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In a recent post, I wrote the following: Changing people’s minds to make them stop holding positions dogmatically and instead hold them tentatively is still a change of mind one may zealously pursue. On Facebook, Greg writes in reply: I want to address the peculiarity of this statement. One may passionately pursue such a change [...]
Archive for the ‘Epistemic Justification’ Category
On Zealously, Tentatively, and Perspectivally Holding Viewpoints
March 2nd, 2011 
Daniel Fincke 
Posted in Epistemic Justification, Epistemic Justification, Epistemology, Epistemology, Featured, Intellectual Virtues, Intellectual Virtues, Nietzsche, Nietzsche, Personal, Philosophy, Skepticism, Skepticism 
Tags: Nietzsche's Perspectivism, Nietzsche's Perspectivist Theory of Truth, Perspectival Epistemology, Perspectivalism 
5 Comments »The Flexibility of the Word "Evangelical"
March 1st, 2011 Daniel Fincke In a previous post, I conceded that it was acceptable to call at least some activist atheists like me “evangelical atheists” on some possible senses of the word “evangelical”. Greg wanted to say that this could not be so because all that atheists do (or should) advocate is tentative, skeptical empiricism, and that we do not (or should [...]
Is it Too Risky to Debate Morality's Foundations in the Public Square?
February 28th, 2011 Daniel Fincke Jean Kazez argues that the public square is not the place for atheists to be arguing that science and religion are incompatible. I strongly reject her position on this point because not only do I believe that ordinary people are quite capable of handling a vigorous, no-holds-barred debate about religion but because I believe the [...]
Posted in Atheism, Atheism, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Cultural Secularism, Cultural Secularism, Duty, Duty, Epistemic Justification, Epistemic Justification, Epistemology, Ethics, Ethics, Featured, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, Nietzsche, Nietzsche, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Philosophy Of Religion, Politics, Politics, Religion, Religious Extremism, Religious Extremism, Right Wing Politics, Right Wing Politics, Sarah Palin, Sarah Palin, Secularism, Skepticism, Skepticism Tags: J.L. Mackie, Jean Kazez, Jean-Paul Sartre, Moral Anti-Realism, Moral Error Theory, Moral Realism, Pragmatism, Russell Blackford, Sam Harris, The Death of God 8 Comments »Defending The Apparent Truth Of Evolution's Mindlessness
February 21st, 2011 Daniel Fincke Last Christmas Eve, I argued that the belief that God “guided evolution” was not a rationally respectable way to reconcile science with faith but rather it was essentially an effective denial of the theory of natural selection, in its scientifically explanatory sense. Part of the revolutionary character of the discovery of evolution by natural selection [...]
Posted in Arguments Against The Existence of God, Arguments Against The Existence of God, Arguments for the Existence of God, Arguments for the Existence of God, Atheism, Atheism, Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Biology, Biology, Creationism, Creationism, Cultural Secularism, Cultural Secularism, Epistemic Justification, Epistemic Justification, Epistemology, Epistemology, Evidence, Evidence, Evolution, Evolution, Featured, Fundamentalism, Fundamentalism, God, God, Historical Philosophy, Intelligent Design, Intelligent Design, Metaphysics, Metaphysics, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, Philosophy Of Religion, Philosophy of Science, Philosophy of Science, Political Secularism, Political Secularism, Politics, Politics, Religion, Religion, Religion and Science, Religious Extremism, Religious Extremism, Religious Moderates, Religious Moderates, Right Wing Politics, Right Wing Politics, Science, Secularism Tags: Alvin Plantinga, Eugenie Scott, Huston Smith, Jerry Coyne, National Association of Biology Teachers (NABT), National Center for Science Education (NCSE) 4 Comments »Atheists Have Affirmative Positions On The Status Of Evidence And On The Standards Of Belief
February 21st, 2011 Daniel Fincke In reply to my defense of what is sometimes called “Evangelical Atheism” on my personal Facebook page, Greg Teed thinks my account comes “so close” to correct but argues that I missed something crucial: All good points, but there is a radical difference *in kind* between what atheists/skeptics promote and what the religious evangelical proselytizes. Sometimes [...]
