I argue in my moral philosophy that our highest ethical goods are to maximally flourish in our power and in our will to power. When I say this, many immediately assume that my ethics must be quite at odds with the sorts of concerns for selfless respect for duty and for the autonomy of all [...]
Archive for the ‘Ethics’ Category
Why Be Morally Dutiful, Fair, or Self-Sacrificing If The Ethical Life Is About Power?
November 17th, 2011
Daniel Fincke
Posted in Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Duty, Duty, Ethical Pluralism, Ethical Pluralism, Ethics, Ethics, Historical Ethics, Historical Ethics, Historical Philosophy, Historical Philosophy, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Nietzsche, Nietzsche, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Teleology, Virtues, Virtues
Tags: Kant's moral philosophy
8 Comments »The Universe Does Not Care About Our Morality. But So What?
November 16th, 2011
Daniel Fincke Towards the end of my dialogue on immoralism, I discussed, through the voice of one of my characters, my view that there can be relatively objective moralities. In reply, Jesse writes: I saw your post on objective goods and it till doesn’t work for me. I still get back to the question of what an [...]
Emma Goldman’s “The Victims of Morality”
November 14th, 2011
Daniel Fincke In reply to my dialogue which I posted this morning examining what I perceive to be immoralism’s important contributions to moral thinking and its inevitable limits, a reader sent me to investigate Max Stirner and Emma Goldman. I may have something to say about Stirner in the future if time permits. But for now I [...]
Posted in Applied Ethics, Applied Ethics, Atheism, Atheism, Atheism, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Authority, Authority, Autonomy, Autonomy, Christianity, Christianity, Ethics, Ethics, Feminism, Feminism, Historical Ethics, Historical Ethics, Historical Philosophy, Historical Philosophy, Morality, Morality, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, Nietzsche, Nietzsche, Religion, Religion, Religious Extremism, Religious Extremism, Separation of Church and State, Separation of Church and State, Theocrats, Theocrats, Women's Rights, Women's Rights, Women's Rights, Women's Rights, Women's Issues
7 Comments »Immoralism?
November 14th, 2011
Daniel Fincke Taylor: I’ve been reading a lot of Nietzsche of late, like you recommended. Pat: Oh? And what do you think? What are you taking away from it? Taylor: I really like what he has to say about immoralism. I realized I am an immoralist. Pat: How so? How are you interpreting that word? Taylor: Well, he makes this really fascinating [...]
Posted in Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Authority, Authority, Autonomy, Autonomy, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Ethical Pluralism, Ethical Pluralism, Ethics, Ethics, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Nietzsche, Nietzsche, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy
10 Comments »Bullying or Debating? Religious Privilege or Freedom of Speech?
November 13th, 2011
Daniel Fincke Jaime: Did you see the Republicans just endorsed the right to bully in schools as long as it’s done in the name of religion. Kelly: They did not. Jaime: Yes. They did. They perversely added to anti-bullying bill the right to bully as long as such bullying was based on “sincerely held religious or moral convictions.” [...]
Posted in Applied Ethics, Applied Ethics, Atheism, Atheism, Atheism, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Ethical Pluralism, Ethical Pluralism, Ethics, Ethics, Free Speech, Free Speech, Homophobia, Homophobia, Homosexuality, Homosexuality, Law, Law, Law & Politics, LGBTQAA, Morality, Morality, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, News, News Discussion, News Discussion, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy Of Religion, Political Secularism, Political Secularism, Politics, Politics, Racism, Religion, Religion, Religious Extremism, Religious Extremism, Religious Rights, Religious Rights, Right Wing Politics, Right Wing Politics, Same Sex Marriage, Same Sex Marriage, Secularism, Separation of Church and State, Separation of Church and State, Theocrats, Theocrats
Tags: John Rawls, Libertarianism, Tolerance
33 Comments »A Critique of Noble Lies And The “Theologies” They Create
November 10th, 2011
Daniel Fincke In this long post, I begin by explaining Plato’s formulation of the concept of a noble lie for those unfamiliar with it and then I explain in detail numerous problems I see with employing noble lies and with attempts to persuade people through “theological” arguments. I think all theology is either an explicit or an [...]
