power 5 Comments »Non-Reductionistic Analysis Of Values Into Facts
January 27th, 2011 Daniel Fincke I have recently been arguing that the term good: must be cashed out in fact terms lest it just be a projection of our preferences and nothing more. [And] if it means anything objective, it means effectiveness. In reply, James Gray accuses me of reductionism: One, “good” does not have be defined in non-good terms. [...]
Posted in Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Ethical Pluralism, Ethical Pluralism, Ethics, Ethics, Featured, Metaethics, Metaethics, Metaphysics, Metaphysics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Naturalistic Fallacy, Naturalistic Fallacy, Nietzsche, Nietzsche, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Mind, Teleology, Teleology Tags: Good, Immoralism, Intrinsic Goods, Metaphysics of Value, Natural Good, Non-Good Terms, Non-Reductionism, Reductionism, Values 8 Comments »What Is Happiness And Why Is It Good?
January 24th, 2011 Daniel Fincke In this post, I explore the meanings and worths of two phenomena recognized by our language as of happiness, in reply to remarks by James Gray on my most recent post. For a little background for those joining late and who would like to catch up: I have been arguing in several posts now that goodness [...]
Posted in Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Ethics, Ethics, Featured, Historical Ethics, Historical Ethics, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Teleology, Teleology, Virtues, Virtues Tags: Happiness 13 Comments »Effectiveness Is The Primary Goal In Itself, Not Merely A Means
January 24th, 2011 Daniel Fincke In a recent post I argued that goodness, objectively speaking, means effectiveness. Of course we use the word “good” for numerous purposes, to express that we find something pleasant, desirable, useful, advantageous to our interests, etc. But I want to argue that when it comes to the facts of reality, goodness has only this one essential [...]
Posted in Atheism, Atheism, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Ethics, Ethics, Featured, Metaethics, Metaethics, Morality, Morality, Naturalistic Fallacy, Naturalistic Fallacy, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Teleology, Teleology, Virtues, Virtues 25 Comments »Grounding Objective Value Independent Of Human Interests And Moralities
January 23rd, 2011 Daniel Fincke In my most recent philosophical post, I have finally explained one of the most fundamental premises necessary for explaining and justifying my overall views on ethics. I explained my view that goodness objectively means effectiveness and that all further true ideas of “good” should be understood only as derivative from the basic good of effectiveness. Also [...]
Posted in Atheism, Atheism, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Ethics, Ethics, Featured, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Naturalistic Fallacy, Naturalistic Fallacy, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Teleology, Teleology, Virtues, Virtues 12 Comments »Goodness Is A Factual Matter (Goodness=Effectiveness)
January 23rd, 2011 Daniel Fincke All statements about values can be restated as statements of facts. The truth or falsity about value claims can be discovered by investigations of facts. Goodness is a word that can be defined by reference to certain kinds of factual relationships in the world. Whether or not something deserves to be called good can be [...]
Posted in Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Ethics, Ethics, Featured, Metaethics, Metaethics, Naturalistic Fallacy, Naturalistic Fallacy, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Teleology, Teleology Tags: Good, Goodness, Hypothetical Imperatives, Value, Value Theory 26 Comments »I Am A Moral Naturalist, Not A Subjectivist
January 20th, 2011 Daniel Fincke In a long comment on my post from this morning, George raised the question of usage of “subjectivism” beyond my own interpretation of the word. Let’s look to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, which should be as neutral an adjudicating source as the English-speaking philosophy world has. I selected this source for its independent, encyclopedia character [...]
Posted in Atheism, Atheism, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Authority, Authority, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Ethical Pluralism, Ethical Pluralism, Ethics, Ethics, Featured, Metaethics, Metaethics, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Teleology, Teleology Tags: Divine Command Theory, Moral Relativism, Moral Subjectivism, Objectivist Relativism, Subjectivist Relativism, Voluntarism 8 Comments »
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