Rejecting And Reconciling Moral Intuitionist Ideas With My Naturalist Account Of Goodness
January 30th, 2011 Daniel Fincke In reply to my post, Against Moral Intuitionism, James Gray defended his moral intuitionist leanings against my attacks on them. He starts by quoting me: But many people can be and have been persuaded that goodness is not a property of things but rather of people’s attitudes towards them. The very existence of anti-realists about the existence [...]
Posted in Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Epistemic Justification, Epistemic Justification, Epistemology, Epistemology, Ethics, Ethics, Evidence, Evidence, Featured, Metaethics, Metaethics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy Tags: Moral Intuitionism, Self-evidence 3 Comments »Against Moral Intuitionism
January 27th, 2011 Daniel Fincke In the series of posts I began on Sunday and which has continued through this morning, I have developed and defended my naturalistic approach to understanding value as a realist. James Gray, despite being a moral realist, has balked at much in my attempts to do this and it has become increasingly clear that the [...]
Posted in Atheistic Ethics, Atheistic Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Contemporary Ethics, Epistemic Justification, Epistemic Justification, Ethics, Ethics, Evidence, Evidence, Featured, Metaethics, Metaethics, Metaphysics, Metaphysics, Moral Psychology, Moral Psychology, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy Tags: Alasdair MacIntyre, Emotivism, Error Theory, G.E. Moore, Intuitions, Moral Anti-Realism, Moral Intuitionism, Moral Realism, Robert Audi, Values 6 Comments »Disambiguating Faith: Faith Which Exploits Infinitesimal Probabilities As Openings For Strong Affirmations
January 8th, 2011 Daniel Fincke Pete C. argues that because our comprehension is limited, it is hubris for us to rule out faith in things that alleged to go beyond it: I’m not sure where I fall in the spectrum of agnosticism (if i belong there at all) so I can’t really self identify. But I will offer an explanation [...]
Posted in Arguments Against The Existence of God, Arguments Against The Existence of God, Arguments for the Existence of God, Arguments for the Existence of God, Atheism, Atheism, Disambiguating Faith, Disambiguating Faith, Epistemic Justification, Epistemic Justification, Epistemology, Epistemology, Evidence, Evidence, Faith, Faith, Featured, God, God, Intellectual Vices, Intellectual Vices, Intellectual Virtues, Intellectual Virtues, Metaphysics, Metaphysics, Philosophy, Philosophy Of Religion, Spinoza, Spinoza 2 Comments »TOP Q (7): When, If Ever, Are Intellectual Mistakes Morally Culpable?
January 7th, 2011 Daniel Fincke Can we morally blame people for failing to pursue the truth well enough or for employing irrational methods of belief formation? Is belief something not in our volitional control at all? Is it an entirely passive thing to “just believe” something? Or even if we have some volitional control over what we believe, does it [...]
Posted in Applied Ethics, Applied Ethics, Epistemic Justification, Epistemic Justification, Epistemology, Epistemology, Ethics, Ethics, Faith, Faith, Intellectual Vices, Intellectual Vices, Intellectual Virtues, Intellectual Virtues, Morality, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy Tags: Blameworthy Beliefs, Epistemic Duties, Ethics of Belief, Free Will, Praiseworthy Beliefs, Virtue Epistemology 3 Comments »Disambiguating Faith: The Evidence-Impervious Agnostic Theists
December 29th, 2010 Daniel Fincke A vast majority of believers, though probably not all, believed in God before they ever encountered any arguments for its existence. For obvious cultural and psychological reasons, the concept of God is intuitively understandable and believable for most children and by far most believers start believing in childhood. Even those who spend a short time as [...]