Posted in Applied Ethics, Applied Ethics, Atheism, Atheism, Atheism, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Authoritarianism, Authoritarianism, Cultural Secularism, Cultural Secularism, Ethics, Ethics, Historical Ethics, Historical Ethics, Historical Philosophy, History, Hypocrisy, Hypocrisy, Intellectual Vices, Intellectual Vices, Intellectual Virtues, Intellectual Virtues, Law, Law, Law & Politics, Morality, Morality, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, News Discussion, News Discussion, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Philosophy Of Religion, Political Secularism, Political Secularism, Politics, Politics, Religion, Religion, Religion and Science, Religious Extremism, Religious Extremism, Religious Moderates, Religious Moderates, Religious Secularism, Religious Secularism, Right Wing Politics, Right Wing Politics, Secularism, Separation of Church and State, Separation of Church and State, Theocracy, Theocracy, Theocrats, Theocrats, Virtues, Virtues
34 Comments »Qualia Soup on Morality Part 3: Of Objectivity and Oughts
November 6th, 2011
Daniel Fincke Qualia Soup makes the case for a J.L. Mackie sort of subjectivism in ethics against William Lane Craig. I think more can be said for objectivity than he allows. As I summarized last week, in my own objections to Craig’s positions: I, for one, am convinced atheists can have a perfectly fine naturalistic ontology of objective goodness, which allows us [...]
Posted in Ethics, Ethics, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Naturalistic Fallacy, Naturalistic Fallacy, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy
Tags: David Hume, Defense of Moral Subjectivism, Error Theory, J.L. Mackie, Projectivism
No Comments »Some People Live Better As Short-Lived Football or Boxing Stars Than As Long Lived Philosophers
October 26th, 2011
Daniel Fincke I have argued in several posts that our good is to maximally flourish in our powers and recently I wrote that “it is a practical contradiction to destroy (or reduce on net) the preconditions of one’s own being.” In reply, Russell Turpin writes: There are myriad examples of people committing suicide or sacrificing their lives [...]
Posted in Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Ethical Pluralism, Ethical Pluralism, Ethics, Ethics, Metaethics, Metaethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Teleology, Teleology, Virtues, Virtues
Tags: Desires, Judging Desires, Objective Flourishing, Practical Contradictions, Rational Desires, True Desires
7 Comments »Natural Functions
October 24th, 2011
Daniel Fincke I have argued several times that objective goodness, factually speaking, tracks objective effectiveness. To say that something is good, in objective terms, is to say that it effectively (i.e., in fact) functions in such a way that it realizes a kind of being (such that it is a good instance of that kind of being), [...]
Force and Reason
October 21st, 2011
Daniel Fincke In previous posts (like Rational Passional Persuasion and On Zealously, Tentatively, and Perspectivally Holding Viewpoints) I have argued that there is a proper place for emotional appeals as part of a rational argument. In the last couple of weeks, though, I have also argued firmly against certain kinds of emotional appeals that I consider abusive, counter-productive, and hypocritical [...]
Posted in Applied Ethics, Applied Ethics, Authority, Authority, Autonomy, Autonomy, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Epistemic Justification, Epistemic Justification, Epistemology, Epistemology, Ethics, Ethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Virtues, Virtues
Tags: Coercion, Emotional Appeals, Emotional Persuasion, Emotions in Reason, Emotivism, Force of Reason, Manipulation, Objective Valuing, Perspectivalism, Persuasion, Rational Appeals, Rational Force, Rational Persuasion, Rationality, Reason and Emotion, Subjective Valuing, Values
15 Comments »From Is To Ought: How Normativity Fits Into Naturalism
October 19th, 2011
Daniel Fincke In a previous post, I laid out a number of reasons that people think values cannot be grounded in naturalistic ways or that if they were they would be values which would threaten vulnerable groups. In this post, I want to address the charge of the naturalistic fallacy: i.e., the claim that you cannot derive [...]
Fighting The Dictionary
October 18th, 2011
Daniel Fincke Ophelia wrote an insightful, controversial paragraph: Churches don’t do education. Religion doesn’t do education. Churches and religion do religion, which is different from education. Education is what schools do. It is fundamentally secular – it is about the world, and exploring and learning about the world. Like newspapers, like forensics, like medicine, like so many human institutions, [...]
