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October 9, 2009 at 3:30 pm 
Daniel Fincke Carlo Strenger argues the case that the statistical correlation between increased education and increased rates of atheism is not a coincidence or a matter of conformity for the sake of status among intellectuals:
Nick Spencer shows that there is indeed a correlation between educational level and atheism. In the US this phenomenon is far more pronounced: a recent Pew survey shows that among scientists in the US only one-third believe in God, as opposed to 83% in the general population.
For some reasons it seems to be anathema to say that there might be an intrinsic reason for the correlation between educational level and the rejection of religion: atheism takes training, and is more difficult. We accept that in medicine, physics and mathematics, but, for reasons of political correctness, it is very much considered a faux pas to say the old 19th-century thing: it takes education to develop a worldview based on science. It would be even more outrageous to say that the reasons for choosing atheism over religion might actually be valid, as the so-called new atheists have dared to claim. It seems that it has become something of a class-thing (not necessarily socio-economic, but of belonging to the politically-correct elite) to bash Dawkins, Dennett and Hitchens.
Cognitive psychologist Howard Gardner has shown that there is an essential difference between the unschooled mind which picks up certain things without formal training and the mature, schooled mind. The unschooled mind acquires sensorimotor and interpersonal skills, language – and stories. The human mind is naturally inclined to think in anthropomorphic terms. A child is more prone to explain the behaviour of dots on a computer screen through intentions and beliefs than through the workings of a computer programme.
Religions primarily function through stories that are easily remembered, because they’re counterintuitive. We more easily remember stories about people going to heaven, resurrecting the dead and splitting the waters of the sea, because these events (called “miracles” in religious parlance) run against what we know about the world. Hence religions are easily taught from age 3 onwards, and, as Richard Dawkins has pointed out angrily, it is very difficult for humans to let go of stories that have been inculcated by the authority figures we depend on as children.
Complex theories like classical physics (let alone relativity and quantum physics) and evolutionary theory can only be taught once the mind achieves the ability to abstract thought (what Piaget called “formal operations”), ie in adolescence. Understanding these theories requires training, and they are always at a disadvantage vis-a-vis anthropomorphic stories used by most religions.
Throw in the emotional reasons to want to believe in religious teachings (most prominently to believe that we will survive our deaths) and you have the deck stacked against scientific reasoning and in favor of religious sorts. Strenger claims this is an “evolutionary advantage” of religion. I have to chew on that last bit.
I also apparently need to think about how to incorporate more counter-intuitive stories in my lectures for explaining the finer and more abstract points of philosophy.
Your Thoughts?
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[...] even some of academia are Christians. Guess they fell for the same lie we ordinary folk have. Why Do Atheism Rates Correlate With Education Levels? [...]
There’s a few assumptions at work here. Aside from philosophy and perhaps religious studies (though the latter tends to assume the existence of God), I don’t know of any academic area that explores whether there is a god or not. So how does someone getting a Ph.D. in, say, chemistry, give one any more expertise in assessing whether there is a god or not? Hence, correlations between higher education levels and irreligiosity likely have less to do with individuals “discovering” through their studies the nonexistence of God than it reflects other cultural and psychological factors. For example, it’s in the nature of the practice of science to assume that there is some material explanation for anything studied (how else can one operate as a scientist?) – some have called this “methodological materialism.” It doesn’t, however, logically follow that since one’s practice assumes a material explanation for whatever one studies, then that means that there is in fact a material explanation for everything (philosophical materialism). However, it isn’t too much of a psychological leap (albeit a not necessarily logical one) to go from methodological materialism to philosophical materialism. Believing that through your research you (or human beings) can find the answer generates an attitude of ideological independence that may push some away from the notion that there is a mind greater out there than one’s own. That may explain why scientists tend to be atheists more than the general public, particularly since there is no area in science that explores whether there is a god or not.
But these are psychological reasons for higher education possibly pushing people away from religion,not logical ones or one based on intelligence. It would be in the same family of reasons for disbelief as someone rejecting God because they associate God with a father figure and they had a bad relationship with their father. I don’t think it’s a coincidence that the European nations with the nastiest histories of religious violence and religious persecution are more likely to reject religion. But that one’s history had a bad relationship with religion doesn’t logically entail that religion per se is wrong.