Posted in Arguments Against The Existence of God, Arguments Against The Existence of God, Arguments for the Existence of God, Arguments for the Existence of God, Atheism, Atheism, Disambiguating Faith, Disambiguating Faith, Epistemic Justification, Epistemic Justification, Epistemology, Epistemology, Evidence, Faith, Faith, Featured, God, God, Philosophy, Philosophy Of Religion, Religion, Religion, Why I Am Not A Christian, Why I Am Not A Christian 21 Comments »Agnostics Or Apistics?
October 27th, 2010 Daniel Fincke In the past, I have defended the idea that rather than classifying people simply as atheists, agnostics, and theists that we should separate the questions of the contents of beliefs (whether they are atheistic or theistic) from whether one’s atheism or theism is held as a matter of knowledge or not. If one’s theism is [...]
Posted in Atheism, Atheism, Disambiguating Faith, Disambiguating Faith, Epistemic Justification, Epistemic Justification, Epistemology, Epistemology, Faith, Faith, Featured, God, God, Philosophy, Philosophy Of Religion Tags: Agnostic Atheism, Agnostic Theism, Agnosticism, Apistic Agnostic Atheism, Gnostic Atheism, Gnostic Theism, Pistic Agnostic Atheism 33 Comments »Disambiguating Belief
August 8th, 2010 Daniel Fincke Ophelia Benson counters a common and deeply misleading equivocation (one I counter often, but most specifically addressed here and here): Belief is about truth; it equates to”it is true that X”. It is thus cognitive rather than emotive. It seems odd to me to ask if it would be better to believe the things I [...]
Typical Mind Fallacy: The Limits Of Generalizing From One Example
July 8th, 2010 Daniel Fincke “Everyone generalizes from one example. At least, I do.” – Vlad Taltos (Issola, Steven Brust) My old professor, David Berman, liked to talk about what he called the “typical mind fallacy”, which he illustrated through the following example: There was a debate, in the late 1800s, about whether “imagination” was simply a turn of phrase [...]
Posted in Daniel Dennett, Daniel Dennett, Epistemic Justification, Epistemic Justification, Epistemology, Epistemology, Evidence, Evidence, Historical Philosophy, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Mind Tags: Behaviorists, Berkeley, David Berman, Generalization, Gilbert Ryle, Less Wrong, Typical Mind Fallacy No Comments »Do New Atheists Unjustifiably Shirk Their Burden For Evidence?
July 7th, 2010 Daniel Fincke Michael Antony has an interesting but problematic article in Philosophy Now exploring whether “New Atheism” holds itself to a double standard when it comes to rules of evidence. He argues that New Atheists dismiss religious belief explicitly on “evidentialist” epistemic criteria whereby we must always proportion our belief to evidence, but at the same time, [...]
Posted in Atheism, Atheism, Christopher Hitchens, Christopher Hitchens, Cultural Secularism, Cultural Secularism, Epistemic Justification, Epistemic Justification, Epistemology, Epistemology, Evidence, Evidence, Featured, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, New Atheism, Philosophy, PZ Myers, PZ Myers, Religion, Religion, Secularism 9 Comments »Disambiguating Faith: Implicit Faith
July 5th, 2010 Daniel Fincke In last night’s installment of the “Disambiguating Faith” series, I talked about the difference between, on the one hand, volitionally choosing to believe something that is either not rationally warranted or which is positively refuted by the available evidence, and, on the other hand, simply thinking one has rational warrant for one’s belief and yet [...]
Posted in Disambiguating Faith, Disambiguating Faith, Epistemic Justification, Epistemic Justification, Epistemology, Faith, Faith, Featured, Intellectual Vices, Intellectual Vices, Intellectual Virtues, Intellectual Virtues, Philosophy, Religion, Religion Tags: Cognitive Dissonance, Implicit Faith No Comments »Disambiguating Faith: Defending My Definition Of Faith As “Belief Or Trust Beyond Rational Warrant”
July 5th, 2010 Daniel Fincke Last week I responded to David Crowther’s argument that we should equally consider all beliefs that are not 100% certain to be “faith beliefs”. I argued that the word “belief” already covers the fact that we are fallible human beings and as such even our most nearly 100% certain propositions about the world are always [...]