Posted in Applied Ethics, Applied Ethics, Atheism, Atheism, Atheism, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Cultural Secularism, Cultural Secularism, Education, Ethical Pluralism, Ethical Pluralism, Ethics, Ethics, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Language, Secularism
20 Comments »Judging Yourself Truthfully
October 15th, 2011
Daniel Fincke One of the most important mental disciplines is to assess yourself honestly. We are so naturally susceptible to judging ourselves according to both the flattery of our admirers and of our own ego, on the one hand, and the disdain of our detractors and our own irrational fears, on the other. It takes a lot [...]
Nietzsche: We Cannot “Selflessly” Investigate Morality
October 14th, 2011
Daniel Fincke Nietzsche writes a lot of things which attack the ideal of selflessness. Yet he does not make any blanket call for an ideal of unmitigated, small-minded selfishness. He calls for certain kinds of self-concern and in some cases certain kinds of self-denial in the pursuit of higher purposes or higher ideals of self-cultivation. Rather than [...]
Posted in Atheism, Atheism, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Autonomy, Autonomy, Epistemic Justification, Epistemic Justification, Epistemology, Epistemology, Ethical Pluralism, Ethical Pluralism, Ethics, Ethics, Evidence, Evidence, Historical Ethics, Historical Ethics, Historical Philosophy, Intellectual Virtues, Intellectual Virtues, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Nietzsche, Nietzsche, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy
6 Comments »Homosexuality As Naturally Good Part 1: Laying Out Objections To Ethical Naturalism, Some On Behalf Of Gays
October 13th, 2011
Daniel Fincke I intend to lay out the case for the ethical goodness of homosexuality for homosexual people in a way that is consistent with my funadmentally naturalistic ethical theory. Many philosophers, natural scientists, social scientists, and laypeople alike are averse about trying to base ethical judgments on appeals to nature. And there are a number of [...]
Posted in Applied Ethics, Applied Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Ethical Pluralism, Ethical Pluralism, Ethics, Ethics, Evolution, Evolution, Gay Marriage, Gay Marriage, Gay Rights, Gay Rights, Homosexuality, Homosexuality, LGBTQAA, Love, Love, Metaethics, Metaethics, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Teleology, Teleology
Tags: Ethical Naturalism, Naturalistic Fallacy, Objections to Ethical Naturalism
8 Comments »Love Religious People (Tip 10 of 10 For Reaching Out To Religious Believers)
October 10th, 2011
Daniel Fincke Top Ten Tips For Reaching Out To Religious Believers: 1. Don’t Call Religious Believers Stupid. 2. Make Believers Stay on Topic During Debates. 3. Don’t Tell Religious Believers What They “Really Believe”. 4. Clarify What Kinds of Evidence Warrant What Kinds of Beliefs. 5. Help Break The Spell Of Religious Reverence. 6. Don’t Demonize Religious [...]
Posted in Applied Ethics, Atheism, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Ethics, Ethics, Intellectual Vices, Intellectual Vices, Intellectual Virtues, Intellectual Virtues, Love, Love, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, Philosophy, Virtues, Virtues
Tags: "Love The Religious Hate The Religion", "Love The Sinner Hate The Sin"
10 Comments »Nietzsche: “‘Good’ Is No Longer Good When One’s Neighbor Mouths It”
September 26th, 2011
Daniel Fincke I argued yesterday that Nietzsche believes that there are objective standards of value for assessing divergent moralities. In reply, Juno (of the blog Letters from Le Vrai) asks what I would make of Section 43 of Beyond Good and Evil which reads, in full, as follows: Are these coming philosophers new friends of “truth”? That is probable enough, for [...]
Posted in Atheism, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Autonomy, Autonomy, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Epistemology, Epistemology, Ethical Pluralism, Ethical Pluralism, Ethics, Ethics, Historical Ethics, Historical Ethics, Historical Philosophy, Historical Philosophy, Intellectual Virtues, Intellectual Virtues, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, Nietzsche, Nietzsche, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Virtues, Virtues
3 Comments »Nietzsche: Moral Absolutism and Moral Relativism Are “Equally Childish”
September 25th, 2011
Daniel Fincke Recently Joel Marks, a career moral philosopher, concluded that the moral certitude he has felt and argued for his entire career was built as much on faith as many theists’ belief in God is. And in response he swung radically in the opposite direction and came to believe that there can be no rational objectivity [...]