As for religious people believing stories told in childhood rather than discovering truth about the world, the assumption seems to be that atheists are distinguishable in not believing anything that they can’t logically demonstrate to be true, which is nonsense. Atheists as well, even when raised by atheists, are taught moral and political world views that assume truths that can’t be rationally or empirically justified.
A final assumption is that there’s a dichotomy between believing in science versus believing in religion, but obviously that’s not necessary. Plenty of religious people believe in both, and there’s no scientific reason why religion is less than plausible.
And I don’t know how much “training” it takes to be an atheist. Since there is no logically compelling reason to reject the existence of God (certainly no more logically compelling reason than there is to accept the existence of God), then what exactly is the “training?” Training in science? But again, science education doesn’t involve itself in the question of God’s existence. It may be that people who think intensely about(and immerse themselves in studies concerning) such things are more likely going to have doubts when there is no logically compelling reason to go one way or the other, but that doesn’t mean that such studies logically push one away from the idea of God as it means that when you have a question about which there is no logically compelling reason to go one way or the other, then there’s going to be more balanced representation on both sides of the question among those who think intensely about such a matter than in the near homogeneity on the issue in the general population.
I have addressed this false notion that methodological naturalism gives no reason to be philosophical naturalists here: http://camelswithhammers.com/2009/06/29/how-faith-is-not-like-other-revisable-reflexive-assumptions/
(And more on the same topic can be found in this follow up post: http://camelswithhammers.com/2009/06/30/against-faith-and-in-defense-of-naturalism-and-induction/ )
And, yes, science does undermine the case for belief in God: http://camelswithhammers.com/2010/12/24/how-theistic-evolution-is-nearly-as-much-a-denial-of-science-as-creationism/
And it’s false to say that the positions for and against God are logically equal when those most informed and versed in the issues are overwhelmingly non-theists (only 16% philosophy phd’s either lean towards or outright accept theism): http://camelswithhammers.com/2010/05/18/69-7-of-philosophy-phd-holders-accept-or-lean-towards-atheism/
And if you want to wade through some of the reasons for this strong philosophical opinion, I have laid them out many times before, including here http://camelswithhammers.com/2010/06/29/no-im-not-an-atheist-by-faith-here-are-my-arguments/
http://camelswithhammers.com/2010/06/30/how-i-know-various-kinds-of-gods-do-not-exist-based-on-scientific-and-philosophical-reasons/
http://camelswithhammers.com/2010/07/03/the-cosmological-argument-the-composition-fallacy-and-more-reasons-not-to-believe-in-god/
http://camelswithhammers.com/2010/07/07/do-new-atheists-unjustifiably-shirk-their-burden-for-evidence/
And even though atheists believe some things that they have not worked out all the reasons for themselves, that does not make them equal to theists who believe things which are positively counter-indicated by evidence. We also do not willfully commit ourselves to already unsupported beliefs in advance of any and all future counter-evidence as those who accept propositions by faith do. On this I have written the following posts (among others): http://camelswithhammers.com/2010/06/30/disambiguating-faith-not-all-beliefs-held-without-certainty-are-faith-beliefs/
http://camelswithhammers.com/2010/07/05/disambiguating-faith-defending-my-definition-of-faith-as-belief-or-trust-beyond-rational-warrant-2/
http://camelswithhammers.com/2010/07/05/disambiguating-faith-implicit-faith/
http://camelswithhammers.com/2010/06/21/disambiguating-faith-why-faith-is-unethical-or-in-defense-of-the-ethical-obligation-to-always-proportion-belief-to-evidence/
http://camelswithhammers.com/2010/06/21/disambiguating-faith-why-faith-is-unethical-or-in-defense-of-the-ethical-obligation-to-always-proportion-belief-to-evidence/
http://camelswithhammers.com/2009/06/29/how-faith-is-not-like-other-revisable-reflexive-assumptions/
I would be interested in your responses to any or all of these posts.
Good post Daniel. I think Stenger’s right about religion’s insidiously adapted survivable characteristics, but its memetic fitness is perhaps not the whole story. While it may have been like kudzu for primordial minds, on a large time scale, science and reason continue to gain mindshare. And not because naturalism is slowly becoming a better adapted competitor, but rather that intellectual sloppiness is becoming increasingly costly in a world so dependent upon advanced technology.