Posted in Authority, Authority, Disambiguating Faith, Disambiguating Faith, Epistemic Justification, Epistemic Justification, Epistemology, Epistemology, Faith, Faith, Featured, Intellectual Vices, Intellectual Vices, Intellectual Virtues, Intellectual Virtues, Philosophy, Philosophy Of Religion, Religion, Religion Tags: Faith As Loyalty, Faith as Trust, Loyalty, Trust, Trustworthiness, Volition, Volitional Disposition, Volitional Faith 9 Comments »The Cosmological Argument, The Composition Fallacy, And More Reasons Not To Believe In God
July 3rd, 2010 Daniel Fincke Shane Wilkins, a graduate student in philosophy at Fordham (where we were fellow students and colleagues until just recently), has been an invaluable regular commentator at Camels With Hammers. He has served as my primary theistic foil since the beginning, when our 7-part debate (which started with my post Objections to Religious Moderates and Intellecuals 1) propelled this [...]
Posted in Arguments Against The Existence of God, Arguments Against The Existence of God, Arguments for the Existence of God, Arguments for the Existence of God, Atheism, Atheism, Christianity, Christianity, Epistemic Justification, Epistemic Justification, Epistemology, Epistemology, Featured, Historical Philosophy, Jesus, Jesus, Metaphysics, Metaphysics, Philosophy, Religion, Spinoza, Spinoza, Why I Am Not A Christian, Why I Am Not A Christian Tags: Composition Fallacy, Compositional Wholes No Comments »Disambiguating Faith: Not All Beliefs Held Without Certainty Are Faith Beliefs
June 30th, 2010 Daniel Fincke David Crowther raises a crucial point of contention: What I really want to do, is get back to the question of whether atheism is necessarily a “faith position”. If we generalize the term “faith” to mean believing or relying on something without absolute proof, than I think it is true to say that every possible [...]
Posted in Disambiguating Faith, Disambiguating Faith, Epistemic Justification, Epistemic Justification, Epistemology, Epistemology, Faith, Faith, Featured, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Language, Religion and Science, Science, Science, Skepticism, Skepticism Tags: Beliefs, Certainty, Skepticism 18 Comments »Beyond Agnosticism: More Details About How I Know Various Kinds Of Gods Do Not Exist, Based On Scientific And Philosophical Reasons
June 30th, 2010 Daniel Fincke While I agree with, and vigorously defend, the notion that there is an important difference between lacking a belief in gods (as an agnostic atheist) and believing there are no gods (as a gnostic atheist), I also think that atheists should not, based on the best available scientific evidence and philosophical arguments, merely lack belief [...]
Posted in Arguments Against The Existence of God, Arguments Against The Existence of God, Arguments for the Existence of God, Arguments for the Existence of God, Atheism, Atheism, Christianity, Christianity, Epistemic Justification, Epistemic Justification, Epistemology, Epistemology, Evidence, Evidence, Evolution, Evolution, Featured, God, God, Intelligent Design, Intelligent Design, Metaphysics, Metaphysics, Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Mind, Problem of Evil, Problem of Evil, Religion, Religion, Roman Catholic Church, Roman Catholic Church, Skepticism, Skepticism, Why I Am Not A Christian, Why I Am Not A Christian Tags: Agnosticism, Personal God 9 Comments »No, I’m Not An Atheist By Faith, Here Are My Arguments.
June 29th, 2010 Daniel Fincke Yesterday Ron Rosenbaum aggressively attacked atheism and defended agnosticism in Slate. He starts out with the familiar charge that atheists have “faith”. But faith in what? Atheists display a credulous and childlike faith, worship a certainty as yet unsupported by evidence—the certainty that they can or will be able to explain how and why the [...]