Posted in Atheism, Atheism, Atheism, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Ethical Pluralism, Ethical Pluralism, Ethics, Ethics, Historical Ethics, Historical Ethics, Historical Philosophy, Historical Philosophy, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, Nietzsche, Nietzsche, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Teleology, Teleology
22 Comments »The Facts About Intrinsic and Instrumental Goods and The Cultural Construction of Intrinsic Goods
September 23rd, 2011
Daniel Fincke In this post I want to say something which many would find radical and would assume is impossible and clearly false: I want to say that it can be a fact whether something is intrinsically good in some particular respect, for some particular being. A major part of this requires that I distinguish another kind of [...]
The Moral Toll of Executions on the Consciences of Executioners
September 22nd, 2011
Daniel Fincke Allen Ault is the retired director of the Georgia Department of Corrections and former warden of the Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison which handled Troy Davis. Ault oversaw executions for the state of Georgia. He is now Eastern Kentucky University’s dean of “College of Justice and Society” and well-informed from an academic perspective about the [...]
Posted in Applied Ethics, Applied Ethics, Authoritarianism, Authoritarianism, Civil Rights, Civil Rights, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Ethics, Ethics, Law, Law, Law & Politics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, News, News Discussion, News Discussion, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Politics, Politics, Videos
Tags: Allen Ault, Anti-Death Penalty, Death Penalty, Dennis O'Neill, Ed Schultz, Ed Show, Effects of Executions on Executioners, Georgia Department of Corrections, Georgia Diagnostic and Classification Prison, Jeanne Woodford, Rachel Maddow, Reginald Wilkinson, Rick Perry, Ron McAndrew, Terry Collins, Troy Anthony Davis, Troy Davis
7 Comments »On The Ethics of “Sugar Daddies” and “Sugar Babies”
September 21st, 2011
Daniel Fincke Kelly: Did you hear about this “sugar daddy” and “sugar baby” phenomenon wherein college girls are whoring themselves out through the internet to skeevy rich older men so they can pay for their college educations? It makes me sick to think that for these girls an education costs their bodies. These kids have to sell [...]
Posted in Applied Ethics, Applied Ethics, Autonomy, Autonomy, Ethics, Ethics, Feminism, Feminism, Love, Love, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Sex, Virtues, Virtues, Women's Issues
Tags: Vices
34 Comments »Defining Intrinsic Goodness, Using Marriage As An Example
September 20th, 2011
Daniel Fincke The other day, I wrote a post exploring a major reason that getting away without penalties would not be enough to make at least some kinds of wrongdoing in our best interests. I was taking one of a few possible tacks at answering Glaucon’s question in Plato’s Republic as to how being a just person might be [...]
Moral Perfectionism, Moral Pragmatism, Free Love Ethics, and Adultery
September 19th, 2011
Daniel Fincke Kelly: You are a moral absolutist, Jaime. Jaime: Nonsense. You are the one who wants to impose monogamy on everyone, whether they like it or not. Kelly: No, when we talked the other day, I conceded it was your right to have whatever kinds of open relationships you wanted. I only said that, given human [...]
Posted in Applied Ethics, Applied Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Autonomy, Autonomy, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Duty, Duty, Ethical Pluralism, Ethical Pluralism, Ethics, Ethics, Love, Love, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Psychology, Psychology, Sex, Virtues, Virtues
Tags: Adultery, Anti-Adultery, Anti-Monogamy, Changes in Moral Values, Consequentialism, Marriage, Monogamy, Moral Absolutism, Moral Idealism, Moral Institutions, Moral Perfectionism, Moral Revisionism, Moral Values, Non-Moral Values, Pleasure and Pain, Polyamory, Promiscuity, Utilitarianism
60 Comments »Why Getting Away With Wrongdoing Does Not Make It Worth It
September 18th, 2011
Daniel Fincke This past week across numerous different classes I am teaching in both ancient philosophy and ethics, I have been talking with my students about Plato’s Republic, Book II. We have discussed whether there would be any intrinsic goodness to justice such that it would be in our interests to choose just courses of action even [...]
On Rejecting Faith in Morality
September 16th, 2011
Daniel Fincke Update: Joel Marks has replied to this post and to my first follow up post. I have reedited this post to incorporate his remarks at the end. Joel Marks is at the Center for Bioethics at Yale University and is professor emeritus of philosophy at the University of New Haven. Though writing on ethics throughout [...]
Posted in Atheism, Atheism, Atheism, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Christianity, Christianity, Ethics, Ethics, Love, Love, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Nietzsche, Nietzsche, Personal, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Skepticism, Skepticism
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