Posted in Arguments Against The Existence of God, Arguments Against The Existence of God, Arguments for the Existence of God, Arguments for the Existence of God, Atheism, Atheism, Cosmology, Cosmology, Disambiguating Faith, Disambiguating Faith, Epistemic Justification, Epistemic Justification, Epistemology, Epistemology, Ethics, Evidence, Evidence, Faith, Faith, Featured, God, God, Metaphysics, Metaphysics, Philosophy, Physics, Physics, Religion, Religion 45 Comments »Disambiguating Faith: Why Faith Is Unethical (Or “In Defense Of The Ethical Obligation To Always Proportion Belief To Evidence”)
June 21st, 2010 Daniel Fincke A couple of weeks ago, I argued that there was a real distinction between “lacking a belief in any God or gods” on the one hand and “believing there is no God (or gods)” on the other hand. Primarily I saw the heart of the distinction as resting with the difference between on the one [...]
Posted in Applied Ethics, Atheism, Atheistic Ethics, Authority, Autonomy, Contemporary Ethics, Cultural Secularism, Disambiguating Faith, Duty, Epistemic Justification, Epistemology, Ethical Pluralism, Ethics, Evidence, Faith, Featured, Intellectual Vices, Intellectual Virtues, Law, Metaethics, Morality, Philosophical Ethics, Philosophy, Political Secularism, Politics, Rationalism, Religion, Religious Extremism, Secularism, Separation of Church and State, Skepticism, Teleology, Virtues, Why I Am Not A Christian Tags: Agnostic Atheism, Agnostic Theism, Belief, Belief Apportioned To Evidence, Evolutionary Epistemology, Evolutionary Ethics, Gnostic Atheism, Gnostic Theism, Indirect Consequentialism, Moral Formalism, Moral Rationalism, Principle of Sufficient Reason, Rational Belief 10 Comments »Disambiguating Faith: How A Lack Of Belief In God May Differ From Various Kinds Of Beliefs That Gods Do Not Exist
June 7th, 2010 Daniel Fincke Yesterday on Friendly Atheist there was a vigorous debate in the comments section about whether there is a real and important difference between claiming one lacks belief in God (or gods) and outright claiming that there is no God (or gods). Here is a nice formulation of the argument that the distinction is an irrelevant [...]
Posted in Arguments Against The Existence of God, Arguments for the Existence of God, Atheism, Atheistic Ethics, Christianity, Disambiguating Faith, Epistemic Justification, Epistemology, Ethics, Evidence, Faith, Featured, God, Intellectual Vices, Intellectual Virtues, Metaphysics, New Atheism, Philosophy, Problem of Evil, Skepticism, Why I Am Not A Christian Tags: Agnostic Atheism, Agnostic Theism, Agnosticism, Friendly Atheist, Gnostic Atheism, Gnostic Theism, theism 24 Comments »Differently Abled Or Simply More Virtuous In One Respect
June 4th, 2010 Daniel Fincke Earlier today, I made a post comparing the different routes which atheists and those with Asperger’s syndrome take to their naturalistic explanations of causes of events that more religiously inclined people tend to chalk up to supernatural agency. Whereas religious people would attribute an illness or finding their true love to the purposeful forces, like God’s [...]
A Little Evidence That Atheists and Theists Don’t “Simply Think Differently”
June 4th, 2010 Daniel Fincke In order to respond to certain misunderstandings based on this post’s original, provocative title (Do Atheists Just Have Asperger’s?) I have re-edited it and retitled it. There is now a new opening paragraph and extra concluding paragraphs. It is often suggested that the difference between theists and atheists might simply stem from differences in their naturally given [...]
Evolution and Epistemology
May 17th, 2010 Daniel Fincke If our minds take to be true only what evolution has conditioned us to think is true for the sake of fitness for survival, does this mean that our beliefs cannot be genuinely true but only some sort of useful ways of thinking that do not necessarily track how the world actually is? And if [...]
Posted in Atheism, Epistemic Justification, Epistemology, Evolution, Featured, Nietzsche, Philosophy, Philosophy of Science Tags: "On Deriving and Defending An Axiology of the Will To Power", Alvin Plantinga, Eric Steinhart, Evolution and Truth, John Wilkins, Nietzsche's Perspectivist Theory of Truth, Perspectivism, Theories of Truth No Comments »
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